INTRODUCTION TO THE BRAHMA-JĀLA SUTTA
The phase of beliefs which this Suttanta is intended to meet, into which its argument fits, has been set out in some setail in the opening chapter of my ‘American Lectures.’ As there pointed out [1], the discussion which thus opens this series of dialogues forms also the first question in the Kathā Vatthu, and the first question in the Milinda. We cannot be far wrong if, in our endeavours to understand the real meaning of the original Buddhism, we attach as much weight to this question as did the author or authors of these ancient and authoritative Buddhist books.
The Suttanta sets out in sixty-two divisions [2] various speculations or theories in which the theorisers, going out always from various forms of the ancient view of a ‘soul’-a sort of subtle manikin inside the body but separate from it, and continuing, after it leaves the body, as a separate entity-attempt to reconstruct the past, or to arrange the future. All such speculation is condemned. And necessarily so, since the Buddhist philosophy is put together without this ancient idea of ‘soul.’
The Buddhist scheme endeavours, in other words, to include all the truth which previous thinkers had grafted on to the old savage theories of a semi-material, subtle, permanent entity inside the body, while rejecting those theories themselves; it endeavours to retain all the philosophic truth which previous thinkers had grafted on to the theosophies-the corollaries of the soul theories-while rejecting those theosophies themselves. The reasons given for this position are threefold firstly, that such speculators about ultimate things, either in the past or the future, have insufficient evidence. see only one side of the shield; [3] secondly, that such speculations do not lead to emancipation, to Arahatship; [4] and thirdly, that such theories are really derived from the hopes, the feelings, and the sensations arising from evanescent phenomena [5]-they belong, in other words, to the realm of hastily formed, empirical opinion (diṭṭhi), not to that of’ the higher wisdom (paññā). So that Buddhism, in the first place, holds a position somewhat similar to the modern Agnostic position. Secondly, while acknowledging the importance of feeling and of intellect, it lays special stress upon the regulation, the cultivation, of the Will [6]. And thirdly, it distinguishes between a lower and a higher wisdom, [7].
Several scholars, and especially—with more knowledge and detail—Dr. Karl Neumann, have maintained that the position of Buddhism in the history of Indian philosophy is analogous to that of Schopenhauer in European philosophy. On the other hand, it is maintained by Professor Deussen that Schopenhauer’s position is analogous to that of the Upanishads. The reconciliation will probably be found to be that what Buddhism took over, with more or less of modification, from the Upanishads, is about the same as that part of the Upanishad doctrine which is found, in European phraseology, in Schopenhauer; and what Buddhism rejected alto-ether is not to be found in Schopenhauer. He himself, who however knew both systems only from second-hand and inaccurate authorities, says, ‘If I am to take the results of my own Philosophy as the standard of truth, I should be obliged to concede to Buddhism the pre-eminence over other (systems of philosophy).’
However this question may be decided-and its discussion, at the necessary length, by a competent student of philosophy, is a very pressing want-it is certain from the details given in our Suttanta that there were then current in Northern India many other philosophic and theosophic speculations besides those the priests found it expedient to adopt, and have preserved for us in the Upanishads. And who can doubt but that some, if not all of them, may also have had their influence on the new doctrine? There was always much philosophising in India outside the narrow and inexact limits [\q xxvii/] of the so-called six Darsanas; and we have to thank Buddhist scholars for preserving, in their Pāli and Sanskrit works, the evidences of such philosophy as the priests wished to exclude from notice [8].
DIALOGUES OF THE BUDDHA DĪGHA NIKĀYA
[COLLECTION OF LONG DIALOGUES]
I. BRAHMA-JĀLA SUTTA [9]
The Perfect Net
1. Thus have I heard. The Blessed One was once going along the high road between Rājagaha and Nālandā [10] with a great company of the brethren, with about five hundred brethren. And Suppiya the mendicant [11] too was going along the high road between Rājagaha and Nālandā with his disciple the youth Brahmadatta. Now just then Suppiya the mendicant was speaking in many ways in dispraise of the Buddha, in dispraise of the Doctrine, in dispraise of the Order. But young Brahmadatta, his pupil, gave utterance, in many ways, to praise of the Buddha, to praise of the Doctrine, to praise of the Order. Thus. they two, teacher and pupil, holding opinions in direct contradiction one to the other, were following, step by [\q 002/] step, after the Blessed One and the company of the brethren.
2. Now the Blessed One put up at the royal rest-house in the Ambalaṭṭhikā. pleasance [12] to pass the night, and with him the company of the brethren. And so also did Suppiya the mendicant, and with him his young disciple Brahmadatta. And there, at the rest-house, these two carried on the same discussion as before.
[2] 3. And in the early dawn a number of the brethren assembled, as they rose up, in the pavilion; and this was the trend of the talk that sprang up among them, as they were seated there. ‘How wonderful a thing is it, brethren, and how strange that the Blessed One, he who knows and sees, the Arahat, the Buddha Supreme, should so clearly have perceived how various are the inclinations of men! For see how while Suppiya the mendicant speaks in many ways in dispraise of the Buddha, the Doctrine, and the Order, his own disciple young Brahmadatta, speaks, in as many ways, in praise of them. So do these two, teacher and pupil, follow step by step after the Blessed One and the company of the brethren, giving utterance to views in direct contradiction one to the other.’
4. Now the Blessed One, on realising what was the drift of their talk, went to the pavilion, and took his seat on the mat spread out for him. And when he had sat down he said: ‘What is the talk on which you are engaged sitting here, and what is the subject of the conversation between you?’ And they told him all. And he said:
[\q 003/] Minor Details Of Mere Morality
5. ‘Brethren, if outsiders should speak against me, or against the Doctrine, or against the Order, you should not on that account either bear malice, or suffer heart-burning, or feel ill will. If you, on that account, should be angry and hurt, that would stand in the way of your, own self-conquest. If, when others speak against us, you feel angry at that, and displeased, would you then be able to judge how far that speech of theirs is well said or ill?’
‘That would not be so, Sir.’
‘But when outsiders speak in dispraise of me, or of the Doctrine, or of the Order, you should unravel what is false and point it out as wrong, saying: “For this or that reason this is not the fact, that is not so, such a thing is not found among us, is not in us.”
6. ‘But also, brethren, if outsiders should speak in praise of me, in praise of the Doctrine, in praise of the Order, you should not, on that account, be filled with pleasure or gladness, or be lifted up in heart. Were you to be so that also would stand in the way of your self-conquest. When outsiders speak in praise of me, or of the Doctrine, or of the Order, you should acknowledge what is right to be the fact, saying: “For this or that reason this is the fact, that is so, such a thing is found among us, is in us.”
7. ‘It is in respect only of trifling things, of matters of little value, of mere morality, that an unconverted man, when praising the Tathāgata, would speak. And what are such trifling, minor details of mere morality that he would praise.
[4] [THE MORALITIES [13]. PART I.]
8. “Putting away the killing of living things, Gotama the recluse holds aloof from the destruction [\q 004/] of life. He has laid the cudgel and the sword aside, and ashamed of roughness, and full of mercy, he dwells compassionate and kind to all creatures that have life” It is thus that the unconverted man, when-speaking in praise of the Tathāgata, might speak [14].
‘Or he might say: “Putting away the taking of what has not been given, Gotama the recluse lived aloof from grasping what is not his own. He takes only what is given, and expecting that gifts will come [15], he passes his life in honesty and purity of heart.”
Or he might say: “Putting away unchastity, Gotama the recluse is chaste. He holds himself aloof, far off, from the vulgar practice, from the sexual act [16].”
9. ‘Or he might say: “Putting away lying words, Gotama the recluse holds himself aloof from falsehood. He speaks truth, from the truth he never swerves; faithful and trustworthy, he breaks not his word to the world.”
‘Or he might say: “Putting away slander, Gotama the recluse holds himself aloof from calumny. What he hears here he repeats not elsewhere to raise a quarrel [\q 005/] against the people here; what he hears elsewhere he repeats not here to raise a quarrel against the people there. Thus does he live as a binder together of those who are divided, an encourager of those who are friends, a peacemaker, a lover of peace, impassioned for peace, a speaker of words that make for peace.”
‘Or he might say: “Putting- away rudeness of speech, Gotama the recluse holds himself aloof from harsh language. Whatsoever word is blameless, pleasant to the car, lovely, reaching to the heart, urbane [17], pleasing to the people, beloved of the people-such are words he speaks.”
‘Or he might say: “Putting away frivolous talk [18],Gotama the recluse holds himself aloof from vain conversation. In season he speaks, in accordance with the facts, words full of meaning, on religion, on the discipline of the Order. He speaks, and at the right time, words worthy to be laid up in one’s heart, [5] fitly illustrated, clearly divided, to the point.”
10. ‘Or he might say:
He takes but one meal a day, not eating at night, refraining from food after hours (after midday).
He refrains from being a spectator at shows at fairs, with nautch dances, singing, and music.
He abstains from wearing, adorning, or ornamenting himself with garlands, scents, and unguents.
He abstains from the use of large and lofty beds.
He abstains from accepting silver or gold.
He abstains from accepting uncooked grain.
He abstains from accepting raw meat.
He abstains from accepting women or girls.
He abstains from accepting bondmen or bondwomen.
[\q 006/] He abstains from accepting sheep or goats.
He abstains from accepting fowls or swine.
He abstains from accepting elephants, cattle. horses, and mares.
He abstains from accepting cultivated fields or waste.
He abstains from the acting as a, go-between or messenger.
He abstains from buying and selling.
He abstains from cheating with scales or bronzes [20] or measures.
He abstains from the crooked ways of bribery, cheating, and fraud.
He abstains from maiming, murder, putting in bonds, highway robbery, dacoity, and violence.”
‘Such are the things, brethren, which an unconverted man, when speaking in praise of the Tathāgata, might say.’
11. ‘Or he might say: “Whereas some recluses and Brahmans, while living on food provided by the faithful, continue addicted to the injury of seedlings and growing plants whether propagated from roots or cuttings or joints or buddings or seeds [21]-Gotama the [\q 007/] recluse holds aloof from such injury to seedlings and growing plants.”
12. [6] ‘Or he might say: “Whereas some recluses and Brahmans, while living on food provided by the faithful, continue addicted to the use of things stored up; stores, to wit, of foods, drinks, clothing, equipages, bedding, perfumes, and curry-stuffs [22]- Gotama the recluse holds aloof from such use of things stored up.”
13. ‘Or he might say: “Whereas some recluses and Brahmans while living on food provided by the faithful, continue addicted to visiting shows [23]; that is to say,
(2) Singing of songs (gītaṃ).
(3) Instrumental music (vāditaṃ).
(4) Shows at fairs (pekkhaṃ) [25].
[\q 008/] (5) Ballad recitations (akkhānaṃ) [26].
(6) Hand music (pāṇissaraṃ) [27].
(7) The chanting of bards (vetālaṃ) [28].
(8) Tam – tam playing (kumbhathūnaṃ) [29]. [\q 009/]
(9) Fairy scenes (sobhanagarakaṃ) [30].
(10) Acrobatic feats by Caṇḍālas (caṇḍāla-vaṃsa-dhopanaṃ) [31].
(11) Combats of elephants, horses, buffaloes, bulls, goats, rams, cocks, and quails.
(12) Bouts at quarter- staff [32], boxing, wrestling [33].
(13-16) Sham-fights, roll-calls, manoeuvres, reviews [34].”
14. ‘Or. he might say: “Whereas some recluses and Brahmans, while living on food provided by the faithful, continue addicted to games and recreations [35]; that is to say,
(2) The same games [\q 010/] played by imagining such boards in the air [37].
(3) Keeping going over diagrams drawn on the ground so that one steps only where one ought to go [38].
(4) Either removing the pieces or men from a heap with one’s nail, or putting them into a heap, in each case without shaking it. He who shakes the heap, loses [39]
(5) Throwing dice [40]
(6) Hitting a short stick with a long one [41].
(7) Dipping the hand with the fingers stretched out in lac, or red dye, or flower-water, and striking the wet hand on the ground or on a wall, ‘calling out ‘What shell it be?’ and showing the form required -elephants, horses, &c. [42]
(8) Games with balls [43]
(9) Blowing through toy pipes made of leaves [44]
(10) Ploughing with. toy ploughs [45]
(11) Turning summersaults [46].
(12) Playing with toy windmills made of palm-leaves [47].
[\q 011/] (13) Playing with toy measures made of palm-leaves.
(14, 15) Playing with toy carts or toy bows [48]
(16) Guessing at letters traced in the air, or on a. playfellow’s back [49]
(17) Guessing the play fellow’s thoughts.,
(18) Mimicry of deformities.”
15. ‘Or he might say: “Whereas some recluses and Brahmans, while living on food provided by the faithful, continue addicted to the use of high and large couches; that is to say [50],
(2) Divans with animal figures carved on the sup-ports (pallanko) [52].
[\q 012/] 1. BRAHMA-JĀLA SUTTA.
(3) Goats’ hair coverlets with very long fleece (gonako) [53].
(4) Patchwork counterpanes of many colours (cittakā).
(5) White blankets (Paṭikā).
(6) Woollen coverlets embroidered with flowers (paṭalikā).
