

The Collection of Connected Discourses

(Saṃyutta Nikāya)

Part Three

The Book of Connected Discourses

on the Aggregates

(Khandhavaggasaṃyuttapāḷi)

Homage to the Blessed One,
the Arahant, the Fully Enlightened One

Book I
Chapter 22

Connected Discourses on the Aggregates
(*Khandha-saṃyutta*)

I. Nakulapitā

1 (1) Nakulapitā

[1] Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling among the Bhaggas at Sumsumāragira in the Bhesakaḷā Grove, the Deer Park. Then the householder Nakulapitā approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:¹

‘I am old, venerable sir, aged, burdened with years, advanced in life, come to the last stage, afflicted in body, often ill. I rarely get to see the Blessed One and the bhikkhus worthy of esteem.² Let the Blessed One exhort me, venerable sir, let him instruct me, since that would lead to my welfare and happiness for a long time.’

‘So it is, householder, so it is! This body of yours is afflicted, weighed down, encumbered.³ If anyone carrying around this body were to claim to be healthy even for a moment, what is that due to other than foolishness? Therefore, householder, you should train yourself thus: “Even though I am afflicted in body, my mind will be unafflicted.” Thus should you train yourself.’

Then the householder Nakulapitā, having delighted and rejoiced in the Blessed One’s statement, [2] rose from his seat and, having paid homage to the Blessed One, keeping him on his right, he approached the Venerable Sāriputta. Having paid homage to the Venerable Sāriputta, he sat down to one side, and the Venerable Sāriputta then said to him:

‘Householder, your faculties are serene, your facial complexion is pure and bright. Did you get to hear a Dhamma talk today in the presence of the Blessed One?’

‘Why not, venerable sir? Just now I was anointed by the Blessed One with the ambrosia of a Dhamma talk.’

‘With what kind of ambrosia of a Dhamma talk did the Blessed One anoint you, householder?’

‘Here, venerable sir, I approached the Blessed One....’

(*The householder Nakulapitā repeats his entire conversation with the Buddha.*)

‘It was with the ambrosia of such a Dhamma talk, venerable sir, that the Blessed One anointed me.’

‘Didn’t it occur to you, householder, to question the Blessed One further as to how one is afflicted in body and afflicted in mind, and how one is afflicted in body but not afflicted in mind?’ [3]

‘We would come from far away, venerable sir, to learn the meaning of this statement from the Venerable Sāriputta. It would be good indeed if the Venerable Sāriputta would clear up the meaning of this statement.’

‘Then listen and attend carefully, householder, I will speak.’

‘Yes, venerable sir,’ the householder Nakulapitā replied. The Venerable Sāriputta said this:

‘How, householder, is one afflicted in body and afflicted in mind? Here, householder, the uninstructed worldling,⁴ who does not get to see the noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who does not

¹ The name means ‘Nākula’s father.’ His wife is called Nakulamātā, ‘Nakula’s mother,’ though the texts never disclose the identity of Nakula. The Buddha pronounced him and his wife the most trusting (*etadaggaṃ viśāsakānaṃ*) of his lay disciples (A I 26). According to SA, they had been the Blessed One’s parents in five hundred past lives and his close relations in many more past lives. For additional references see DPPN 2:3.

² All three eds. of SN, and both eds. of SA, read *aniccadassāvī*, ‘not always a seer,’ but the SS reading *adhiccadassāvī*, ‘a chance seer,’ may be more original; CPD also prefers the latter. SA: ‘Because of my affliction I am unable to come whenever I want; I get to see (him) only sometimes, not constantly.’

Manobhāvanīyā, used in apposition to *bhikkhū*, has often been misinterpreted by translators to mean ‘with developed mind.’ However, the expression is a gerundive meaning literally ‘who should be brought to mind,’ i.e., who are worthy of esteem. SA: ‘Those great elders such as Sāriputta and Moggallāna are called ‘worthy of esteem’ (‘to be brought to mind’) because the mind (*citta*) grows in wholesome qualities whenever they are seen.’

³ Be and Ce read the second descriptive term as *aṇḍabhūto*, lit. ‘egg-become,’ and SA endorses this with its explanation: ‘*Aṇḍabhūto*: become weak (*dubbala*) like an egg. For just as one cannot play with an egg by throwing it around or hitting it—since it breaks apart at once—so this body has ‘become like an egg’ because it breaks apart even if one stumbles on a thorn or a stump.’ Despite the texts and SA, Ee’s reading *addhabhūto* (which could be a dialectical variant of *abhibhūto*, ‘overcome’) may be preferable; see 35:29 and IV,n.14.

⁴ On the commentarial etymology of *puthujjana*, see II,n.153. SA gives a long analysis of this passage; for a translation of the parallel at MA I 20–25, see Bhikkhu Bodhi, *Discourse on the Root of Existence*, pp.33–38. The commentaries distinguish

get to see superior persons and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. He lives obsessed by the notions: “I am form, form is mine.”⁵ As he lives obsessed by these notions, that form of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of form, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.

‘He regards feeling as self, or self as possessing feeling, or feeling as in self, or self as in feeling. He lives obsessed by the notions: “I am feeling, feeling is mine.” As he lives obsessed by these notions, that feeling of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of feeling, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.

‘He regards perception as self, or self as possessing perception, or perception as in self, or self as in perception. He lives obsessed by the notions: “I am perception, perception is mine.” As he lives obsessed by these notions, that perception of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of perception, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.

‘He regards volitional constructions as self, or self as possessing volitional constructions, or volitional constructions as in self, or self as in volitional constructions. He lives obsessed by the notions: “I am volitional constructions, volitional constructions are mine.” As he lives obsessed by these notions, those volitional constructions of his change and alter. [4] With the change and alteration of volitional constructions, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.

‘He regards consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. He lives obsessed by the notions: “I am consciousness, consciousness is mine.” As he lives obsessed by these notions, that consciousness of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of consciousness, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.

‘It is in such a way, householder, that one is afflicted in body and afflicted in mind.’⁶

‘And how, householder, is one afflicted in body but not afflicted in mind? Here, householder, the instructed noble disciple, who gets to see the noble ones and is skilled and disciplined in their Dhamma, who gets to see superior persons and is skilled and disciplined in their Dhamma, does not regard form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form.’⁷ He does not live obsessed by the notions: “I am form, form is mine.” As he lives unobsessed by these notions, that form of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of form, there do not arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.