(7) Quilts stuffed with cotton wool (tūlikā).
(8) Coverlets embroidered with figures of lions, tigers, &c. (vikatikā).
(9) Rugs with fur on both sides (uddalomī).
(10) Rugs with fur on one side (ekantalomī).
(11) Coverlets embroidered with gems(kaṭṭhissaṃ).
(12) Silk coverlets (koseyyaṃ).
(13) Carpets large enough for sixteen dancers (kuttakaṃ).
(14-16) Elephant, horse, and chariot rugs.
(17) Rugs of antelope skins sewn together (ajina-paveṇi).
(18) Rugs of skins of the plantain antelope.
(19) Carpets with awnings [\q 013/] above them (sauttara-cchadaṃ).
(20) Sofas with red pillows for the head and feet.”
patting the limbs with clubs after the manner of wrestlers [54].
The use of mirrors, eye-ointments, garlands,
rouge, cosmetics, bracelets, necklaces,
walking-sticks, reed cases for drugs, rapiers,
sunshades, embroidered slippers, turbans, diadems,
whisks of the yak’s tail, and long-fringed white robes,”
17. ‘Or he might say: “Whereas some recluses and Brahmans, while living on food provided by the faithful, continue addicted to such low conversation as these:
Tales of kings, of robbers, of ministers of state, tales of war, of terrors, of battles; talk about foods and drinks, clothes, beds, garlands, perfumes; talks about relationships, equipages, villages, town, cities, and countries; tales about women [8], and about heroes; gossip at street corners [56], or places whence [\q 014/] water is fetched; ghost stories [57]; desultory talk [58]; speculations about the creation of the land or sea [59], or about existence and non-existence [60].”
‘Gotama the recluse holds aloof from such low conversation.’
18. ‘Or he might say: “Whereas some recluses and Brahmans, while living on food provided by the faithful, continue addicted to the use of wrangling phrases [61] such as
How should you know about this doctrine and discipline?
“You have fallen into wrong views. It is I who am in the right.”
“I am speaking to the point, you are not [62]”
“You are putting last what ought to come first, first what ought to come last [63].”
“What you’ve excogitated so long, that’s all quite upset.”
[\q 015/] “Your challenge has been taken up [64]
“You are proved to be wrong [65].”
“Set to work to clear your views [66].”
“Disentangle yourself if you can [67].”
19. ‘Or he might say: “Whereas some recluses and Brahmans, while living on food provided by the faithful, continue addicted to taking messages, going on errands, and acting as go-betweens; to wit, on kings, ministers of state, Kshatriyas, Brahmans, or young men, saying: ‘Go there, come hither, take this with you, bring that from thence.”
‘Gotama the recluse abstains from such servile duties.’
20. ‘Or he might say: “Whereas some recluses and Brahmans, while living on food provided by the faithful, are tricksters [68], droners out (of holy words for pay) [69], [\q 016/] diviners [70], and exorcists [71], ever hungering to add gain to gain [72] – Gotama the recluse holds aloof from such deception and patter.”’
Here ends the Majjhima Sīla [the Longer Paragraphs on Conduct].
[9] 2 I. ‘Or he might say: “Whereas some recluses and Brahmans, while living on food provided by the faithful, earn their living by wrong means of livelihood, by low arts, such as these:
(2) Divining by means of omens and signs [74].
(3) Auguries drawn from thunderbolts and other celestial portents [75].
[\q 017/] (4) Prognostication by interpreting dreams [76].
(5) Fortune-telling from marks on the body [77].
(6) Auguries from the marks on cloth gnawed by mice [78].
(7) Sacrificing to Agni [79].
(8) Offering oblations from a spoon [80].
(9-13) Making offerings to gods of husks, of the red powder between the grain and the husk, of husked grain ready for boiling, of ghee, and of oil [81].
(14) Sacrificing by spewing mustard seeds, &c., into the fire out of one’s mouth [82].
(15) Drawing blood from one’s right knee as a sacrifice to the gods [83].
[\q 018/] (16) Looking at the knuckles, &c., and, after muttering a charm, divining whether a man is well born or lucky or not [84].
(17) Determining whether the site, for a proposed house or pleasance, is lucky or not [85].
(18) Advising on customary law [86].
(19) Laying demons in a cemetery [87].
(20) Laying ghosts [88].
(21) Knowledge of the charms to be used when lodging in an earth house [89].
(22) Snake charming [90].
[\q 019/] (23) The poison craft [91].
(24) The scorpion craft [92].
(25) The mouse craft [93].
(26) The bird craft [94].
(27) The crow craft [95].
(28) Foretelling the number of years that a man has yet to live.
(29) Giving charms to ward off arrows [96].
(30) The animal wheel [97].”
22. ‘Or he might say: “Whereas some recluses and Brahmans, while living on food provided by the faithful, earn their living by wrong means of livelihood, by low arts, such as these:
Knowledge of the signs of good and bad qualities in the following things and of the marks in them denoting the health or luck of their owners: to wit, gems [98], staves, garments, swords, arrows, bows, other weapons, women [99], men [100], boys [101], girls [102], slaves, slave-girls, elephants, horses, buffaloes, bulls, oxen, goats [103], sheep [104], fowls [105], quails [106], iguanas [107], earrings [108], tortoises, and other animals.”
‘Gotama the recluse holds aloof from such low arts.’
23. ‘Or he might say: “Whereas some recluses [\q 020/] and Brahmans, while living on food provided by the faithful, earn their living by wrong means of livelihood, by low arts, such as soothsaying, to the effect that:
The chiefs will march back.
The home chiefs will attack, and the enemies’ retreat.
The enemies’ chiefs will attack, and ours will retreat.
The home chiefs will gain the victory, and the foreign chiefs suffer defeat.
The foreign chiefs will gain the victory, and ours will suffer defeat [109]
Thus will there be victory on this side, defeat on that.”
2 4. ‘Or he might say: “Whereas some recluses and Brahmans, while living on food provided by the faithful, earn their living by wrong means of livelihood, by such low arts as foretelling
(2) There will be en eclipse of the sun.
(3) There will be en eclipse of a star (nakshatra) [110].
(4) There will be aberration of the sun or the moon.
(5) The sun or the moon will return to its usual path.
(6) There will be aberrations of the stars.
(7) The stars will return to their usual course [111].
[\q 021/] (8) There will be a fall of meteors [112]
(9) There will be a jungle fire [113].
(10) The-re will be an earthquake.
(11) The god will thunder.
(12-15) There will be rising and setting, clearness and dimness, of the sun or the moon or the stars [114], or foretelling of each of these fifteen phenomena that they will betoken such and such a result.” [11]
Foretelling a deficient rainfall.
Foretelling a good harvest
Foretelling scarcity of food.
Foretelling tranquillity.
Foretelling disturbances.
Foretelling a pestilence.
Foretelling a healthy season.
Counting on the fingers [115].
[\q 022/] Counting without using the fingers [116].
Summing up large totals [117].
Composing ballads, poetising [118].
Casuistry, sophistry [119].”
26. ‘Or he might say: “Whereas some recluses and Brahmans, while living on food provided by the faithful, earn their living by wrong means of livelihood, by low arts, such as
(2) Arranging a lucky day for marriages in which the bride or bridegroom is sent
forth [121].
(3) Fixing a lucky time for the conclusion of treaties of peace [or using charms to procure harmony] [122].
(4) Fixing a lucky time for the outbreak of hostilities [or using charms to make discord] [123].
(5) Fixing-a lucky time for the calling in of debts [or charms for success in throwing dice] [124].
(6) Fixing a lucky time for the expenditure of money [or charms to bring ill luck to an opponent throwing dice] [125].
(7) Using charms to make people lucky [126].
(8) Using charms to make people unlucky.
(9) Using charms to procure abortion.
(10) Incantations to bring on dumbness.
(11) Incantations to keep a man’s jaws fixed.
(12) Incantations to make a man throw up his hands.
(13) Incantations to bring on deafness, [127].
[\q 024/] (14) Obtaining oracular answers by means of the magic mirror [128].
(15) Obtaining oracular answers through a girl possessed [129].
(16) Obtaining oracular answers from a god [130].
(17) The worship of the Sun [131].
(18) The worship of the Great One [132].
(19) Bringing forth flames from one’s mouth.
(20) Invoking Siri, the goddess of Luck [133].”
[\q 025/] [12] 27. ‘Or he might say: “Whereas some recluses and Brahmans, while living on food provided by, the faithful, earn their living by wrong means of livelihood, by low arts, such as these:
(2) Paying such vows.
(3) Repeating charms while lodging in an earth house [134].
(4) Causing virility [135].
(S) Making a man impotent [136].
(6) Fixing on lucky sites for dwelling [137].
(7) Consecrating sites [138].
(8) Ceremonial rinsings of the month.
(9) Ceremonial bathings [139].
(10) Offering sacrifices.
(11-14) Administering emetics and purgatives.
(15) Purging people to relieve the head (that is by giving drugs to make people sneeze).
(16) Oiling people’s ears (either to make them grow or to heal sores on them).
(17) Satisfying people’s eyes (soothing them by dropping medicinal oils into them).
(18) Administering drugs through the nose, [140].
(19) Applying collyrium to the eyes.
(20) Giving medical ointment for the eyes.
(21) Practising as an oculist.
(22) Practising as a surgeon.
(23) Practising as a doctor for children.
[\q 026/] I. BRAHMA-JĀLA SUTTA.
(24) Administering roots and drugs.
(25) Administering medicines in rotation [141]”
‘These, brethren, are the trifling matters, the minor details, of mere morality, of which the unconverted man when praising the Tathāgata, might speak.’
Here end the Long Paragraphs on Conduct.
28. ‘There are, brethren, other things profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise [142] These things the Tathāgata, having himself realised them and seen them face to face, hath set forth; and it is of them that they, who would rightly praise the Tathāgata in accordance with the truth, should speak.
‘And what are they?
29. ‘There are recluses and Brahmans, brethren, who reconstruct the ultimate beginnings of things, whose speculations are concerned with the ultimate past [143], and who on eighteen grounds put forward various [\q 027/] assertions regarding it. [13] And about what, with reference to what, do those venerable ones do so?
30. ‘There are, brethren, some recluses and Brahmans who are Eternalists [144], and who, on four grounds, proclaim that both the soul and the world are eternal. And about what, with reference to what, do those venerable ones do so?
31. ‘In the first place, brethren, some recluse or Brahman by means of ardour, of exertion, of application, of earnestness, of careful thought, reaches up to such rapture of heart that, rapt in heart, he calls to mind his various dwelling-places in times gone by-in one birth, or in two, or three, or four, or five, or ten, or twenty, or thirty, or forty, or fifty, or a hundred, or a thousand, or in several hundreds or thousands or laks of births-to the effect that ” There I had such and such a name, was of such and such a lineage [145] and caste [146], lived on such and such food, experienced such and such pains and pleasures, had such and such a span of years. And when I fell from thence I was reborn in such and such a place tinder such and such a name, in such and such a lineage and caste, living on such and such food, experiencing such and such pains and pleasures, with such and such a span of years. And when I fell from thence I was reborn here.” Thus does he recollect, in full detail both of condition and of custom, his various dwelling [\q 028/] places in times zone by. [14] And he says to himself: “Eternal is the soul; and the world, giving birth to nothing new, is stedfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed. and though these living creatures transmigrate and pass away, fall from one state of existence and spring up in another, yet they ale forever and ever. And why must that be so? Because I, by means of ardour of exertion of application of earnestness of careful thought, can reach up to such rapture of heart that, rapt in heart, I can call to mind, and in full detail both of condition and of custom, my various dwelling-places in times gone by-by that is it that I know this-that the soul is eternal; and that the world, giving birth to nothing new, is stedfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed; and that though these living creatures transmigrate and pass away, fall from one state of existence and spring up in another, yet they are forever and ever.”
‘This, brethren, is the first state of things on account of which, starting from which, some recluses and Brahmans are Eternalists, and maintain that both the soul and the world are eternal.
32. [The second case put is in all respects the same save that the previous births thus called to mind extend over a still longer period up to ten world aeons [147].]
33. [15] [The third case put is in all respects the same save that the previous births thus called to mind extend over a still longer period up to forty world aeons.]
34. [16] ‘And in the fourth place, brethren, on what ground is it, starting from what, that those venerable ones are Eternalists, and maintain that the soul and the world are eternal.
‘In this case, brethren, some recluse or Brahman [\q 029/] is addicted to logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusion of his own, beaten out by his argumentations and based on his sophistry [148]; “Eternal is the soul; and the world, giving birth to nothing new is steadfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed; and these living creatures, though they transmigrate and pass away, fall from one state of existence and spring up in another, yet they are forever and ever.
“’This, brethren, is the fourth state of things on the ground of which, starting from which, some recluses and Brahmans are Eternalists, and maintain that the soul and the world are eternal.
35. ‘These, brethren, are those recluses and Brahmans who are Eternalists, and in four ways maintain that both the soul and the world are eternal. For whosoever of the recluses and Brahmans are such and maintain this, they do so in these four ways, or in one or other of the same, and outside these there is no way in which this opinion is arrived at.