‘He does not regard feeling as self, or self as possessing feeling, or feeling as in self, or self as in feeling. He does not live obsessed by the notions: “I am feeling, feeling is mine.” As he lives unobsessed by these notions, that feeling of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of feeling, there do not arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.

‘He does not regard perception as self, or self as possessing perception, or perception as in self, or self as in perception. He does not live obsessed by the notions: “I am perception, perception is mine.” As he lives unob-

between the ‘uninstructed worldling’ (*assutavā puthujjana*) and the ‘good worldling’ (*kalyāṇa puthujjana*). While both are worldlings in the technical sense that they have not reached the path of stream-entry, the former has neither theoretical knowledge of the Dhamma nor training in the practice, while the latter has both and is striving to reach the path.

⁵ Text here enumerates the twenty types of identity view (*sakkāya-dīṭṭhi*), obtained by positing a self in the four given ways in relation to the five aggregates that constitute personal identity (*sakkāya*; see **22:105**). Identity view is the first of the ten fetters to be eradicated by the attainment of the path of stream-entry.

SA: He *regards form as self* (*rūpaṃ attato samanupassati*), by regarding form and the self as indistinguishable, just as the flame of an oil lamp and its colour are indistinguishable. He regards *self as possessing form* (*rūpavantaṃ attānaṃ*), when he takes the formless (i.e., the mind or mental factors) as a self that possesses form, in the way a tree possesses a shadow; *form as in self* (*attani rūpaṃ*), when he takes the formless (mind) as a self within which form is situated, as the scent is in a flower; *self as in form* (*rūpasmim attānaṃ*), when he takes the formless (mind) as a self situated in form, as a jewel is in a casket. *He is obsessed by the notions, ‘I am form, form is mine’*: he swallows these ideas with craving and views, takes his stand upon them, and grasps hold of them.

SA states that the identification of each aggregate individually with the self is the annihilationist view (*uccheda-dīṭṭhi*), while the other views are variants of eternalism (*sassata-dīṭṭhi*); thus there are five types of annihilationism and fifteen of eternalism. To my mind this is unacceptable, for eternalist views can clearly be formulated by taking the individual mental aggregates as the self. It also seems questionable to me that a view of self must implicitly posit one (or more) of the aggregates as self; for a view of self to have any meaning or content, all this is necessary is that it posit a relationship between the assumed self and the five aggregates. According to the Buddha, all such positions collapse under analysis. See the ‘considerations of self’ section of the Mahānidāna Sutta (DN II 66–68), translated with commentary in Bhikkhu Bodhi, *the Great Discourse on Causation*, pp.53–55, 92–98.

⁶ SA: Even for the Buddhas the body is afflicted, but the mind is afflicted when it is accompanied by lust, hatred, and delusion.

⁷ This is the standard formula describing a disciple whose minimal attainment is stream-entry (*sotāpatti*). The path of stream-entry eradicates the lower three fetters: identity view, doubt, and adherence to rules and vows.

sessed by these notions, that perception of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of perception, there do not arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair. [5]

‘He does not regard volitional constructions as self, or self as possessing volitional constructions, or volitional constructions as in self, or self as in volitional constructions. He does not live obsessed by the notions: “I am volitional constructions, volitional constructions are mine.” As he lives unobsessed by these notions, those volitional constructions of his change and alter. With the change and alteration of volitional constructions, there do not arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.

‘He does not regard consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. He does not live obsessed by the notions: “I am consciousness, consciousness is mine.” As he lives unobsessed by these notions, that consciousness of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of consciousness, there do not arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.

‘It is in such a way, householder, that one is afflicted in body but not afflicted in mind.’⁸

This is what the Venerable Sāriputta said. Being pleased, the householder Nakulapitā delighted in the Venerable Sāriputta’s statement.

2 (2) At Devadaha

Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling among the Sakyans where there was a town of the Sakyans named Devadaha. Then a number of westward-bound bhikkhus approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:

‘Venerable sir, we wish to go to the western province in order to take up residence there.’⁹

‘Have you taken leave of Sāriputta, bhikkhus?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Then take leave of Sāriputta, bhikkhus. Sāriputta is wise, he is one who helps his bhikkhu-companions in the holy life.’¹⁰ [6]

‘Yes, venerable sir,’ those bhikkhus replied. Now on that occasion the Venerable Sāriputta was sitting not far from the Blessed One in a cassia bush.¹¹ Then those bhikkhus, having delighted and rejoiced in the Blessed One’s statement, rose from their seats and, having paid homage to the Blessed One, keeping him on their right, they approached the Venerable Sāriputta. They exchanged greetings with the Venerable Sāriputta and, when they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, they sat down to one side and said to him:

‘Friend Sāriputta, we wish to go to the western province in order to take up residence there. We have taken leave of the Teacher.’

‘Friends, there are wise khattiyas, wise brahmins, wise householders, and wise recluses who question a bhikkhu when he has gone abroad¹²—for wise people, friends, are inquisitive: “What does the venerable ones’ teacher say, what does he teach?” I hope that you venerable ones have learned the teachings well, grasped them well, attended to them well, reflected on them well, and penetrated them well with wisdom, so that when you answer you will state what has been said by the Blessed One and will not misrepresent him with what is contrary to fact: so that you will explain in accordance with the Dhamma, and no reasonable consequence of your assertion would give ground for criticism.’¹³

‘We would come from far away, friend, to learn the meaning of this statement from the Venerable Sāriputta. It would be good indeed if the Venerable Sāriputta would clear up the meaning of this statement.’

‘Then listen and attend carefully, friends, I will speak.’

⁸ SA: Here, non-affliction of mind is shown by the absence of defilements. Thus in this sutta the worldly multitude is shown to be afflicted in both body and mind, the arahant to be afflicted in body but unafflicted in mind. The seven *sekha* (trainees: the four on the path and three at the fruition stages) are neither afflicted nor unafflicted in mind, but they are pursuing non-affliction of mind (*anāturacittataṃ yeva bhajanti*).

⁹ SA: They wanted to spend the three months of the rains residence there.

¹⁰ SA here gives a long account of how Sāriputta assists his fellow monks with both their material needs (*āmisānuggaha*) and with the Dhamma (*dhammānuggaha*). For a translation, see Nyanaponika Thera, ‘Sāriputta: The Marshal of the Dhamma,’ in Nyanaponika and Hecker, *The Great Disciples of the Buddha*, pp.21–22.