36. ‘Now of these, brethren, the Tathāgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. [17] That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations) [149]; and having that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart [150], realised the way of escape from them [151], has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sensations. their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on; and not grasping after any (of [\q 030/] those things men are eager for) he, the Tathāgata, is quite set free [152].
37. ‘These [153], brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic,. subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathāgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathāgata in accordance with the truth, should speak.’
Here ends the First Portion for Recitation.
Chapter II
The Eternalists
1. ‘There are, brethren, some recluses and Brahmans who are Eternalists with regard to some things, and in regard to others Non-Eternalists; who on four grounds maintain that the soul and the world are partly eternal and partly not.
‘And what is it that these venerable ones depend upon, what is it that they start from, in arriving at this conclusion?
2. ‘Now there comes a time, brethren, when, sooner or later, after the lapse of a long long period, this world-system passes away. And when this happens beings have mostly been reborn in the World of Radiance, and there they dwell made of mind, feeding on joy, radiating light from themselves, traversing the air, continuing in glory; and thus they remain for a long long period of time.
3. Now there comes also a time, brethren, when,[\q 031/] sooner or later, this world-system begins to re-evolve. When this happens the Palace of Brahmā appears, but it is empty. And some being or other, either because his span of years has passed or his merit is exhausted, falls from that World -of Radiance, and comes to life in the Palace of Brahmā. And there also he lives made of mind, feeding on joy, radiating light from himself, traversing the air, continuing in glory; and thus does he remain for a long long period of time.
4. ‘Now there arises in him, from his dwelling there so long alone, a dissatisfaction and a longing: “O! would that other beings might come to join me in this place! ” And just then, either because their span of years had passed or their merit was exhausted, other beings fall from the World of Radiance, and appear in the Palace of Brahma as companions to him, and in all respects like him. [18]
5. ‘On this, brethren, the one who was first reborn thinks thus to himself: “I am Brahmā, the Great Brahmā, the Supreme One, the Mighty, the All-seeing, the Ruler, the Lord of all, the Maker, the Creator, the Chief of all, appointing to each his place, the Ancient of days the Father of all that are and are to be [154]. ‘These other beings are of my creation. And why is that so? A while ago I thought, ‘Would that they might come!’ And on my mental aspiration, behold the beings came.”
‘And those beings themselves, too, think thus: “This must be Brahmā,, the Great Brahmā, the Supreme, the Mighty, the All-seeing, the Ruler, the Lord of all, the Maker, the Creator, the Chief of all, appointing to each his place, the Ancient of days, the Father of all that are [\q 032/] and are to be. And we must have been created by him. And why? Because, as we see, it was he who was here first, and we came after that.”
6. ‘On this, brethren, the one who first came into existence there is of longer life, and more glorious, and more powerful than those who appeared after him. And it might well be, brethren, that some being on his falling from that state, should come hither. And having come hither he might go forth from the household life into the homeless state. And having thus become a recluse he, by reason of ardour of exertion of application of earnestness of careful thought, reaches up to such rapture of heart that, rapt in heart, he calls to mind his last dwelling-place, but not the previous ones. He says to himself: “That illustrious Brahmā, the Great Brahmā, the Supreme One, the Mighty, the All-seeing, the Ruler, the Lord of all, the Maker, the Creator, the Chief of all, appointing to each his place, the Ancient of days, the Father of all that are and are to be, he by whom we were created, he is stedfast immutable eternal, of a nature that knows no change, and he will remain so forever and ever. But we who were created by him have come hither as being impermanent mutable limited in duration of life.
[19] ‘This, brethren, is the first state of things on account of which, starting out from which, some recluses and Brahmans, being Eternalists as to some things, and Non-eternalists as to others, maintain that the soul and the world are partly eternal and partly not.
7. ‘And what is the second?
‘There are, brethren, certain gods called the “Debauched by Pleasure” [155]. ‘For ages they pass their time in the pursuit of the laughter and sport of sensual lusts. In consequence thereof their self-possession is corrupted, and through the loss of their self-control they fall from that state [156].
[\q 033/] 8. ‘Now it might well be, brethren, that some being, on his falling from that state, should come hither. And having come hither he should, as in the last case, become a recluse, and acquire the power of recollecting his last birth, but only his last one.
9. ‘And he would say to himself: “Those gods who are not debauched by pleasure are stedfast, immutable, eternal, of a nature that knows no change, and they will remain so forever and ever. [20] But we-who fell from that state, having lost our self-control through being debauched by pleasure-we have come hither as being impermanent, mutable, limited in duration of life.”
10. ‘And what is the third?
‘There are, brethren, certain gods called “the Debauched in Mind [157].” They burn continually with envy [158] one against another, and being thus irritated, their hearts become ill-disposed towards each other, and being thus debauched, their bodies become feeble, and their minds imbecile. And those gods fall from that state.
11. ‘Now it might well be, brethren, that some [\q 034/] being, on his falling from that state, should come hither; and having become a recluse should ‘as in the other cases, acquire the power of recollecting his last birth, but only his last one.
12. ‘And lie would say to himself: “Those gods who are not debauched in mind do not continually burn with envy against each other, so their hearts do not become evil disposed one towards another, nor their bodies feeble and their minds imbecile. Therefore they fall not from that state; they are stedfast, immutable, eternal, of a nature that knows no change, and they will remain so forever and ever. [21] But we were corrupted in mind, being constantly excited by envy against one another. And being thus envious and corrupt our bodies became feeble, and our minds imbecile, and we fell from that state, and have come hither as Being impermanent, mutable, limited in duration of life.”
‘This, brethren, is the third case.
13. ‘And what is the fourth?
In this case, brethren, some recluse or Brahman is addicted to logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusion of his own, beaten out by his argumentations and based on his sophistry: “This which is called eye and ear and nose and tongue and body is a self which is impermanent, unstable, not eternal, subject to change. But this which is called heart, or mind, or consciousness is a self which is permanent, stedfast, eternal, and knows no change, and it will remain forever and ever [159].
This, brethren, is the fourth state of things, on the ground of which, starting from which, some recluses [\q 035/] and Brahmans are Semi-eternalists, and in four ways maintain that the soul and the world are in some respects eternal, and in some not.
14. ‘These, brethren, are those recluses and Brahmans who are Semi-eternalists, and in four ways maintain that the soul and the world are eternal in some cases and not in others. For whosoever of the recluses and Brahmans are such and maintain this, they do so in these four ways or in one or other of the same; and outside these there is no way in which this opinion is arrived at.
[22] 15. ‘Now of these, brethren, the Tathāgata knows that these speculations, thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations); and having that knowledge, he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realised the way of escape from them, has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sensations, their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on, and not grasping after any (of those things men are eager for) he, the Tathāgata, is quite set free.
‘These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathāgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathāgata in accordance with the truth, should speak.’
The Extensionists
16. ‘There are, brethren, certain recluses and Brahmans who are Extensionists [160], and who in four ways set forth the infinity or finiteness of the world. And [\q 036/] on what ground, starting out from what, do these venerable ones maintain this?
17. ‘In the first case, brethren, some recluse or Brahman, by means of ardour of exertion of application of earnestness of careful thought, reaches up to such rapture of heart that he, rapt in heart., dwells in the world imagining it finite. And he says thus to himself: “Finite is the world, so that a path could be traced round it [161]. And why is this so? Since I, by means of ardour of exertion of application of earnestness of careful thought, can reach up to such rapture of heart that, rapt in heart, I dwell in the world perceiving it to be finite-by that I know this.”
‘This, brethren, is the first case.
18. ‘The second case is similar, only that the conclusion is: [23] ‘Infinite is the world without a limit. Those recluses and Brahmans who say it is finite, so that a path could be traced round it, are wrong [162].”
19. ‘The third case is similar, only that the conclusion is that he imagines the world limited in the upward and downward directions, but infinite across; he declares both the former conclusions to be wrong.
20. ‘In the fourth case, brethren, some recluse or Brahman is addicted to logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusion of his own, beaten out by his argumentations and based on his sophistry: “This world is neither finite nor yet infinite. Those recluses and Brahmans who maintain either the first, or the second, or the third conclusion, are wrong. [24] Neither is the world finite, nor is it infinite.”
‘This, brethren, is the fourth case.
[\q 037/] 21. ‘These, brethren, are those recluses and Brahmans who are Extensionists, and in four ways maintain that the world is finite or infinite. For whosoever of the recluses and Brahmans are such, and maintain this, they do so in these four ways or in one or other of the same; and outside these there is no way in which this opinion is arrived at.
22. ‘Now of these, brethren, the Tathāgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations); and having that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realised the way of escape from them, has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sensations, their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on, and not grasping after any (of those things men are eager for) he, the Tathāgata, is quite set free.
‘These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathāgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathāgata in accordance with the truth, should speak.’
The Eel-Wrigglers
23. ‘There are, brethren, some recluses and Brahmans who wriggle like eels; and when a question is put to them on this or that they resort to equivocation, to eel-wriggling, and this in four ways.
‘Now on what ground starting out from what, do those venerable ones do so?
24. ‘In the first place, brethren, some recluse or Brahman does not understand the good in its real nature, nor the evil. And he thinks: -“I neither know [\q 038/] the good, as it really is, nor the evil. [25] That being so, were I to pronounce this to be good or that to be evil, I might be influenced therein by my feelings or desires, by ill will or resentment. And under these circumstances I might be wrong; and my having been wrong might cause me the pain of remorse; and the sense of remorse might become a hindrance to me [163].” Thus fearing and abhorring the being wrong in an expressed opinion, he will neither declare anything to be good, nor to be bad; but on a question being put to him on this or that, he resorts to eel-wriggling. to equivocation, and says: “I don’t take it thus. I don’t take it the other way. But I advance no different opinion. And I don’t deny your position. And I don’t say it is neither the one, nor the other [164].
‘This is the first case.
‘And what is the second?
25. [The same, reading] Under these circumstances I might fall into that grasping condition of heart which causes rebirth; and my so falling might cause me the pain of remorse; and the sense of remorse might become a hindrance to me.” [26] Thus fearing and abhorring the falling into that state [165], he will neither declare (&c., as in Section 24).
‘This is the second case.
‘And what is the third?
26. [The same, reading] ‘And he thinks: “I neither know the good, as it really is, nor the evil. Now there are recluses and Brahmans who are clever, subtle, experienced in controversy, hair-splitters, who ,go about, methinks, breaking to pieces by their wisdom [\q 039/] the speculations of others. Were I to pronounce this to be good, or that to be evil, these men might join issue with me, call upon me for my reasons, point out my errors. And on their doing so, I might be unable to explain [166]. And that might cause me the pain of remorse; and the sense of remorse might become a hindrance to me.” Thus fearing and abhorring the joinder of issue, he will neither declare (&c., as in Section 24).
‘This is the third case. [27]
‘And what is the fourth?
27. ‘In this case, brethren, some recluse or Brahman is dull, stupid. And it is by reason of his dullness, his stupidity, that when a question on this or that is put to him, he resorts to equivocation, to wriggling, like an eel: “If you ask me whether there is another world,—well, if I thought there were, I would say so. But I don’t say so. And I don’t think it is thus or thus. And I don’t think it is otherwise. And I don’t deny it. And I don’t say there neither is, nor is not, another world.” Thus does he equivocate, and in like manner about each of such propositions as the following [167]:
(3) There both is, and is not, another world.
(4) There neither is, nor is not, another world.
(2) There are no such beings.
(3) There both are, and are not, such beings.
(4) There neither are, nor are not, such beings.
(3) There both is, and is not.
(4) There neither is, nor is not.
(2) He does not.
(3) H e both does, and does not.
(4) He neither does, nor does not.
[28] 28. ‘These, brethren, are those recluses and Brahmans who wriggle like eels; and who, when a question is put to them on this or that, resort to equivocation, to eel-wriggling; and that in four ways. For whosoever do so, they do so in these four ways, or in one or other of the same; there is no other way in which they do so.
29. ‘Now of these, brethren, the Tathāgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations); and having that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realised the way of escape from them, has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sensations, their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on, and not grasping after any (of those things men are eager for) he, the Tathāgata, is quite set free.
‘These brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, [\q 041/] sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathāgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathāgata in accordance with the truth, should speak.’
The Fortuitous-Originists
30. ‘There are, brethren, some recluses and Brahmans who are Fortuitous-Originists [170], and who in two ways maintain that the soul and the world arise without a cause. And on what ground, starting out from what, do they do so?
31. ‘There are, brethren, certain gods called Unconscious Beings [171]. As soon as an idea occurs to them they fall from that state. Now it may well be, brethren, that a being, on falling from that state, should come hither; and having come hither he might go forth from the household life into the homeless state. And having thus become a recluse he, by reason of ardour and so on (as in the other cases) reaches up to such rapture of heart that, rapt in heart, he calls to mind how that idea occurred to him, but not more than that. He says to himself: “Fortuitous [\q 042/] in origin are the soul and the world. And why so? Because formerly I was not, but now am. Having not been, I have come to be.” [29]
‘This, brethren, is the first state of things on account of which, starting out from which some recluses and Brahmans become Fortuitous-Originists, and maintain that the soul and the world arise without a cause.
32,33 ‘And what is the second?
In this case, brethren, some recluse or Brahman is addicted to logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusion of his own, beaten out by his argumentations, and based on his sophistry: “The soul and the world arose without a cause.”
‘This, brethren, is the second case.
34. ‘Now of these, brethren, the Tathāgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations); and having that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realised the way of escape from them, has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sensations, their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on, and not grasping after any (of those things men are eager for) he, the Tathāgata, is quite set free.
‘These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathāgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathāgata in accordance with the truth, should speak.’
[30] 35. ‘These, brethren, are the recluses and Brahmans who reconstruct the ultimate beginnings of things, whose speculations are concerned with the [\q 043/] ultimate past, and who on eighteen grounds put forward various assertions regarding the past [172]. And those who do so, all of them, do so in one or other of these eighteen ways. There is none beside.
36. ‘Now of these, brethren, the Tathāgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations); and having that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realised the way of escape from them, has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sensations, their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on, and not grasping after any (of those things men are eager for) he, the Tathāgata, is quite set free.
‘These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathāgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathāgata in accordance with the truth, should speak.’
The Believers in Future Life
37. ‘There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmans who arrange the future, whose speculations are concerned with the future, and who on forty-four grounds put forward various assertions regarding the future. And on account of what, starting out from what, do they do so?
38. ‘There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmans who [31] hold the doctrine of a conscious existence after death [173], and who maintain in sixteen ways that [\q 044/] the soul after death is conscious. And how do they do so?
‘They say of the soul: “The soul after death, not subject to decay, and conscious,
(2 is formless [175],
(3) has, and has not, form,
(4) neither has, nor has not, form,
(5) is finite,
(6) is infinite,
(7) is both,
(8) is neither,
(9) has one mode of consciousness,
(10) has various modes of consciousness
(11) has limited consciousness
(12) has infinite consciousness
(13) is altogether happy
(14) is altogether miserable
(15) is both
(16) is neither.”
40. ‘Now of these, brethren, the Tathāgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations) and having that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realised the way of escape from them, has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing away of sensations, their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on, and not grasping after any (of those things men are eager for) he, the Tathāgata, is quite set free.
‘These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible. only by the wise, which the Tathāgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly raise the Tathāgata in accordance with the truth, should speak.’
Here ends the Second Portion for Recitation. [32]
Chapter III
1. ‘There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmans who hold the doctrine of an unconscious existence after death, and who maintain in eight ways that the soul after death is unconscious. And how do they do so?
2. ‘They say of the soul: “The soul after death, not subject to decay, and unconscious,
(2) is formless,
(3) has, and has not, form,
(4) neither has, nor has not form
(5) is finite,
(6) is infinite,
(7) is both,
(8) is neither.
4. ‘Now of these, brethren, the Tathāgata knows that these speculations thus arrived at, thus insisted on, will have such and such a result, such and such an effect on the future condition of those who trust in them. That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond (far better than those speculations); and having that knowledge he is not puffed up, and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realised the [\q 046/] way of escape from them, has understood, as they really are, the rising up and passing, away of sensations, their sweet taste, their dancer, how they cannot be relied on, and not grasping after any (of those things men are eager for) he, the Tathāgata is quite set free.
‘These, brethren, are those other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathāgata, having himself realised and seen face to face, hath set forth and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathāgata in, accordance with the truth, should speak.
5-8. [33] [Similar sections for those who maintain in eight ways that the soul after death is neither conscious nor unconscious.]
The Annihilationists
[176] 9. [34] ‘There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmans who are Annihilationists, who in seven ways maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being [177]. And on account of what, starting out from what, do they do so?
10. ‘In the first place, brethren, some recluse or Brahman puts forth the following opinion, the following view: “Since, Sir, this soul has form, is built up of the four elements, and is the offspring of father and mother, it is cut off, destroyed, on the dissolution of the body; and does not continue after death; and then, Sir, the soul is completely annihilated.” Thus is it that some maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living, being,
11. ‘To him another says: ‘There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the whole soul, Sir, is not then completely annihilated. For there is a further soul – divine, having form, belonging to the sensuous plane, feeding on solid food. That you neither know of nor perceive. But I know [\q 047/] and have experienced it. And since this soul, on the dissolution of the body, is cut off and destroyed, does not continue after death, then is it, Sir, that the soul is completely annihilated.” Thus is it that some maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being.
12. ‘To him another says: “There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the whole soul, Sir, is not then completely annihilated. For there is a further soul-divine, having form, made of mind, with all its major and minor parts complete, not deficient in any organ. This you neither know of nor perceive. But I know and have experienced it. And since this soul, on the dissolution of the body, is cut off and destroyed, does not continue after death, then is it, Sir, that the soul is completely annihilated.” Thus is it that some maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being.
13. ‘To him another says: “There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the whole soul, Sir, is not then completely annihilated. For there is a further soul, which by passing beyond ideas of form, by the dying out of ideas of resistance, by paying no heed to ideas of difference, conscious that space is infinite, reaches up to the plane of the infinity of space [178]. This you neither know of nor perceive. [35] But I know and have experienced it. And since this soul, on the dissolution of the body, is cut off and destroyed, does not continue after death, then is it, Sir, that the soul is completely annihilated.” Thus is it that some maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being.
14. ‘To him another says: “There is, Sir, such ,a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the whole soul, Sir, is not then completely annihilated.
[\q 048/] For there is a further soul, which having passed beyond the plane of the infinity of space, knowing that consciousness is infinite, reaches up to the plane of the infinity of consciousness [179]. This you neither know of nor perceive. But I know and have experienced it. And since this soul, on the dissolution of the body, is cut off and destroyed, does not continue after death, then is it, Sir, that the soul is completely annihilated.” Thus is it that some maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being.
15. ‘To him another says: “There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the whole soul, Sir, is not then completely annihilated. For there is a further soul, which by passing quite beyond the plane of the infinity of consciousness, knowing that there is nothing, reaches up to the plane of no obstruction [180]. This you neither know of nor perceive. But I know and have experienced it. And since this soul, on the dissolution of the body, is cut off and destroyed, does not continue after death, then is it, Sir, that the soul is completely annihilated.” Thus is it that some maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living, being.
16. ‘To him another says: “There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the whole soul, Sir, is not then completely annihilated. For there is a further soul, which by passing quite beyond the plane of no obstruction, realises ‘This is good, this is excellent,’ and reaches up to the plane of neither ideas nor the absence of ideas [181] This you [\q 049/] neither know of, nor perceive. But I know and have experienced it. And since this soul, on the dissolution of the body, is cut off, destroyed, does not continue after death, then is it, Sir, that the soul is completely annihilated.” Thus is it that some maintain the cutting off, the destruction, !the annihilation of a living being.
17. ‘These, brethren, are the recluses and Brahmans who are Annihilationists and in seven ways maintain the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being. [36] And whosoever do so they, all of them, do so in one or other of these seven ways. There is none beside.
18. [Repetition of Section 40, above p. 44, setting forth that other, higher, knowledge of a Tathāgata, for which alone he can be rightly praised.]
19. ‘There are, brethren, recluses and Brahmans who hold the doctrine of happiness in this life, who in five ways maintain the complete salvation, in this visible world, of a living being. And relying on what, starting out from what, do they do so?
20. ‘Hereon, brethren, some recluse or Brahman may have the following opinion, the following view: “Whensoever the soul, in full enjoyment and possession [\q 050/] of the five pleasures of sense, indulges all its functions, then, Sir, the soul has attained, in this visible world, to the highest Nirvāṇa [182]. ” Thus do some maintain the complete happiness, in the visible world, of a living being.
21. ‘To him another says: “There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the soul does not by that alone attain to the highest Nirvāṇa. And why not? Sensuous delights, Sir, are transitory, they involve pain, their very nature is to fluctuate. And grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and loathing arise out of their inconstancy and change. [37] But whensoever the soul, putting away sensuous delights and evil dispositions, enters into and abides in the First Jhāna, the state of joy and ease, born of seclusion, accompanied by reflection, accompanied by investigation, then, Sir, has the soul attained, in this visible world, to the highest Nirvāṇa.” Thus do some maintain the complete happiness, in the visible world, of a living being.
22. ‘To him another says: “There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the soul does not by that alone attain to the highest Nirvāṇa. And why not? Because inasmuch as that state involves reasoning and investigation it is stamped as being gross. But whensoever, Sir, the soul, suppressing both reasoning and investigation, enters into and abides in the Second Jhāna, the state of joy and case, born of serenity,, without reflection or investigation, a state of elevation of mind, internal calm of heart, then, Sir, has the soul attained, in this visible world, to the highest Nirvāṇa.” Thus do some maintain the complete happiness, in the visible world, of a living being.
[\q 051/] 23. ‘To him another says: “There is, Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the soul does not by that alone attain to the highest Nirvāṇa. And why not? Because inasmuch as that state involves the sense of joy, of exhilaration of heart, it is stamped as being gross. But whensoever, Sir, the soul, by absence of the longing after joy remains in equanimity, mindful and self-possessed, and experiences in the body that ease of which the Arahats speak (when they say) ‘the man serene and thoughtful dwells at case,’ and so enters into and abides in the Third Jhāna-then, Sir, has the soul attained, in this visible world, to the highest Nirvāṇa.” Thus do some maintain the complete happiness, in the visible world, of a living being.
24. ‘To him another says: “There is. Sir, such a soul as you describe. That I do not deny. But the soul does not by that alone attain to the highest Nirvāṇa. And why not? Because inasmuch as that state involves a constant dwelling of the mind on the case it has enjoyed it is stamped as gross. [38] But whensoever, Sir, the soul, by putting away ease, by putting away pain, by the previous dying away both of joys and griefs has entered into and abides in the Fourth Jhāna [183] — a state made pure by self-possession and equanimity, without pain and without ease-then, Sir, has the soul attained, in this visible world, to the highest Nirvāṇa.” Thus do some maintain the complete happiness, in the visible world, of a living, being.
25. ‘These, brethren, are the recluses and Brahmans who hold the doctrine of happiness in this life, who in five ways maintain the complete salvation, in this visible world, of a living being. And those who do [\q 052/] so, all of them, do so in one or other of these five ways. There is none beside.
26. [Repetition of Section 40, above p. 44, setting forth that other, higher, knowledge of a Tathāgata, for which alone he can be rightly praised.]
27. ‘These, brethren, are the recluses and Brahmans who arrange the future, whose speculations are concerned with the future, and who on forty-four grounds put forward various assertions regarding the future. And those who do so, all of them, do so in one or other of these .forty-four ways. There is none beside.
28. [Repetition of Section 40, above p. 44, setting forth that other, higher, knowledge of a Tathāgata, for which alone he can be rightly praised.]
[39] 29. ‘These, brethren, are the recluses and Brahmans who reconstruct the past, and arrange the future, or who do both, whose speculations are concerned with both, and who in sixty-two ways put forward propositions with regard to the past and to the future, and those who do so, all of them, do so in one or other of these sixty-two ways. There is none beside.
30. [Repetition Of Section 40, above p. 44, setting forth that other, higher, knowledge of a ‘Tathāgata, for which alone he can be rightly praised.]
[40] 32. ‘Of these, brethren, those recluses and Brahmans who are Eternalists, who in four ways maintain that the soul and the world are eternal:
(4) those who are Eel-wrigglers, who when a question is put to them on this or that resort, in four ways, to equivocation, to wriggling like eels:
(5) those who are Fortuitous-Originists, who in two ways maintain that the soul and the world arose without, a cause:
(6) those who in any of these eighteen ways reconstruct the past:
(7) those who hold the doctrine of a conscious existence after death, who maintain in sixteen ways that the soul after death is conscious:
(8) those who hold the doctrine of an unconscious existence after death, who maintain in eight ways that the soul after death is unconscious:
(9) those who maintain in eight ways that the soul after death is neither conscious nor unconscious:
(10) those who are Annihilationists, who maintain ill seven ways the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being:
(11) those who hold the doctrine of happiness in this life, who in five ways maintain the complete salvation, in this visible world, of a living being
That opinion of theirs is based only on the personal sensations, on the worry and writhing consequent thereon [184], of those venerable recluses and Brahmans, who know not, neither perceive, and are subject to all kinds of craving:
45 foll. [41,42] ‘Those opinions of theirs are therefore based upon contact (through the senses).
58 foll. [43] That they should experience those sensations without such contact, such a condition of things could not be.
71. [44] ‘They all of them, receive those sensations through continual contact in the spheres of touch. To them on account of the sensations arises craving, on account of the craving arises the fuel (that is, the necessary condition, the food, the basis, of future lives), from the fuel results becoming, from the tendency to become arises rebirth, and from rebirth comes death, and grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair. It is, brethren, when a brother understands, [\q 054/] as they really are, the origin and the end, the attraction, the danger, and the way of escape from the six realms of contact, that he gets to know what is above, beyond, them all [185].
72. [45] ‘For whosoever, brethren, whether recluses or Brahmans, are thus reconstructors of the past or arrangers of the future, or who are both, whose speculations are concerned with both, who put forward various propositions with regard to the past and to the future, they, all of them, are entrapped in the net of these sixty-two modes; this way and that they plunge about, but they are in it; this way and that they may flounder, but they are included in it, caught in it.