¹¹ *Eḷagalāgumbha*. PED identifies *eḷagalā* as the plant Cassia Tora. SA: This bush grows where there is a constant supply of flowing water. People made a bower with four posts, over which they let the bush grow, forming a pavilion. Below this they made a seat by placing bricks down and strewing sand over them. It was a cool place during the day, with a fresh breeze blowing from the water.

¹² *Gone abroad (nānāverajjagataṃ)*: Gone to a realm different from the realm of one king. A foreign realm (*virajja*) is another realm; for as a region different from one’s own is called a foreign region (*videsa*), so a realm different from that one normally resides in is called a foreign realm. That is what is meant by ‘abroad.’

¹³ See II,n.73.

‘Yes, friend,’ those bhikkhus replied. The Venerable Sāriputta said this: [7]

‘There are, friends, wise khattiyas ... wise recluses who question a bhikkhu...: “What does the venerable ones’ teacher say, what does he teach?” Being asked thus, friends, you should answer: “Our teacher, friends, teaches the removal of desire and lust.”

‘When you have answered thus, friends, there may be wise khattiyas ... wise recluses who will question you further—for wise people, friends, are inquisitive: “In regard to what does the venerable ones’ teacher teach the removal of desire and lust?” Being asked thus, friends, you should answer: “Our teacher, friends, teaches the removal of desire and lust for form, the removal of desire and lust for feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness.”

‘When you have answered thus, friends, there may be wise khattiyas ... wise recluses who will question you further—for wise people, friends, are inquisitive: “Having seen what danger does the venerable ones’ teacher teach the removal of desire and lust for form, the removal of desire and lust for feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness?” Being asked thus, friends, you should answer thus: “If, friends, one is not devoid of lust, desire, affection, thirst, passion, and craving in regard to form,¹⁴ then with the change and alteration of form there arise in one sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair. If, friends, one is not devoid of lust, desire, affection, thirst, passion, and craving in regard to feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, then with the change and alteration of consciousness there arise in one sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair. Having seen this danger, our teacher teaches the removal of desire and lust for form, the removal of desire and lust for feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness.” [8]

‘When you have answered thus, friends, there may be wise khattiyas ... wise recluses who will question you further—for wise people, friends, are inquisitive: “Having seen what benefit does the venerable ones’ teacher teach the removal of desire and lust for form, the removal of desire and lust for feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness?” Being asked thus, friends, you should answer thus: “If, friends, one is devoid of lust, desire, affection, thirst, passion, and craving in regard to form, then with the change and alteration of form sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair do not arise in one. If one is devoid of lust, desire, affection, thirst, passion, and craving in regard to feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, then with the change and alteration of consciousness sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair do not arise in one. Having seen this benefit, our teacher teaches the removal of desire and lust for form, the removal of desire and lust for feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness.”

‘If, friends,¹⁵ one who enters and dwells amidst unwholesome states could dwell happily in this very life, without vexation, despair, and fever, and if, with the break up of the body, after death, he could expect a good destination, then the Blessed One would not praise the abandoning of unwholesome states. But because one who enters and dwells amidst unwholesome states dwells in suffering in this very life, with vexation, despair, and fever, and because he can expect a bad destination with the breakup of the body, after death, the Blessed One praises the abandoning of unwholesome states.

‘If, friends, one who enters and dwells amidst wholesome states would dwell in suffering in this very life, with vexation, [9] despair, and fever, and if, with the breakup of the body, after death, he could expect a bad destination, then the Blessed One would not praise the acquisition of wholesome states. But because one who enters and dwells amidst wholesome states dwells happily in this very life, without vexation, despair, and fever, and because he can expect a good destination with the breakup of the body, after death, the Blessed One praises the acquisition of wholesome states.’

This is what the Venerable Sāriputta said. Being pleased, those bhikkhus delighted in the Venerable Sāriputta’s statement.

3 (3) Hālidakāni (1)

Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Venerable Mahākaccāna was dwelling among the people of Avantī on the Papāta Mountain at Kuraraghara.¹⁶ Then the householder Hālidakāni approached the Venerable Mahākaccāna, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:

¹⁴ SA says that all these terms should be understood as synonyms of craving (*taṇhā*). I deliberately translate *pariḷāha* in two ways: as ‘passion’ when it is used as a synonym for craving (as here), and as ‘fever’ (just below) when it is used to signify a severe degree of suffering.

¹⁵ SA: This passage is introduced to show the danger facing one who is not devoid of lust for the five aggregates, and the benefits won by one who is devoid of lust.

¹⁶ Mahākaccāna was the Buddha’s foremost disciple in the detailed exposition of brief sayings, a skill he displays in this sutta and the next, and elsewhere in SN at **35:130, 132**. For a study of his life and teachings, see Bhikkhu Bodhi, ‘Mahākaccāna:

‘Venerable sir, this was said by the Blessed One in “The Questions of Māgandiya” of the *Aṭṭhakavagga*.¹⁷

“Having left home to roam without abode,
In the village the sage is intimate with none:
Rid of sense pleasures, without preference,
He would not engage people in dispute.”

How, venerable sir, should the meaning of this, stated by the Blessed One in brief, be understood in detail?

‘The form element, householder, is the home of consciousness: one whose consciousness is shackled by lust for the form element is called one who roams about in a home.¹⁸ The feeling element is the home of consciousness ... [10] The perception element is the home of consciousness ... The volitional constructions element is the home of consciousness: one whose consciousness is shackled by lust for the volitional constructions element is called one who roams about in a home. It is in such a way that one roams about in a home.¹⁹

‘And how, householder, does one roam about homeless? The desire, lust, delight, and craving, the engagement and clinging, the mental standpoints, adherences, and underlying tendencies regarding the form element: these have been abandoned by the Tathāgata, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that they are no more subject to future arising.²⁰ Therefore the Tathāgata is called one who roams about homeless. The desire, lust, delight, and craving, the engagement and clinging, the mental standpoints, adherences, and underlying tendencies regarding the feeling element ... the perception element ... the volitional constructions element ... the consciousness element:²¹ these have been abandoned by the Tathāgata, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that they are no more subject to future arising. Therefore the Tathāgata is called one who roams about homeless. It is in such a way that one roams about homeless.