‘Just, brethren, as when a skilful fisherman or fisherlad should drag a tiny pool of water with a fine-meshed net he might fairly think: “Whatever fish of size may be in this pond, every one will be in this net; flounder about as they may, they will be included in it, and caught”-just so is it with these speculators about the past and the future, in this net, flounder. as they may, they are included and caught. [46]
73. ‘The outward form, brethren, of him who has won the truth [186], stands before you, but that which binds it to rebirth is cut in twain. So long as his body shall last, so long do gods and men behold him. On the dissolution of the body, beyond the end of his life, neither gods nor men shall see him.
‘Just, brethren, as when the stalk of a bunch of mangoes has been cut, all the mangoes that were hanging on that stalk go with it; just so, brethren, though the outward form of him who has won the truth stands before you, that which binds it to rebirth has been cut in twain. So long as his body shall last, so long do gods and men behold him. On the dissolution of the body, beyond the end of his life, neither gods nor men shall see him.’
[\q 055/] 74. When he had thus spoken, the venerable Ānanda said to the Blessed One: ‘Strange, Lord, is this, and wonderful! And what name has this exposition of the truth?’
‘Ānanda, you may remember this exposition as the Net of Advantage, and as the Net of Truth, and as the Supreme Net, and as the Net of Theories; remember it even as the Glorious Victory in the day of battle!’
Thus spake the Blessed One, and glad at heart the brethren exalted his word. And on the delivery of this discourse the thousandfold world-system shook.
Here ends the Brahma-Jāla Sutta.
[1] ‘American Lectures on Buddhism.’ London, 1896, pp. 38~43.
[2] Summed up below, pp. 52, 53; and set out more fully in the list in the ‘American Lectures,’ pp. 31-33.
[3] See the fable quoted below, pp. 187, 188.
[4] See below, pp. 44, 188.
[5] See for instance below, pp. 53, 54.
[6] See the paper on ‘The Will in Buddhism,’ J R. A. S., 1898.
[7] See below, p. 42, &c., of this Suttanta.
[8] Professor Cowell has been good enough to inform me that, in his opinion, the attempted restriction of all philosophy to the six Darsanas, and the very use of the term, is late mediaeval. The six are of course not mutually exclusive; and this, and the omissions in the classification of philosophy under these six heads, render it rather like a classification of animals into men, horses, birds, ghosts, beetles, and sparrows.
[9] The whole of this Sutta was translated into English by the Rev. Daniel Gogerly, Wesleyan missionary in Ceylon, in the journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1846 (reprinted by P. Grimblot in his ‘Sept Suttas Palis,’ Paris, 1876).
[10] Nālandā, afterwards the seat of the famous Buddhist university, was about seven miles north of Rājagaha, the capital of Magadha, the modern Raj-gir (Sum. p. 35).
[11] Suppiya was a follower of the celebrated teacher Sañjaya, whose views are set out and controverted in the next Sutta.
[12] Ambalaṭṭhikā, ‘the mango sapling.’ It was, says Buddhaghosa (pp. 41, 42), a well-watered and shady park so called from a mango sapling by the gateway. It was surrounded with a rampart, and had in it a rest-house adorned with paintings for the king’s amusement.
There was another garden so named at Anurādhapura in Ceylon, to the east of the Brazen Palace (Sum. 1, 13 1). This was so named, no doubt, after the other which was famous as the scene of the ‘Exhortation to Rāhula starting with falsehood,’ mentioned in Asoka’s Bhabra Edict (see my ‘Buddhism,’ pp. 224, 225).
[13] These titles occur, in the MSS., at the end of the sections of the tract that now follows. It forms a part of each of the Suttas in the first division, the first third, of this collection of Suttas. The division is called therefore the Sīla Vagga or Section containing the Sīlas. The tract itself must almost certainly have existed as a separate work before the time when the discourses, in each of which it recurs, were first put together.
Certain paragraphs from this tract occur also elsewhere. So in Majjhima I, 179 we have the whole of the short paragraphs; in Majjhima, Nos. 76 and 77, and in Mahāvagga V, 8, 3, we have Section 17; in Majjhima II, 3 we have most of Section 18; and so on. The whole of this tract has been translated into English by Gogerly (in Grimblot, see page 1, note), into French by Burnouf (also in Grimblot, pp. 212 foll.), and into German by Dr. Neumann (in his Buddhistische Anthologie, pp. 67 foll.).
[14] This refrain is repeated at the end of each clause. When the Sīlas recur below, in each Sutta, the only difference is in the refrain. See, for instance, the translation of p. 100 in the text.
[15] Neumann has ‘waiting for a gift’ which is a possible rendering: but pātikankhati has not yet been found elsewhere in the sense of ‘waiting for.’ The usual meaning of the word expresses just such a trifling matter as we have been led, from the context, to expect.
[16] Gāma-dhammā, ‘from the village habit, the practice of country folk the “pagan”’ way.’ One might render the phrase by ‘pagan’ if that word had not acquired, in English, a slightly different connotation. It is the opposite of porī, urbane (applied to speech, below, Section9)Ḍr. Neumann misses the point here, but has ‘h”flich’ below.
[17] Porī. See note above on Section 8.
[18] Sampha-ppalāpa. Sampha occurs alone in the Hemavata Sutta, and at Jāt. VI, 295; A. 11, 23.
[19] Samārambhā cannot mean ‘planting’ as Dr. Neumann renders it.
[20] Kaṃsa-kūṭa. The context suggests that kaṃsa (bronze) may here refer to coins, just as we say in English ‘a copper,’ and the word is actually so used in the 11th and 12th Bhikkhunī Nissaggiya Rules -the oldest reference in Indian books to coins. The most ancient coins, which were of private (not state) coinage, were either of bronze or gold. Buddhaghosa (p.79) explains the expression here used as meaning the passing off of bronze vessels as gold. Gogerly translates ‘weights,’ Childers sub voce has ‘counterfeit metal,’ and Neumann has ‘Māss.’ Buddhaghosa is obliged to take kaṃsa in the meaning of ‘gold pot,’ which seems very forced; and there is no authority for kaṃsa meaning either weight or mass. On the whole the coin explanation seems to me to be the simplest.
[21] Buddhaghosa gives examples of each of these five classes of the vegetable. kingdom without explaining the terms. But it is only the fourth which is doubtful. It may mean ‘graftings,’ if the art of grafting was then known in the Ganges valley.
[22] Āmisa. Buddhaghosa (p. 83) gives a long list of curry-stuffs included under this term. If he is right then Gogerly’s ‘raw grain’ is too limited a translation, and Neumann’s ‘all sorts of articles to use’ too extensive. In its secondary meaning the word means something. nice, a relish, a dainty.’
[23] Visūka-dassanaṃ. This word has only been found elsewhere in the phrase diṭṭhi-visūkaṃ, ‘the puppet shows of heresy’ (Majjhima I, pp. 8, 486; and Serissaka Vimāna LXXXIV, 26). The Sinhalese renders it wiparīta-darsaṇa.
[24] Dancing. cannot mean here a dancing in which the persons referred to took part. It must be ballet or nautch dancing.
[25] Literally ‘shows.’ This word, only found here, has always been rendered ‘theatrical representations.’ Clough first translated it so in his Sinhalese Dictionary, p. 665, and he was followed by Gogerly, Burnouf, myself (in ‘Buddhist Suttas,’ p. 192), and Dr. Neumann (p. 69),-and Weber (Indian Literature, pp. 199, 319) seems to approve this. But it is most unlikely that the theatre was already known in the fifth century B. C. And Buddhaghosa (p. 84) explains it, quite simply, as naṭa-samajjā. Now samajjo is a very interesting old word (at least in its Pāli form). The Sanskrit, according to the Petersburg Dictionary, has only been found in modern dictionaries. The Pāli occurs in other old texts such as Vinaya 11, 107; IV, 267 (both times in the very same context as it does here); ibid. II, 150; 1V, 85; Sigālovāda Sutta, p.300; and it is undoubtedly the same word as samāja in the first of the fourteen Edicts of Asoka. In the Sigālovāda there are said to be six dangers at such a samajjo; to wit, dancing, singing, music, recitations, conjuring tricks, and acrobatic shows. And in the Vinaya passages we learn that at a samajjo not only amusements but also food was provided; that high officials were invited, and had special seats; and that it took place at the top of a bill. This last detail of ‘high places’ (that is sacred places) points to a religious motive as underlying the whole procedure. The root aj (??greak??agw??, ago, whence our ‘act’) belongs to the stock of common Aryan roots, and means carrying on. What was the meaning of this ‘carrying on together’? Who were the people who took part? Were they confined to one village? or have we here a survival from old exogamic communistic dancings together? Later the word means simply fair,’ as at Jātaka III, 541:
‘Many the bout 1 have played with quarterstaves at the fair,’ with which Jātaka I, 394 may be compared. And it is no doubt this side of the festival which is here in the mind of the author; but ‘fair’ is nevertheless a very inadequate rendering. The Sinhalese has rapid movement in dance-figures’ (ranga-maṇḍalu).
[26] These ballad recitations in prose and verse combined were the source from which epic poetry was afterwards gradually developed. Buddhaghosa has no explanation of the word, but gives as examples the Bhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa. The negative anakkhānaṃ occurs Majjhima I, 503.
[27] Buddhaghosa explains this as ‘playing on cymbals’; and adds that it is also called pāṇitāḷaṃ. The word is only found here and at Jātaka V, 5o6, and means literally ‘hand-sounds.’
[28] Buddhaghosa says ‘deep music, but some say raising dead bodies to life by spells.’ His own explanation is, I think, meant to be etymological; and to show that he derives the word from vi + tāḷa. This would bring the word into connection with the Sanskrit vaitāḷika, ‘royal bard.’ The other explanation connects the word with Vetāla, ‘a demon,’ supposed to play pranks (as in the stories of the Vetāla-pañca-viṃsati) by reanimating corpses. Dr. Neumann adopts it. But it does not agree so well with the context; and it seems scarcely justifiable to see, in this ancient list, a reference to beliefs which can only be traced in literature more than a thousand years later. Gogerly’s rendering funeral ceremonies,’ which I previously followed, seems to me now quite out of the question.
[29] It is clear from Jātaka V, 5o6 that this word means a sort of music. And at Vinaya IV, 285 kumbhathūnikā are mentioned in connection with dancers, acrobats, and hired mourners. Buddhaghosa is here obscure and probably corrupt, and the derivation is quite uncertain. Gogerly’s guess seems better than Burnouf’s or Neumann’s. The Sinhalese has ‘striking a drum big enough to hold sixteen gallons.’
[30] Buddhaghosa seems to understand by this term (literally ‘of Sobha city’) the adornments or scenery used for a ballet-dance. (Paṭibhāṇa-cittam at Vinaya 11, 151; IV, 61, 298, 358; Sum. 1, 42 is the nude in art.) Weber has pointed out (Indische Studien, II, 38; III, 153) that Sobha is a city of the, fairies much given to music and love-making. It is quite likely that the name of a frequently used scene for a ballet because a proverbial phrase for all such scenery. But the Sinhalese has ‘pouring water over the heads of dancers, or nude paintings.’
[31] Buddhaghosa takes these three words separately, and so do all the MSS. of the text, and the Sinhalese version. But 1 now think that the passage at Jātaka IV, 390 is really decisive, and that we have here one of the rare cases where we can correct our MSS. against the authority of the old commentator. But 1 follow him in the general meaning he assigns to the strange expression ‘Caṇḍāla-bamboo washings.’
[32] See Jātaka III, 541.
[33] Nibbuddhaṃ. The verbal form nibbujjhati occurs in the list at Vinaya III, 180 (repeated at 11, 10); and our word at Milinda 232.
[34] All these recur in the introductory story to the 50th Pācittiya (Vinaya IV, 107). On the last compare Buddhaghosa on Mahāvagga V, I, 2 9.
[35] All these terms recur at Vinaya III, 180 (repeated at II, 10).
[36] Chess played originally on a board of eight times ten squares was afterwards played on one of eight times eight squares. Our text cannot be taken as evidence of real chess in the fifth century B. C., but it certainly refers to games from which it and draughts must have been developed. The Sinhalese Sanna says that each of these games was played with dice and pieces such as kings and so on. The word for pieces is poru (from purisa)-just our men.’
[37] Ākāsaṃ. How very like blindfold chess !
[38] Parihāra-pathaṃ. A kind of primitive ‘hop-scotch.’ The Sinhalese says the steps must be made hopping-.
[39] Santikā. Spellicans, pure and simple.
[40] Khalikā. Unfortunately the method of playing is not stated. Compare Eggeling’s note as in his Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa 11I, 106, 7. In the gambling-scene on the Bharhut ‘Tope (Cunningham, PI. XLV, No. 9) there is a board marked out on the stone of six times five squares (not six by six), and six little cubes with marks on the sides visible lie on the stone outside the board.
[41] Jhaṭikaṃ Something like ‘tip-cat.’ Siṃ – kelīmaya in Sinhalese.
[42] Sa1āka-hatthaṃ. On flour-water as colouring matter, see Jātaka I, 220.
[43] Akkhaṃ. The usual meaning is ‘a die.’ But the Sinhalese translator agrees with Buddhaghosa. Neither gives any details.
[44] Pangacīram. The Sinhalese for this toy is pat-kulal. Morris in J. P. T. S., 1889, p. 205, compares the Marathīpungi.
[45] Vankakaṃ. From Sanskrit vrika. See journal of the Pāli Text Society, 1889, p. 206.
[46] Mokkhacikā,. So the Sinhalese. Buddhaghosa has an alternative explanation of turning over on a trapeze, but gives this also. See Vinaya I, 275, and J. P. T. S., 1885, p. 49.
[47] Cingulikaṃ. See Morris in the J. P. T. S., 1885, p. 5o, who compares cingulāyitvā at Aṅguttara III, 15, 2.
[48] All these six, from No. 10 inclusive, are mentioned in the Majjhima, vol. 1, p. 266, as children’s games.
[49] Akkharikā. it is important evidence for the date at which writing was known in India that such a game should be known in the fifth century B. C.
[50] The following list recurs Vinaya I, 192 = 11, 163 = Aṅguttara 1, 181, &c.
[51] Āsandī. Buddhaghosa merely says ‘a seat beyond the allowed measure,’ but that must refer to height, as the only rule as to measure in seats is the 87th Pācittiya in which the height of beds or chairs is limited to eight ‘great’ inches (probably about eighteen inches). The Sinhalese Sanna adds ‘a long chair for supporting the whole body.’ At Jāt. I, 208 a man lies down on an āsandī so as to be able to-look up and watch the stars. At Dīgha I, 55 = Majjhima 1,515 = Saṃyutta 111, (where the reading must be corrected), the Āsandī is used as a bier. The Āsandī is selected as the right sort of seat for the king in both the Vājapeya and Inauguration ceremonies because of its height (Eggeling, Sat.-Brāh. III, 35, 105). It is there said to be made of common sorts of wood, and perforated; which probably means that the frame was of wood and the seat was of interlaced cane or wickerwork. The diminutive āsandiko, with short legs and made square (for sitting, not lying on), is allowed in the Buddhist Order by Vinaya 11, 149. And even the āsandī is allowed, if the tall legs be cut down, by Vinaya II, 169, 170 (where the reading chinditvā seems preferable, and is read in the quotation at Sum. 1, 88). The renderings ‘large cushion’ at ‘Vinaya Texts,’ II, 27 and ‘stuffed couch’ at 111, 209 must be accordingly corrected. Gogerly translates ‘large couch,’ Burnouf une chaise longue,’ and Neumann bequeme Lehnstuhl.’
[52] Pallanko. It is noteworthy that, in spite of the use of a divan with animals carved on its supports being here objected to, it is precisely the sort of seat on which the Buddha himself, or Buddhist personages of distinction, are often, in later sculptures, represented as sitting (Grunwedel, ‘Buddhistische kunst,’ pp. III, 124, 137; Mitra, ‘Budh Gayā,’ Plates XI, XX, &c. &c.). At Mahāvaṃsa 25 sīhāsana and pallanko are used of the same seat (Asoka’s throne), and sīhāsana is used of Duṭṭha Gamini’s throne, ibid. 157. But the Lion throne of Nissanka Malla, found at Pollonnaruwa, is not a pallanko, but an actual stone lion, larger than life size (’Indian Antiquary,’ vol. 1, p. 135. Compare the similar seat in Grunwedel, p. 95).
By Vinaya 11, 170 the possession of a pallanka was allowed to the Order if the animal figures were broken off (the translation in ‘Vinaya Texts,’ III, 209, must be altered accordingly, reading vāle for vale, as at Vinaya IV, 312). By Vinaya II, 163 it is laid down that members of the Order were not to use a complete pallanko even in laymen’s houses, so that Nigrodha’s action in the passage just quoted (Mahāvaṃsa 25) was really a breach of the regulations.
[53] The words from gonako down to kaṭṭhissaṃ inclusive, and also kuttakaṃ, are found only in this list, and Buddhaghosa seems to be uncertain as to the exact meaning of some of them. All except No. 7 might be used in laymen’s houses (’Vinaya Texts,’ III, 197), and all might be possessed by the Order i used only as floor coverings (ibid. 111, 209); except again No. 7, the cotton wool of which might be utilised for pillows. As there is a doubt about the spelling it may be noticed that the Sanna reads goṇakaṃ and uddalomiṃ: and the MS. in the R. A. S. (which repeats each sentence) has -gonakaṃ and uddalomiṃ both times.
[54] Sambāhanaṃ. Perhaps rubbing the limbs with flat pieces of wood. See Buddhaghosa here and at ‘Vinaya Texts,’ III, 60.
[55] This is not quite accurate. Out of the twenty items here objected to, three (shampooing, bathing, and the use of sunshades) were allowed in the Order, and practised by Gotama himself. Bathrooms, and halls attached to them, are permitted by ‘Vinaya Texts,’ III, 189; shampooing by ibid. III, 68, 297. There are elaborate regulations for the provision of hot steam baths and the etiquette to be observed in them; and instances of the use of the ordinary bath in streams or rivers are frequent. The use of sunshades is permitted by ‘Vinaya Texts,’ 111, 13 2-3, and is referred to ibid. 111, 88, 274.
[56] Visikhā-kathā. Buddhaghosa (p.90) takes this word (literally street-talk’) in the sense of talk about streets, whether ill or well situate, and whether the inhabitants are bold or poor, &c.
[57] Pubba-peta-kathā. The commentator confines this to boasting talk about deceased relatives or ancestors.
[58] Nānatta-kathaṃ, literally ‘difference-talk.’ The expression seems somewhat forced, if taken as meaning ‘desultory’; but I see no better explanation.
[59] Lokakkhāyikā. Buddhaghosa refers this specially to such speculations as are put forth according to the Lokātyata system by the Vitaṇḍas (also called Lokāyatikas). These are materialistic theorisers, of whose system very little is, so far, known. See the note at ‘Vinaya Texts, vol. iii, p. 151. 1 have collected other references to them in my ‘Milinda,’ vol. i, p.7; and to these Dīgha I, 11 114,120, and Attha Sālinī, p.3, may now be added. They are probably referred to below in chap. iii of this Sutta, SectionSection 10, 20.
[60] ‘This list of foolish talks recurs in Suttas 76-78 in the Majjhima, and at Vinaya I,188.
[61] These expressions all recur at Majjhima II, 3.
[62] Sahitaṃ me, literally ‘the put together is to me,’ &c. The idiom is only found here, and may mean either as rendered above, or ‘the context is on my side,’ or ‘the text (of the Scriptures) is on my side,’ or merely ‘that which is of use is on my side.’ This last, given by the Sanna, amounts to the same as the version adopted above.
[63] Putting the cart before the horse.
[64] Āropito te vādo. On the use of this idiom compare the Commentary on the Therī Gāthā, p. 101. There is a misprint here in the text, aropito for āropito. ‘Issue has been joined against you would be a possible rendering. It is the phrase used, when some one has offered to hold debate (maintain a thesis) against all corners, by an opponent who takes up the challenge.
[65] Niggahīto si. On this idiom compare the opening paragraphs of the Kathā Vatthu and the Commentary on them (especially pp. 9,10). It is literally ‘you are censured.’
[66] 3 Cara vāda-pamokkhāya. So Buddhaghosa. But Gogerly renders, ‘Depart, that you may be freed from this disputation and the only parallel passage seems to support this view. It is Majjhima 1, 133, where it is said to be wrong to learn the Scriptures for the sake of the advantage of being freed from discussion or debate where texts are quoted against one. Pamokkha occurs besides at Saṃyutta I, 2, Jātaka V, 30, 31, and Mahāvaṃsa 158, but not in this connection.
[67] So the author of Milinda in making his hero Nāgasena use just such a phrase (Mil. P. 27) is making him commit a breach of propriety.
[68] Kuhakā. ‘Astonish the world with the three sorts of trickery,’ says Buddhaghosa. These are also referred to without explanation at Jātaka IV, 297 (where we should, 1 think, read kuhana).
[69] Lapakā. Compare Itivuttaka, No. 99 = Aṅguttara I, 165, 168; and also Milinda 228, Jātaka III, 349.
[70] Nemittakā, ‘interpreters of signs and omens.’ See the note on nimittaṃ in the next paragraph. Compare Milinda 299; Jāt. IV, 124.
[71] Nippesikā, ‘scarers away’ (? of ghosts, or bad omens). But the Commentary and Sanna give no help, and the word has only been found in this list.
[72] All the five words in this list recur at A. III, iii but the context there is as undecisive as it is here, and the Commentary (fol. di of the ‘Turnour MS. at the India Office), though slightly different, gives no better help.
[73] Aṅgaṃ, literally ‘limbs.’ Buddhaghosa distinguishes this from lakkhaṇaṃ (No. 5 in this list), and from anga-vijjā (No. 16). It is not found, in this sense, anywhere in the texts.
[74] Nimittaṃ, literally ‘marks,’ or ,signs.’ Buddhaghosa tells a story in illustration. King Paṇḍu, they say (Pāṇḍi in the Sanna), took three pearls in his closed hand, and asked a diviner what he had in it. The latter looked this way and that for a sign; and seeing a fly which had been caught by a house-lizard (the Sanna says ‘by a dog,’ perhaps the meaning is simply ‘in sugar’) getting free (ṃuttā), said at once ‘pearls’ (also muttā in Pāli). ‘How many.” says the king. The diviner, hearing a dog bark thrice, answered ‘three.’ Compare Mil. 178, and the note to the last section on nemittikā, and the story at Mahāvaṃsa 82.
[75] Uppādo, ‘the portents of the great ones, thunderbolts falling, and so on,’ says Buddhaghosa. The Great Ones here mean, 1 think, the spirits or gods presiding over the sun, moon, and planets (see the note on Section 26). The word corresponds to the Sanskrit Utpāta, though the d is vouched for by overwhelming authority. But this is only another instance of a change not infrequent (as Ed. M�ller has shown, Pāli Grammar, p. 37); and the one or two cases where Burmese scribes have (wrongly) corrected to uppāta is another instance to be added to those referred to in the Introduction to Sum. 1 of their habit of putting an easier reading where the more difficult one is really right. Childers should therefore have kept this word separate from the other uppādo. Comp. Jāt. 1, 374.
[76] Supinaṃ. On the theory of dreams compare Mil., pp. 297-301. At Jāt. I, 374 the word is masculine. Perhaps charms to avert bad dreams (Ath.-veda VI, 46; XVI, 5 and 6) are included in this low art.’ Jāt. No. 77 mocks at the dream interpreters.
[77] Lakkhaṇaṃ. The commentator on this word as used in the very same connection at Jāt. I, 374 adds that it means also the knowledge of good and bad marks on such persons and things as are mentioned here in our next paragraph. Buddhaghosa confines its meaning to that given above. This contradiction is another confirmation of the opinion expressed by me in 1880 in ‘Buddhist Birth Stories,’ pp. lxiii foll., that Childers was wrong in ascribing the Jātaka Commentary to Buddhaghosa. The word occurs in Buddhaghosa’s sense at D. I, 114, 120= A. 1, 163, &c.; Jāt. I, 56.
[78] Musikācchinnaṃ. The allied superstition of thinking it unlucky to wear clothes gnawed by mice is laughed out of court in the Mangala Jātaka, No. 87.
[79] Aggi-homaṃ. Telling people that a sacrifice, if offered in a fire of such and such a wood, will have such and such a result.
[80] Dabbi-homaṃ. Telling people that an oblation of such and such grains, butter, or so on, poured into the fire from such and such a sort of spoon, will have such and such a result.
[81] See Hillebrandt, ‘Neu und Vollmondsopfer,’ pp. 31, 171, and Ritual-literatur’ in B�hler’s ‘Grundriss,’ pp. 71, 72, 114, 176. The nine homas here objected to may also be compared with the seven at Ath.-veda VIII, 9, 18.
[82] No instance of this can be traced in the books of the Brahmans.
[83] Compare the passage in Hillebrandt, in B�hler’s Grundriss,’ p. 176, on the use of blood for sorcery. In one passage, Rig-vidh. III, 18, 3, it is one’s own blood that is to be used. But the specific interpretation given here by Buddhaghosa cannot be paralleled from the Brahmanical books.
[84] Anga-vijja. Buddhaghosa thus separates this from the aṅgaṃ of No. 1. In both the passages Jāt. 11, 200, 250 the knowledge is simply that of judging from a man’s appearance that he is rough or bad. and it is the good man in the story (in the second case the Bodisat himself) who is the anga-vijjā-pāṭhako. So at Jāt. V, 458 it is by anga-vijjā that the Bodisat prophesies that a man will be cruel.
[85] Vatthu-vijjā. Childers (Dict., p. 559) has ‘pool’ instead of ‘house,’ having misread sara for ghara (s and gh are nearly alike in Sinhalese). The craft is further explained by Buddhaghosa in his comment on the Mahā-parinibbāna Sutta I, 26. Its success depended on the belief that the sites were haunted by spirits. See further below, Section 27.