‘And how, householder, does one roam about in an abode? By diffusion and confinement in the abode (consisting in) the sign of forms, one is called one who roams about in an abode.²² By diffusion and confinement in the

The Master of Doctrinal Exposition,’ in Nyanaponika and Hecker, *The Great Disciples of the Buddha*, pp.213–44. Avantī, his native region, was to the far southwest of the Ganges basin.

¹⁷ Sn 844. In analysing the first line of the verse, Mahākaccāna does not simply explain the literal meaning of the words, which makes perfectly good sense in the original context, but instead treats the terms as metaphors bearing non-figurative meanings. He then draws out these meanings by plotting the terms in relation to a technical system of exegesis. This approach to interpretation was to become prominent in the commentaries.

¹⁸ The first line of the verse reads: *okaṃ pahāya aniketasārī*. No mention is made of *okasārī* or *anokasārī*, ‘one who roams in a home’ and ‘one who roams about homeless,’ but Mahākaccāna introduces these terms as implicit in the absolute constructive *okaṃ pahāya*. The use of *dhātu* as a synonym for *khandha* is unusual; more often the two are treated as headings for different schemes of classification. But see 22:45, 53, 54, etc., where we also find this usage.

I follow the reading of the text in Ce and Ee, *rūpadhāturāgavinibaddham*, also supported by SA (Be), as against Be’s -*vinibandham*. SA resolves the compound, *rūpadhātumhi rāgena vinibaddham*, and explains this consciousness as the kammic consciousness (*kamma-viññāṇa*). The passage confirms the privileged status of consciousness among the five aggregates. While all the aggregates are conditioned phenomena marked by the three characteristics, consciousness serves as the connecting thread of personal continuity through the sequence of rebirths. This ties up with the idea expressed at 12:38–40 that consciousness is the persisting element in experience that links together the old existence with the new one. The other four aggregates serve as ‘stations for consciousness’ (*viññāṇaṭṭhitiyo*; see 22:53–54). Even consciousness, however, is not a self-identical entity but a sequence of dependently arisen occasions of cognizing; see MN I 256–60.

¹⁹ SA: Why isn’t the consciousness element mentioned here (as a ‘home for consciousness’)? To avoid confusion, for ‘home’ is here spoken of in the sense of a condition (*paccaya*). An earlier kammic consciousness is a condition for both a later kammic consciousness and a resultant consciousness, and an (earlier) resultant consciousness for both a (later) resultant consciousness and a kammic consciousness. Therefore the confusion could arise: ‘What kind of consciousness is intended here?’ To avoid such confusion, consciousness is not included, and the teaching is expressed without disorder. Further, the other four aggregates, as objects (or bases: *ārammaṇavasena*), are said to be ‘stations for the volitionally constructive consciousness’ (*abhisankhāraviññāṇaṭṭhitiyo*), and to show them thus consciousness is not mentioned here.

²⁰ *Engagement and clinging* (*upay’upādāna*), etc. See 12:15 and II,n.31. SA explains that although all arahants abandon these, the Tathāgata, the Fully Enlightened One, is mentioned as the supreme example because his status as an arahant is most evident to all the world.

²¹ SA: Why is consciousness mentioned here? To show the abandoning of defilements. For defilements are not fully abandoned in relation to the other four aggregates only, but in relation to all five.

²² I read the long compound with Be and Ce *rūpanimittaniketa-visāra*vinibandha. Ee has *-sāra-* in place of *-visāra-*. The interpretation is as difficult as it looks. I have unravelled it with the aid of SA, which explains: ‘Form itself is the ‘sign’ (*nimitta*) in the sense that it is a condition for defilements, and it is also the abode (consisting in) the ‘sign of forms,’ being an abode in the sense of a dwelling place, namely, for the act of objectification. By the two terms ‘diffusion and confinement’ (*visāra-vinibandha*) what is meant is the expansion of defilements and their confining (or binding) nature. (Thus the full compound should be resolved:) ‘diffusion and confinement in the abode (consisting in) the sign of forms.’ Hence the meaning is: ‘by the diffusion of defilements, and by the bondage of defilements arisen in the abode (consisting in) the sign of forms.’

abode (consisting in) the sign of sounds ... the sign of odours ... the sign of tastes ... the sign of tactile objects ... the sign of mental phenomena, one is called one who roams about in an abode.

‘And how, householder, does one roam about without abode? Diffusion and confinement in the abode (consisting in) the sign of forms: these have been abandoned by the Tathāgata, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that they are no more subject to future arising. Therefore the Tathāgata is called one who roams about without abode. Diffusion and confinement in the abode (consisting in) the sign of sounds ... the sign of odours ... the sign of tastes ... the sign of tactile objects ... the sign of mental phenomena: these have been abandoned by the Tathāgata, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, [11] obliterated so that they are no more subject to future arising. Therefore the Tathāgata is called one who roams about without abode. It is in such a way that one roams about without abode.²³

‘And how, householder, is one intimate in the village? Here, householder, someone lives in association with laypeople: he rejoices with them and sorrows with them, he is happy when they are happy and sad when they are sad, and he involves himself in their affairs and duties.²⁴ It is in such a way that one is intimate in the village.

‘And how, householder, is one intimate with none in the village? Here, householder, a bhikkhu does not live in association with laypeople. He does not rejoice with them or sorrow with them, he is not happy when they are happy and sad when they are sad, and he does not involve himself in their affairs and duties. It is in such a way that one is intimate with none in the village.

‘And how, householder, is one not rid of sensual pleasures? Here, householder, someone is not devoid of lust, desire, affection, thirst, passion, and craving in regard to sensual pleasures. It is in such a way that one is not rid of sensual pleasures.

‘And how, householder, is one rid of sensual pleasures? Here, householder, someone is devoid of lust, desire, affection, thirst, passion, and craving in regard to sensual pleasures. It is in such a way that one is rid of sensual pleasures.

‘And how, householder, does one make preferences?²⁵ Here, householder, someone thinks: “May I have such form in the future! May I have such feeling in the future! May I have such perception in the future! May I have such volitional constructions in the future! May I have such consciousness in the future!” It is in such a way that one makes preferences.

‘And how, householder, is one free from preferences? Here, householder, someone does not think: “May I have such form in the future!... [12] May I have such consciousness in the future!” It is in such a way that one is free from preferences.