[86] Khatta-vijjā,. The Burmese MSS. correct the rare khatta into the familiar khetta. Khetta-vijjā indeed occurs at Ud. III, 9, and may just possibly there (in connection with writing, arithmetic, tables, &c.) be correct in the meaning- of ‘land-surveying, mensuration.’ Buddhaghosa, though his explanation is corrupt, evidently understands the phrase in a sense similar to that of khatta-dhamma at Jāt. V, 489, 490; Mil. 164 (see also 178); and his gloss nītisatthaṃ is probably nearer the mark than Saṅkara’s (on Chānd. Up. VII, 1, 2), which is dhanur-veda. It is the craft of government, then lying in great part in adhering- to custom.
The Sutta only follows the Upanishad in looking at all these crafts as minor matters, but it goes beyond it in looking upon them as a ‘low’ way, for a Brahman, of gaining a livelihood.
[87] Siva-vijjā. It is clear that siva is used euphemistically, and we may here have an early reference to what afterwards developed into the cult of the god Siva. Buddhaghosa gives an alternative explanation as knowledge of the cries of jackals.
[88] Bhūta-vijjā. Also in the Chāndogya list (lac. cit.)
[89] Bhūri-vijjā. It is the same as bhūri-kammaṃ, explained in the same way by Buddhaghosa on Section 27 below.
[90] Ahi-vijjā. One method is described at Jāt. IV, 457, 8, Perhaps such charms against snake-bite as Ath.-v. V,13; VI, 12, 56; VII, 88, are included.
[91] Buddhaghosa says curing or giving poison, or poison spells (compare Ath.-v. VI, 90, 93, 100).
[92] These are explained to mean simply curing the bites of these creatures.
[93] These are explained to mean simply curing the bites of these creatures.
[94] Understanding their language.
[95] Divining- by the appearance and the cawings of crows.
[96] Compare the Ambaṭṭha-vijjā at Sum. 255 and below, p. 96 of the text, Section 23.
[97] Miga-cakkaṃ. Understanding the language of all creatures.
[98] The whole of this ‘low art’ as applied to gems has been collected in a series of manuals now edited by L. Finot in his ‘Lapiddires Indiens,’ Paris, 1896.
[99] The art in these four cases is to determine whether the marks on them show they will bring good (or bad) luck to the houses in which they dwell.
[100] The art in these four cases is to determine whether the marks on them show they will bring good (or bad) luck to the houses in which they dwell.
[101] The art in these four cases is to determine whether the marks on them show they will bring good (or bad) luck to the houses in which they dwell.
[102] The art in these four cases is to determine whether the marks on them show they will bring good (or bad) luck to the houses in which they dwell.
[103] The art in these four cases is to determine whether the marks on them show they will bring good (or bad) luck to the houses in which they dwell.
[104] The art in these five cases is to determine whether it is unclean or not to eat them.
[105] The art in these five cases is to determine whether it is unclean or not to eat them.
[106] The art in these five cases is to determine whether it is unclean or not to eat them.
[107] The art in these five cases is to determine whether it is unclean or not to eat them.
[108] ‘This comes in here very oddly. But the old commentator had the same reading, and takes the word in its ordinary senses, not even as amulet.
[109] Throughout these paragraphs the plural is used. This cannot be honorific, as the few great kings of that time are always spoken of in the singular. Yet all the previous translators, except Burnouf, translate by the singular-’the king will march out,’ &c. It is evident that we have to understand ‘chiefs,’ and not the ‘king ‘: and that not absolute monarchies, but republican institutions of a more or less aristocratic type, were in the mind of the composer of the paragraph.
[110] Nakkhatta, translated by Gogerly and Neumann a ‘planet.’ Buddhaghosa explains it by ‘Mars and so on.’ This may apply to planets, but also to stars in general, and I know no other passage where the meaning of the word is confined to planets. Burnouf has (constellation,’ but what can the eclipse of a constellation mean?
[111] Patha-gamana and uppatha-gamana. Prof. Kielhorn says (in a note he has been kind enough to send me on this section): What the author means by these words 1 do not know. But uppatha-gamana would be literally “aberration, the going away from one’s proper path”; and patha-gamana therefore should be “following one’s proper course.” 1 am sure the two words could not mean conjunction and opposition; nor, 1 think, ascension and declension. It is curious that Buddhaghosa has not explained them.’
[112] Ukkā-pāto. See Jāt. 1, 374; Mil. 178.
[113] Disā-dāho. Thunder and lightning,’ according to Neumann; fiery corruscations in the atmosphere,’ according to Gogerly, whom Burnouf follows. But Buddhaghosa’s words are only explicable of a jungle fire. Compare Jāt. 1, 212, 213, 374.
[114] Burnouf takes these four words to refer to four occurrences. Gogerly and Neumann take them as only two. Buddhaghosa seems to imply four.
[115] Muddā. There has been great diversity in the various guesses made at the meaning in this connection of muddā, which usually means ‘seal’ or ‘seal-ring.’ Gogerly has 1 conveyancing,’ and so also Childers; Burnouf takes this word and the next as one compound in the sense of foretelling the future by calculating diagrams’; and Neumann has ‘Verwaltungsdienste, ‘administrative services. Buddhaghosa is very curt. He says only hattha-muddāgaṇanā Hatthamuddā is found elsewhere only at Jāt. III, 528, where hattha- muddaṃ karoti means ‘to beckon,’ and at Vin. V, 163, where it is said of the polite member of the Order that he makes, no sign with his hand, nor beckons. (On hattha-vikāra compare Mil. 1, 207, 547 = Vin. I,157 = Vin. II, 216.) Both these passages are much later than our text, and the sense of beckoning is here impossible. But muddā is mentioned as a craft at Vin. IV, 7 (where it is called honourable), at M. I, 85, and several times in the Milinda (pp. 3, 59, 78, 178 of the Pāli text), and muddiko as the person who practises that craft at D. I, 51 and Vin. IV, 8. The Sinhalese comment on this (quoted in my translation of the Milinda, 1, 91) shows that the art there was simply arithmetic, using the joints or knuckles of the fingers as an aid to memory. And this is no doubt the meaning in our paragraph.
[116] Gaṇanā. Buddhaghosa’s comment on this is acchiddakā-gaṇanā, in contradistinction to the last. It is evidently calculation not broken up by using, the fingers, mental arithmetic pure and simple. The accountant who uses this method is called gaṇako (D. I, 51; Vin. IV, 8). Buddhaghosa’s comment on the latter passage is given by Minayeff at Pat. 84, but with a wrong reading, akkhiṃṭaka.
[117] Saṃkhānaṃ, literally ‘counting up.’ He who has the faculty of doing this can, on looking at a tree, say how many leaves it has, says Buddhaghosa. But the first words of his comment are doubtful. He may perhaps mean calculating masses by means of the rosary. Burnouf skips this word, and Neumann has simply ‘counting.’
[118] Kāveyyaṃ. The word recurs, in a bad sense, at A. 1, 72= III, 107, and also at S. I, 110 in the phrase kāveyya-matto, ‘drunk with prophecy, inspired.’ Buddhaghosa enumerates, in the words of A. II, 230, four kinds of poetry, and explains them in nearly the same words as found in the Manoratha Pūranī on that passage. None of the four refer to sacrificial hymns. Impromptu rhyming, ballad singing, and the composition of poems are meant.
[119] Lokāhyataṃ. Usually rendered ‘materialism.’ But it is quite clear that this meaning is impossible in this connection. See Milinda 174.
[120] Compare the Sinhalese bīna (binna) marriage in which the bridegroom is brought into the house of the bride’s family.
[121] Compare the Sinhalese dīga marriage in which the bride is sent out to live in the bridegroom’s family. We have no words now in English to express this difference between marrying and giving in marriage.
[122] Saṃvadanaṃ. Childers calls this a magic art, following Burnouf who calls it sorcery. Buddhaghosa explains it as astrology. The fact is all these expressions are technical terms for acts of astrology or sorcery, they none of them occur elsewhere either in Pāli or Sanskrit, and the tradition preserved by Buddhaghosa may be at fault in those cases in which the use of the word had not survived to later times. The general sense may be sufficiently clear, but for absolute certainty of interpretation we must wait till examples are found in Indian books of the actual use of the words, not in mere lists, but in a connection which shows the meaning. Ath-v III, 30 is a charm to secure concord in a family, compare VII, 52; and there are several charms in the Athara-veda for success in gambling.
[123] Saṃvadanaṃ. Childers calls this a magic art, following Burnouf who calls it sorcery. Buddhaghosa explains it as astrology. The fact is all these expressions are technical terms for acts of astrology or sorcery, they none of them occur elsewhere either in Pāli or Sanskrit, and the tradition preserved by Buddhaghosa may be at fault in those cases in which the use of the word had not survived to later times. The general sense may be sufficiently clear, but for absolute certainty of interpretation we must wait till examples are found in Indian books of the actual use of the words, not in mere lists, but in a connection which shows the meaning. Ath-v III, 30 is a charm to secure concord in a family, compare VII, 52; and there are several charms in the Athara-veda for success in gambling.
[124] Saṃvadanaṃ. Childers calls this a magic art, following Burnouf who calls it sorcery. Buddhaghosa explains it as astrology. The fact is all these expressions are technical terms for acts of astrology or sorcery, they none of them occur elsewhere either in Pāli or Sanskrit, and the tradition preserved by Buddhaghosa may be at fault in those cases in which the use of the word had not survived to later times. The general sense may be sufficiently clear, but for absolute certainty of interpretation we must wait till examples are found in Indian books of the actual use of the words, not in mere lists, but in a connection which shows the meaning. Ath-v III, 30 is a charm to secure concord in a family, compare VII, 52; and there are several charms in the Athara-veda for success in gambling.
[125] Saṃvadanaṃ. Childers calls this a magic art, following Burnouf who calls it sorcery. Buddhaghosa explains it as astrology. The fact is all these expressions are technical terms for acts of astrology or sorcery, they none of them occur elsewhere either in Pāli or Sanskrit, and the tradition preserved by Buddhaghosa may be at fault in those cases in which the use of the word had not survived to later times. The general sense may be sufficiently clear, but for absolute certainty of interpretation we must wait till examples are found in Indian books of the actual use of the words, not in mere lists, but in a connection which shows the meaning. Ath-v III, 30 is a charm to secure concord in a family, compare VII, 52; and there are several charms in the Athara-veda for success in gambling.
[126] Subhaga-karanaṃ. Many such charms are preserved in the Atharva-veda (for instance, X, 3:; 5; XVI, 4; 9)
[127] It would be useless to seek in the Atharva-veda, which (with the one exception mentioned in the notes to the next section) gives only the charms which are supposed to bring benefits, for instances of these malevolent practices. But we have here direct evidence that black magic, as was indeed inevitable was as fully trusted in the sixth century B. C. in the valley of the Ganges as white. We need not be surprised that the malevolent charms are not recorded.
[128] Adāsa-pañho. Buddhaghosa says they made a god appear in the mirror and answer questions put. It is a later conception to discard the god, and make the mirror itself give pictures of the hidden events. The mirror is of metal (Par. Dip. 235).
[129] Kumāri-pañho. Through a girl of good family and repute.
[130] Deva-pañho. Also obtained through a girl, but this time a deva-dāsī or temple prostitute. It is instructive to find, even under the patriarchal regime of the sixth century B. C., that men thought they could best have communications from the gods through the medium of a woman.
[131] Ādiccupaṭṭhānam. Such sun-worship is ridiculed in the Jātaka of the same name, No. 173.
[132] Buddhaghosa explains the Great One as Mahā Brahma. This seems to me very doubtful. It is at least odd to find Brahma introduced in this connection. We may grant that the Buddhists might have put sun-worship into a list of sorceries, but there was no ceremonial cult of Brahma and little or none of Brahmā. And however much the new gospel might hold the speculations of the dominant theosophy in contempt, that would scarcely explain their being ranked as privates in this regiment. Burnouf avoids this by rendering the phrase generally ‘serving the great,’ and Neumann has ‘practising sorcery.’ Neither of these guesses seems happy. Mahat in composition is elsewhere always mahā in Pāli, and we possibly have here a sandhi for mahatī-upaṭṭhānam, in the sense of worship of the Great Mother, the Earth, with covert allusion to Mahī. This would give excellent sense, as the worship of the Mother Earth was closely associated in the popular mind with witchcraft. A god or goddess is certainly meant, and one so associated would be best in place here. It is perhaps worthy of note that in the oldest portion of the Taittirīya Upanishad, Sun, Moon, Earth, and Srī occur together in a set of mystic groups, and Sun, Moon, Brahma, and food are all identified by a word-play with Mahas (Sīkrā-vallī” 4-7).
[133] See Milinda 191, and Jāt. II, 410.
[134] Bhūri-kammaṃ. Is this a place sacred to Mother Earth? The ceremony referred to is the carrying out of the vijjā or craft mentioned in the list at Section 2 I.
[135] Vassa- and vossa-kammaṃ. Morris discusses the etymology of these words, only found in this list, in the J. P. T. S., 1889, p. 208. The idea of the second is not, of course, castration, but making a man’s desire to fail by a spell. Several such are preserved in the Atharva (IV, 4; VI, 1 0 1 to give virility; VI, I 3 8; VII, 1 I 3 to cause impotence).
[136] Vassa- and vossa-kammaṃ. Morris discusses the etymology of these words, only found in this list, in the J. P. T. S., 1889, p. 208. The idea of the second is not, of course, castration, but making a man’s desire to fail by a spell. Several such are preserved in the Atharva (IV, 4; VI, 1 0 1 to give virility; VI, I 3 8; VII, 1 I 3 to cause impotence).