‘And how, householder, does one engage people in dispute? Here, householder, someone engages in such talk as this: “You don’t understand this Dhamma and Discipline. I understand this Dhamma and Discipline. What, you understand this Dhamma and Discipline! You are practising wrongly, I am practising rightly. What should have been said before you said after: what should have been said after you said before. I am consistent, you are inconsistent. What you took so long to think out has been overturned. Your thesis has been refuted. Go off to rescue your thesis, for you’re defeated, or disentangle yourself if you can.” It is in such a way that one engages people in dispute.

One is called ‘one who roams about in an abode’: one is called ‘one who roams about in a dwelling place’ by making (forms) an object.’

²³ SA: Why are the five aggregates here called ‘home,’ while the six objects are called ‘an abode’? Because of the relative strength and weakness of desire and lust, respectively. For though they are similar in being places of residence, ‘home’ means one’s house, a permanent dwelling place, while ‘abode’ is a place where one dwells for a special purpose, such as a park, etc. As desire and lust are strong in relation to one’s home, which is inhabited by one’s wife, children, wealth, and possessions, so too they are strong in regard to the internal aggregates. But as lust and desire are weaker in regard to such places as parks, etc., so too in relation to external objects.

ST: Because desire and lust are strong in relation to the internal five aggregates, the latter are called ‘home,’ and because desire and lust are weaker in relation to the six external objects, the latter are called ‘an abode.’

²⁴ See 9:7.

²⁵ Ce: *purekkharāno*; Be and Ee: *purakkharāno*. Sn reads as in Ce. The word usually means ‘honouring, revering,’ but the text here plays on the literal meaning ‘putting in front,’ interpreted as projecting into the future through desire. SA glosses it with *vaṭṭaṃ purato kurumāno*, ‘putting the round of becoming in front.’ The negative *apurekkharāno* is here glossed as *vaṭṭaṃ purato akurumāno*, and at SnA 547,6–7 as *āyatim attabhāvaṃ anabhinibbattento*, ‘not producing individual existence in the future.’ Mahākaccāna’s explanation mirrors the Buddha’s exegesis of the Bhaddekaratta verses at MN III 188,15–26.

‘And how, householder, does one not engage people in dispute? Here, householder, someone does not engage in such talk as this:²⁶ “You don’t understand this Dhamma and Discipline.... “ It is in such a way that one does not engage people in dispute.

‘Thus, householder, when it was said by the Blessed One in “The Questions of Māgandiya” of the Aṭṭhakavagga:

“Having left home to roam without abode,
In the village the sage is intimate with none:
Rid of sense pleasures, free from preferences,
He would not engage people in dispute”–

it is in such a way that the meaning of this, stated in brief by the Blessed One, should be understood in detail.’

4 (4) Hālidakāni (2)

Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Venerable Mahākaccāna was dwelling among the people of Avantī on the Papāta Mountain at Kuraraghara. [13] Then the householder Hālidakāni approached the Venerable Mahākaccāna, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:

‘Venerable sir, this was said by the Blessed One in “The Questions of Sakka”: “Those recluses and brahmins who are liberated in the full extinction of craving are those who have reached the ultimate end, the ultimate security from bondage, the ultimate holy life, the ultimate goal, and are best among devas and humans.”²⁷ How, venerable sir, should the meaning of this, stated in brief by the Blessed One, be understood in detail?’

‘Householder, through the destruction, fading away, cessation, giving up, and relinquishment of desire, lust, delight, craving, engagement and clinging, mental standpoints, adherences, and underlying tendencies towards the form element, the mind is said to be well liberated.²⁸

‘Through the destruction, fading away, cessation, giving up, and relinquishment of desire, lust, delight, craving, engagement and clinging, mental standpoints, adherences, and underlying tendencies towards the feeling element ... the perception element ... the volitional constructions element ... the consciousness element, the mind is said to be well liberated.

‘Thus, householder, when it was said by the Blessed One in “The Questions of Sakka”: “Those recluses and brahmins who are liberated in the full extinction of craving are those who have reached the ultimate end, the ultimate security from bondage, the ultimate holy life, the ultimate goal, and are best among devas and humans”–it is in such a way that the meaning of this, stated in brief by the Blessed One, should be understood in detail.’

5 (5) Concentration

Thus have I heard. At Sāvattihī.... There the Blessed One said this:

‘Bhikkhus, develop concentration. A bhikkhu who is concentrated understands things as they really are.

‘And what does he understand as it really is? The origin and passing away of form: the origin and passing away of feeling: [14] the origin and passing away of perception: the origin and passing away of volitional constructions: the origin and passing away of consciousness.²⁹

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the origin of form? What is the origin of feeling? What is the origin of perception? What is the origin of volitional constructions? What is the origin of consciousness?

‘Here, bhikkhus, <a bhikkhu> one seeks delight, one welcomes, one remains holding. And what is it that one seeks delight in, what does one welcome, to what does one remain holding? One seeks delight in form, welcomes it, and remains holding to it. As a consequence of this, delight arises. Delight in form is clinging. With one’s clinging as condition, becoming (comes to be): with becoming as condition, birth: with birth as condition, aging–

²⁶ This passage is also found at 56:9, also at DN I 8,9–16 and elsewhere. The expressions used are probably taken from the arsenal of rhetoric used in the heated philosophical debates that took place between the wanderers of different sects. The mood of these debates, and the Buddha’s evaluation of them, is effectively conveyed at a number of suttas in the Aṭṭhakavagga; see Sn IV,8, 12, 13.

²⁷ The quote is from DN II 283,9–13, but the words *seṭṭhā devamanussānaṃ* are not found there. They are, however, attached to the partly parallel statement, also addressed to Sakka, at MN I 252,3–5.

²⁸ SA: *Liberated in the extinction of craving (taṇhāsaṅkhayavimuttā)*: Liberated in Nibbāna, the extinction of craving, by the liberation of the fruit, which takes Nibbāna as object.

This explanation, it seems <make up your mind: either it is supported by them or it is not. This perpetual scepticism is not helpful for the reader>, is supported by the texts. While simple *khaya*, in relation to *vimutta*, usually occurs in the ablative (see e.g. MN III 31,2, 34, etc.), *saṅkhaya* is in the locative (e.g., at 4:25: *anuttare upadhisāṅkhaye vimutto*).

²⁹ See II,n.58.

and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

‘One seeks delight in feeling ... One seeks delight in perception ... One seeks delight in volitional constructions ... One seeks delight in consciousness, welcomes it, and remains holding to it. As a consequence of this, delight arises.... Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

‘This, bhikkhus, is the origin of form: this is the origin of feeling: this is the origin of perception: this is the origin of volitional constructions: this is the origin of consciousness.’³⁰

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the passing away of form? What is the passing away of feeling? What is the passing away of perception? What is the passing away of volitional constructions? What is the passing away of consciousness?’

‘Here, bhikkhus, one does not seek delight, one does not welcome, one does not remain holding. And what is it that one does not seek delight in? What doesn’t one welcome? To what doesn’t one remain holding? One does not seek delight in form, does not welcome it, does not remain holding to it. As a consequence of this, delight in form ceases. With the cessation of delight comes cessation of clinging: with cessation of clinging, cessation of becoming.... Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.

‘One does not seek delight in feeling ... [15] ... One does not seek delight in perception ... One does not seek delight in volitional constructions ... One does not seek delight in consciousness, does not welcome it, does not remain holding to it. As a consequence of this, delight in consciousness ceases.... Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.

‘This, bhikkhus, is the passing away of form: this is the passing away of feeling: this is the passing away of perception: this is the passing away of volitional constructions: this is the passing away of consciousness.’

6 (6) Seclusion

Setting at Sāvattihī. ‘Bhikkhus, make an exertion in seclusion.’³¹ A bhikkhu who is secluded understands things as they really are.

‘And what does he understand as it really is? The origin and passing away of form: the origin and passing away of feeling: the origin and passing away of perception: the origin and passing away of volitional constructions: the origin and passing away of consciousness.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the origin of form?...’

(The rest of this sutta is identical with the preceding one.)

7 (7) Agitation through Clinging (1)

Setting at Sāvattihī. ‘Bhikkhus, I will teach you agitation through clinging and non-agitation through non-clinging.’³² Listen to that and attend carefully, I will speak.’ [16]

‘Yes, venerable sir,’ those bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

‘And how, bhikkhus, is there agitation through clinging? Here, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling, who does not get to see the noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who does not get to see superior persons and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. That form of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of form, his consciousness becomes preoccupied with the change of form. Agitation and a constellation of mental states

³⁰ Here the text speaks of the diachronic or distal origination of the five aggregates, in contrast to the synchronic or proximal origination shown below at 22:56, 57<56 (4) Phases of Clinging and 57 (5) The Seven Cases>. The concluding portion of the passage shows that we have here a compressed statement of dependent origination. To ‘seek delight, welcome, and remain holding’ is the work of craving (*taṇhā*). The delight (*nandi*) obtained is clinging (*upādāna*), from which the remaining links of the series flow. The passage thus demonstrates how craving for the present five aggregates is the generative cause for the arising of a fresh set of five aggregates in the next existence. The section on passing away should be understood in the converse manner: when craving for the present five aggregates ceases, one has eliminated the efficient cause for the arising of the five aggregates in a future existence.

³¹ *Paṭisallāna*. SA: The Blessed One saw those bhikkhus falling away from physical seclusion (*kāyaviveka*) and spoke to them thus because he knew that their meditation would succeed if they would obtain physical seclusion.

³² A nearly identical passage is incorporated into MN No. 138. The reading here shows that *anupādā paritassanā* and *anupādāya paritassati* there are ancient errors which had crept into the texts even before the age of the commentators, ~~who were beguiled into devising bad explanations of the bad reading~~. The MN text should be corrected on the basis of SN. On *paritassanā* and *paritassati*, see II,n.137.

born of preoccupation with the change of form remain obsessing his mind.³³ Because his mind is obsessed, he is frightened, distressed, and anxious, and through clinging he becomes agitated.

‘He regards feeling as self ... perception as self ... volitional constructions as self ... consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. That consciousness of his changes and alters.... [17] Because his mind is obsessed, he is frightened, distressed, and anxious, and through clinging he becomes agitated.

‘It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that there is agitation through clinging.

‘And how, bhikkhus, is there non-agitation through non-clinging? Here, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple, who gets to see the noble ones and is skilled and disciplined in their Dhamma, who gets to see superior persons and is skilled and disciplined in their Dhamma, does not regard form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. That form of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of form, his consciousness does not become preoccupied with the change of form. No agitation and constellation of mental states born of preoccupation with the change of form remain obsessing his mind. Because his mind is not obsessed, he is not frightened, distressed, or anxious, and through non-clinging he does not become agitated.

‘He does not regard feeling as self ... perception as self ... volitional constructions as self ... [18] ... consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. That consciousness of his changes and alters.... Because his mind is not obsessed, he is not frightened, distressed, or anxious, and through non-clinging he does not become agitated.

‘It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that there is non-agitation through non-clinging.’

8 (8) Agitation through Clinging (2)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, I will teach you agitation through clinging and non-agitation through non-clinging. Listen to that and attend carefully....

‘And how, bhikkhus, is there agitation through clinging? Here, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling regards form thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self.”³⁴ That form of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of form, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.

‘He regards feeling thus ... perception thus ... volitional constructions thus ... consciousness thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self.” That consciousness of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of consciousness, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.

‘It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that there is agitation through clinging.

‘And how, bhikkhus, is there non-agitation through non-clinging? [19] Here, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple does not regard form thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self.” That form of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of form, there do not arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.

‘He does not regard feeling thus ... perception thus ... volitional constructions thus ... consciousness thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self.” That consciousness of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of consciousness, there do not arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.

‘It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that there is non-agitation through non-clinging.’

9 (9) Impermanent in the Three Times

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is impermanent, both of the past and future, not to speak of the present. Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple is indifferent towards form of the past: he does not seek delight in form of the future: and he is practising for disenchantment with form of the present, for its fading away and cessation.

‘Feeling is impermanent ... Perception is impermanent ... Volitional constructions are impermanent ... Consciousness is impermanent, both of the past and future, not to speak of the present. Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple is indifferent towards consciousness of the past: he does not seek delight in consciousness of the future: and he is practising for disenchantment with consciousness of the present, for its fading away and cessation.’

³³ SA explains *paritassanādharmasamuppādā* as a *dvanda* compound: *taṇhāparitassanā ca akusaladhammasamuppādā ca*; ‘the agitation of craving and a constellation of unwholesome states.’ The long compound might also have been taken as a *tappurisa*: ‘a constellation of states (arisen from, associated with) agitation.’ While both SA and SṬ understand *paritassanā* in the sense of craving, it seems to me that the text emphasizes *bhayaparitassanā*, ‘agitation through fear.’ On how *paritassanā* has come to bear two meanings, see **II,n.137**.