[137] Vatthu-kammaṃ and -parikiraṇaṃ. These constitute the vatthu-vijjā of Section 21.
[138] Vatthu-kammaṃ and -parikiraṇaṃ. These constitute the vatthu-vijjā of Section 21.
[139] Bathings, that is, of other people.
[140] See Mil. I, 511 and the rules laid down in ‘Vinaya Texts, II 53-55.
[141] The Buddhist view of Nos. 11-25 must not be mistaken. It is sufficiently clear from the numerous examples in the Vinaya (see especially ‘Vinaya Texts,’ II, pp. 4I-I44), and from the high praise accorded to Jīvaka and other physicians, that the objection was to recluses and Brahmans practising medicine as a means of livelihood. They might do so gratis for themselves or for their coreligionists, and laymen might do so for gain.
The use of paṭimokkha in No. 25 is curious. It is when, for instance, a purgative is first given and then a tonic to counteract the other, to set free from its effect. Compare Jāt. V, 25.
[142] The corresponding Sanskrit terms occur at Divyāvadāna, p. 492. No doubt the reading there ought to be nipuṇo.
[143] These phrases recur S. III, 45. On anuddiṭṭhi see also Gogerly in the, Ceylon Friend, 1875, p. 133, and Morris in the J. P. T. S., 1886, p. 113; and compare , attānuddiṭṭhi at Mil. 146, 160, 352 S. N. 1119. As in our colloquial expression a ‘viewy man,’ diṭṭhi almost always, and anudiṭṭhi in all the seven passages where it occurs, have a connotation of contempt-a mere view, an offhand ill-considered opinion, a delusion. The Greek greak.ØŪŚa has had a similar history, and dogma or speculation is a better rendering than view or belief.
[144] Sassata-vādā.
[145] Gotra, literally ‘cow-stall.’ The history of this word has yet to be written. It probably meant at the time this Sutta was written a family or lineage traced through the father. On the meaning of gotraja (the gentiles of Roman Law) in the later law-books see West and B�hler, ‘Hindu Law of Inheritance,’ p.17 I.
[146] Vaṇṇa, literally colour.’ Gogerly renders it ‘appearance,’ and Neumann ‘Beruf.’ I have chosen caste (though it is not caste in its strictest sense) because it no doubt refers to the cattāro vaṇṇā mentioned so often in the Suttas. it is true that these-Khattiyas, Brahmans, Vessas, and Suddas-were not castes, but four divisions of the people, each consisting of many subdivisions (by customs as to connubium and commensality) which afterwards hardened into castes. ,,See J. R. A. S., 1897, PP. SO-,90.
[147] Saṃvaṭṭa – vivaṭṭaṃ (rolling up and evolution, from vaṭṭ, to turn). It is the period of the gradual disintegration and conformation of a world. Needless to add that the length of this period cannot be expressed in figures.
Neither the idea nor the word occurs in books known to be before the Buddha. But both are Indian rather than Buddhist. Saṃvarta is found in the Mahā Bhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa; and the later Sāṅkhya notion of pralaya is closely allied.
[148] This phrase recurs below, chap. iii SectionSection 14, 20.
[149] Sīla, for instance, and samādhi, and all the other things known to a Buddha, says Buddhaghosa, p. 108.
[150] Paccattaṃ. See the common phrases A. II, 198=S. I, 9, 10, 117; M. I, 188=422; M. I, 251, 252 = S. III, 54, &c.; and S. N. 611,906; Mil. 96, 347; Sum. 182. ‘Without depending on anyone else, himself by himself,’ says Buddhaghosa.
[151] Nirvana, says Buddhaghosa.
[152] Gogerly (PP. 77, 78 in Grimblot) has made a sad mess of this paragraph misunderstanding the grammatical construction of the first clause, and misinterpreting- parāmasati in the second, and nissaranaṃ in the third.
[153] Not of course the four speculations, but the higher knowledge which has led him to reject them.
[154] This string of epithets recurs at M. I, 327 in the course of the story of the Brahmā, named Baka, who is represented as coming to the very conclusion set out in our section. The story was a favourite one, and three recessions of it have been preserved (M. I, 326-331; S. I, 142-144, and Jāt. No. 405). Mr. Crow evidently considered himself the Mahā Brahmā of the period.
The omission in the Dialogue of all reference to the Kesava Birth Story may be a sign of greater age or it may be due simply to the fact that it is not required for the argument there.
[155] Khiḍḍa-padosikā. They are not mentioned elsewhere except in the list of gods in the Mahā Samaya (p. 287).
[156] Buddhaghosa on this has a curious note. The gods, though of great glory, are delicate in body. A man, having- gone without food – for seven days even, may restore his strength by the use of clear broth and so on. But the gods can’t play tricks with themselves; and if they lose their heads and forget their meal-times, they die-pass away from that state. The poor gods! Whether this be really implied in the text or not, it is at least in harmony with the irony of the Buddha’s talk.
[157] Mano-padosikā. Only found here and in the list in the Samaya Sutta. Even there it is almost certainly merely taken from this passage, so that it looks very much as if both these classes or titles of gods were simply invented, in irony, for the sake of the argument. Buddhaghosa identifies this class with the retinue of the four Great Kings-that is the regents of the four quarters.
[158] Upanijjhāyanti, from jhāyati, to burn. Elsewhere found only at Vin. 1, 193; II, 269; 111, 118, in all which passages it has the connotation of ‘covet, lust after.’ Buddhaghosa takes it here in the sense of envy, and tells a tale, too long to quote, to show the quarrelsome nature of these gods. In the sense of ‘consider’ (from jhāyati, to think) the word has only been found at S. N., p. 143. There may have been confusion between the two homonyms, so that ours got to mean to consider in such a way as to be excited, to burn.’
[159] Buddhaghosa explains that these speculators perceive how the organs of sense break up (and sense impressions pass away); but they fail to see that the same thing holds even more strongly in the case of thoughts, since no sooner has each mental impression given rise to the succeeding one than it passes away. Not perceiving that, and depending on the analogy of birds, who fly away from one tree only to alight on another, they conclude that the mind, when this individuality is broken up, goes (as a unity) elsewhere.
[160] Antānantikā.
[161] Parivaṭumo. Only found here. Buddhaghosa says nothing.
[162] According to Buddhaghosa (Ats. 160) there are four things that are infinite-space, the number of world-systems, the number of living creatures, and the wisdom of a Buddha. Had this doctrine formed part of the original Buddhism we should expect to find these cattāri – anantāni in the chapter on the ‘Fours’ in the Aṅguttara, but I do not find them there.
[163] Either in self-training or in the attainment of bliss in heaven’ says Buddhaghosa (p.115).
[164] Buddhaghosa gives examples of these five equivocations.
[165] Buddhaghosa explains that if, in his ignorance, he should, by chance, declare the good to be good, he will be puffed up by the approval of the wise. But if he should blunder, he will be filled with vexation and ill will when his error is pointed out. Either of these states of mind will be the fuel to keep the fire burning, the state technically called Upādāna, ‘grasping.’
[166] Sampāyati. See the note at ‘Vinaya Texts,’ III, 317, and compare M. I, 85, 96, 472.
[167] Such questions are called elsewhere the common basis of discussions among Brahmans.
[168] The word here used is Tathāgata, ‘he who has gone, or perhaps come, to the truth.’ See Chalmers in the J. R. A. S.’ Jan., 1898, and compare S. III, 111, 116-118; M. I, I40, 171, 486; S. N. 467. The use of sammaggato (D. I, 55, &c.) and of gatatto (D. I, 57, &c.) shows that gata was used elliptically in the sense of gone to the furthest point aimed at’ among the followers of the other sects that arose at the same time as Buddhism. The exact derivation and history of the word Tathāgata may be doubtful, but its meaning is, on the whole, clear enough.
[169] This is the identical answer put below (p. 57 of the text) into the mouth of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta.
[170] Adhicca-samuppannikā. This adhicca (which must be distinguished from the other adhicca, derived from adhīyati, occurring at Jāt. III, 218 = IV, 301) recurs at M. 1, 443, where it is opposed in the sense of ‘occasional’ to abhiṇha at M. I, 442 in the sense of ‘habitual.’ Udāna VI, 5 throws light on its use here. It is there associated with words meaning neither self-originated, nor created by others.’ It is explained by Buddhaghosa on our passage (Sum. I, 118) as ‘springing up without a cause.’ The derivation is doubtful.
[171] Asañña-sattā. They spring into being in this wise. Some one of the Brahman ascetics having practised continual meditation and arrived at the Fourth Jhāna, sees the disadvantage attached to thinking, and says to himself: ‘It is by dwelling on it in thought that physical pain and all sorts of mental terrors arise. Have done with this thinking. An existence without it were better.’ And dying in this belief he is reborn among the Unconscious Ones, who have form only, and neither sensations nor ideas nor predispositions nor consciousness. So long as the power of the Jhāna lasts, so long do they last. Then an idea occurs to them-the idea of rebirth in this world-and they straightway die.
[172] See 1, 1, 29 (p. 12 of the text).
[173] Literally ‘who are After-deathers, Conscious-maintainers.’ These summary epithets are meant to be contemptuous, and the word chosen for death adds to the force of the phrase. It is not the usual word, but āghātana (so read in the text), meaning literally ‘shambles, place of execution.’ The ordinary phrase would have been parammaraṇikā.
[174] So the Ajīvakas, says Buddhaghosa.
[175] So the Nigaṇṭhas, says Buddhaghosa.
[176] SectionSection 9-18 are discussed by James D’Alwis in ‘Buddhist Nirvana,’ p. 47. Comp. Jacobi, ‘Jaina Sūtras,’ II, 236, 339.
[177] Sato sattassa. Insert the word sato in the text (as in SectionSection 17,19, 41, 42). The Kaṭha Upanishad I, 20 alludes to such belief.
[178] Compare the 4th Vimokha. See Rh. D. ‘Buddhist Suttas,’ pp. 5 2, 213. The idea of resistance, paṭigha, is here not ethical, but refers to the senses. Having no sense of reaction to touch, of opposition to muscular effort. it appears from M. I, 164 that this was pretty much the view put forth by Gotama’s first teacher Ālāra Kālāma.
[179] Compare the 5th Vimokha. This seems from M. I 165 to have been much the same as the view held by Rāma, whose son and pupil, Uddaka, was Gotama’s second teacher.
[180] Compare the 6th Vimokha.
[181] Though it is not explicitly so stated, this last of these seven theorisers is no doubt to be considered as believing in all the sorts of soul held by the others, so that he believes in seven. One may compare the five souls each more subtle than the last, made respectively of anna, prāṇa, manas, vijñāṇa, and ānanda (food. breadth mind, consciousness, and joy), described in the Taittirīya Upanishad II, 1-5. The Buddhist modification of these ‘theories omits the souls, and treats instead of various states of mind (produced by stages of meditation), the attainment of which, during this life, leads to rebirth in corresponding worlds, or planes of existence, named after those stages. of meditations. But the oldest Piṭaka texts say very little about it, and the history of Buddhist speculation on the matter has yet to be formulated.
Centuries afterwards we find a somewhat analogous conception in the gradually ascending series of seven, each more subtle than the last (Sthūla-sarīra, Īnga-sarīra, indriya, manas, ahaṅkara, buddhi, and ātman), set out in the Sāṅkhya texts, and the later Vedanta has a similar series. There is sufficient truth in the idea of the series of seven set out in our text to explain the persistence of the general idea in all the Indian systems, but the details and the application are strikingly different.
The text shows that the four Arūpa Vimokhas of the Buddhist theory were regarded by the early Buddhists as derived from closely allied speculations, older than Buddhism, and expressed in almost identical phraseology.
[182] Buddhaghosa here (Sum. 1, 121) explains Nirvāṇa as the suppression of pain; pain, dukkha, being bodily, as opposed to domanassa, mental. ‘In this visible world’ means in whatever world the particular soul happens to be at the time. On parikāreti compare V. II, 290 rājā uyyāne paricāresi, ‘the king indulged himself, enjoyed himself, in the garden.’ All its functions’ is added from the Commentary.
[183] The text shows that the four Jhānas were regarded by the early Buddhists as older than Buddhism. The very words used are identical; the only modification introduced in Buddhism being the omission of the ‘souls.’ These four, Together. with the four Arūpa Vimokhas (see note on Section 19), make up the Eight Attainments (Samāpattiyo), often mentioned in the Jātaka commentary as practised by pre Buddhistic recluses.
[184] On paritasita compare M. 1, 36 na asati paritassati, ‘is not worried at what is not ‘: paritasita, ‘fidgetiness ‘or ‘worry,’ at M. 1, 136; S. III, 15-19; and Mil. 253, 400. On vipphandita, M. I, 8, 486; Dh. S. 381 (Asl. 253); Jāt. IV, 495.
[185] In the text the first three of these four propositions are repeated of each of the eleven classes of theorisers. ‘The fourth is put in the form which, to avoid repetition, I have adopted for all the four.
[186] Tathāgata, that is the speaker himself, the Buddha.
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