³⁴ While the preceding sutta is framed solely in terms of identity view, this one is framed in terms of the ‘three grips’ (*gāha*): ‘this is mine’ (*etaṃ mama*) is the grip of craving; ‘this I am’ (*eso ’ham asmi*), the grip of conceit; and ‘this is my self’ (*eso me attā*), the grip of views. A shift also occurs in the implications of *paritassanā*, from craving and fear to sorrow and grief.

(10) Suffering in the Three Times

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is suffering, both of the past and future, not to speak of the present. [20] Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple is indifferent towards form of the past: he does not seek delight in form of the future: and he is practising for disenchantment with form of the present, for its fading away and cessation.

‘Feeling is suffering ... Perception is suffering ... Volitional constructions are suffering ... Consciousness is suffering, both of the past and future, not to speak of the present. Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple is indifferent towards consciousness of the past: he does not seek delight in consciousness of the future: and he is practising for disenchantment with consciousness of the present, for its fading away and cessation.’

(11) Non-self in the Three Times

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is non-self, both of the past and future, not to speak of the present. Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple is indifferent towards form of the past: he does not seek delight in form of the future: and he is practising for disenchantment with form of the present, for its fading away and cessation.

‘Feeling is non-self ... Perception is non-self ... Volitional constructions are non-self ... Consciousness is non-self, both of the past and future, not to speak of the present. Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple is indifferent towards consciousness of the past: he does not seek delight in consciousness of the future: and he is practising for disenchantment with consciousness of the present, for its fading away and cessation.’

II. Impermanent**12 (1) Impermanent**

[21] Thus have I heard. At Sāvathī... There the Blessed One said this:

‘Bhikkhus, form is impermanent, feeling is impermanent, perception is impermanent, volitional constructions are impermanent, consciousness is impermanent. Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple becomes disenchanted with form, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with volitional constructions, disenchanted with consciousness. Being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion (his mind) is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: “It’s liberated.” He understands: “Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this world.”’

13 (2) Suffering

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is suffering, feeling is suffering, perception is suffering, volitional constructions are suffering, consciousness is suffering. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

14 (3) Non-self

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is non-self, feeling is non-self, perception is non-self, volitional constructions are non-self, consciousness is non-self. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.” [22]

15 (4) What is Impermanent

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is non-self. What is non-self should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”’

‘Feeling is impermanent... Perception is impermanent... Volitional constructions are impermanent... Consciousness is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is non-self. What is non-self should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”’

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

16 (5) What is Suffering

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is suffering. What is suffering is non-self. What is non-self should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”’

‘Feeling is suffering... Perception is suffering... Volitional constructions are suffering... Consciousness is suffering. What is suffering is non-self. What is non-self should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”’

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

17 (6) What is Non-self

Setting at Sāvattḥī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is non-self. What is non-self [23] should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”’

‘Feeling is non-self.... Perception is non-self.... Volitional constructions are non-self.... Consciousness is non-self. What is non-self should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”’

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

18 (7) Impermanent with Cause

Setting at Sāvattḥī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is impermanent. The cause and condition for the arising of form is also impermanent. As form has originated from what is impermanent, how could it be permanent?’

‘Feeling is impermanent.... Perception is impermanent.... Volitional constructions are impermanent.... Consciousness is impermanent. The cause and condition for the arising of consciousness is also impermanent. As consciousness has originated from what is impermanent, how could it be permanent?’

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

19 (8) Suffering with Cause

Setting at Sāvattḥī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is suffering. The cause and condition for the arising of form is also suffering. As form has originated from what is suffering, how could it be permanent?’

‘Feeling is suffering.... Perception is suffering.... Volitional constructions are suffering.... [24] Consciousness is suffering. The cause and condition for the arising of consciousness is also suffering. As consciousness has originated from what is suffering, how could it be permanent?’

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

20 (9) Non-self with Cause

Setting at Sāvattḥī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is non-self. The cause and condition for the arising of form is also non-self. As form has originated from what is non-self, how could it be self?’

‘Feeling is non-self.... Perception is non-self.... Volitional constructions are non-self.... Consciousness is non-self. The cause and condition for the arising of consciousness is also non-self. As consciousness has originated from what is non-self, how could it be self?’

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

21 (10) Ānanda

Setting at Sāvattḥī. Then the Venerable Ānanda approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:

‘Venerable sir, it is said, “cessation, cessation.” Through the cessation of what things is cessation spoken of?’

‘Form, Ānanda, is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, to vanishing, to fading away, to cessation. Through its cessation, cessation is spoken of.’

‘Feeling is impermanent ... Perception is impermanent ... Volitional constructions are impermanent ... [25] ... Consciousness is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, to vanishing, to fading away, to cessation. Through its cessation, cessation is spoken of.’

‘It is through the cessation of these things, Ānanda, that cessation is spoken of.’

III. The Burden

22 (1) The Burden

Setting at Sāvattḥī.... There the Blessed One said this:

‘Bhikkhus, I will teach you the burden, the carrier of the burden,³⁵ the taking up of the burden, and the laying down of the burden. Listen to that....’

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the burden? It should be said: the five aggregates subject to clinging. What five? The form aggregate subject to clinging, the feeling aggregate subject to clinging, the perception aggregate subject to

³⁵ Steven Collins translates *bhārahāra* as ‘the bearing of the burden,’ contending that *hāra* must here be understood as an action noun rather than as an agent noun (*Selfless Persons*, p.165). SED, however, lists ‘a carrier, a porter’ as meanings of *hāra*, and it seems clear that this is the sense required here.

clinging, the volitional constructions aggregate subject to clinging, the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. This is called the burden.³⁶

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the carrier of the burden. It should be said: the person, this venerable one of such a name and such a clan. This is called the carrier of the burden.’³⁷ [26]

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the taking up of the burden? It is this craving which leads to re-becoming, accompanied by delight and lust, seeking delight here and there: that is, craving for sensual pleasures, craving for becoming, craving for disbecoming. This is called the taking up of the burden.’³⁸

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the laying down of the burden? It is the remainderless fading away and cessation of that same craving, the giving up and relinquishing of it, freedom from it, non-reliance on it. This is called the laying down of the burden.’³⁹

This is what the Blessed One said. Having said this, the Sublime One, the Teacher, further said this:

‘The five aggregates are truly burdens,
The burden-carrier is the person.
Taking up the burden is suffering in the world,
Laying the burden down is blissful.
Having laid the heavy burden down
Without taking up another burden,
Having drawn out craving with its root,
One is free from hunger, fully quenched.’⁴⁰

23 (2) Full Understanding

Setting at Sāvattihī. [27] ‘Bhikkhus, I will teach you things that should be fully understood and also full understanding. Listen to that....

‘And what, bhikkhus, are the things that should be fully understood? Form, bhikkhus, is something that should be fully understood: feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness is something that should be fully understood. These are called the things that should be fully understood.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is full understanding? The destruction of lust, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion. This is called full understanding.’⁴¹

³⁶ SA: In what sense are these ‘five aggregates subject to clinging’ called the burden? In the sense of having to be borne through maintenance. For their maintenance—by being lifted up, moved about, seated, laid to rest, bathed, adorned, fed and nourished, etc.—is something to be borne; thus they are called a burden in the sense of having to be borne through maintenance.

³⁷ The *puggalavāda* or ‘personalist’ schools of Buddhism appealed to this passage as proof for the existence of the person (*puggala*) as a real entity, neither identical with the five aggregates nor different from them. It is the *puggala*, they claimed, which persists through change, undergoes rebirth, and eventually attains Nibbāna. This tenet was bluntly rejected by the other Buddhist schools, who saw in it a camouflaged version of the *ātman*, the self of the non-Buddhist systems. For an overview of the arguments, see Dutt, *Buddhist Sects in India*, pp.184–206. The mainstream Buddhist schools held that the person was a mere convention (*vohāra*) or concept (*paññatti*) derivative upon (*upādāya*) the five aggregates, not a substantial reality in its own right.

SA: Thus, by the expression ‘the carrier of the burden,’ he shows the person to be a mere convention. For the person is called the carrier of the burden because it ‘picks up’ the burden of the aggregates at the moment of rebirth, maintains the burden by bathing, feeding, seating, and laying them down during the course of life, and then discards them at the moment of death, only to take up another burden of aggregates at the moment of rebirth.

³⁸ *Bhārādāna*. This formula is identical with the definition of the second noble truth (see 56:11). So too, the explanation of the laying down of the burden (*bhāranikkhepa*) is identical with the definition of the third truth.

SA: *Seeking delight here and there (tatratatrābhinandinī)*: having the habit of seeking delight in the place of rebirth or among the various objects such as forms. Lust for the five cords of sensual pleasure is *craving for sensual pleasures (kāmatanhā)*. Lust for form-sphere or formless-sphere becoming, attachment to jhāna, and lust accompanied by the eternalist view: this is called *craving for becoming (bhavatanhā)*. Lust accompanied by the annihilationist view is *craving for disbecoming (vibhavatanhā)*.

³⁹ SA: All these terms are designations for Nibbāna. For it is contingent upon this (*taṃ hi āgamma*) that craving fades away without remainder, ceases, is given up, is relinquished, and released; and here there is no reliance on sensual pleasures or views. For such a reason Nibbāna gains these names.

⁴⁰ SA: The root of craving is ignorance. One draws out craving along with its root by the path of arahantship.

⁴¹ The explanation of *pariññā*, full understanding, in terms of *rāgakkhaya*, etc., the destruction of lust, etc., initially seems puzzling <why, pray, does it seem puzzling?>, but see MN I 66–67, where *pariññā* is used as a virtual synonym for *pahāna*. SA specifies *pariññā* here as *accantapariññā*, ultimate abandonment, which it glosses as *samatikkama*, transcendence, and

24 (3) Directly Knowing

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, without directly knowing and fully understanding form, without becoming dispassionate towards it and abandoning it, one is incapable of destroying suffering. Without directly knowing and fully understanding feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, without becoming dispassionate towards it and abandoning it, one is incapable of destroying suffering.

‘Bhikkhus, by directly knowing and fully understanding form, by becoming dispassionate towards it and abandoning it, one is capable of destroying suffering. By directly knowing and fully understanding feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by becoming dispassionate towards it and abandoning it, one is capable of destroying suffering.’⁴²

25 (4) Desire and Lust

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, abandon desire and lust for form. Thus that form will be abandoned, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that it is no more subject to future arising.

‘Abandon desire and lust for feeling ... for perception ... for volitional constructions ... for consciousness. Thus that consciousness will be abandoned, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that it is no more subject to future arising.’

26 (5) Gratification (1)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, before my enlightenment, while I was still a bodhisatta, not yet fully enlightened, it occurred to me: “What is the gratification, what is the danger, what is the escape in the case of form? What is the gratification, what is the danger, what is the escape in the case of feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness?”⁴³ [28]

‘Then, bhikkhus, it occurred to me: “The pleasure and joy that arise in dependence on form: this is the gratification in form. That form is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this is the danger in form. The removal and abandonment of desire and lust for form: this is the escape from form.

“The pleasure and joy that arise in dependence on feeling ... in dependence on perception ... in dependence on volitional constructions ... in dependence on consciousness: this is the gratification in consciousness. That consciousness is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this is the danger in consciousness. The removal and abandonment of desire and lust for consciousness: this is the escape from consciousness.”

‘So long, bhikkhus, as I did not directly know as they really are the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of these five aggregates subject to clinging, I did not claim to have awakened to the unsurpassed perfect enlightenment in this world with its devas, Māra, and Brahmā, in this generation with its recluses and brahmins, its devas and humans. But when I directly knew all this as it really is, then I claimed to have awakened to the unsurpassed perfect enlightenment in this world with ... its devas and humans.

‘The knowledge and vision arose in me: “Unshakeable is my liberation of mind: this is my last birth: now there is no more re-becoming.”’ [29]

27 (6) Gratification (2)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, I set out seeking the gratification in form. I discovered the gratification in form. I have clearly seen with wisdom whatever gratification there is in form.

‘Bhikkhus, I set out seeking the danger in form. I discovered the danger in form. I have clearly seen with wisdom whatever danger there is in form.

identifies with Nibbāna. Apparently *accantapariññā* is distinct from the usual three kinds of *pariññā*, on which see the following note.

⁴² SA: By ‘directly knowing’ (*abhijānaṃ*), the full understanding of the known (*ñātapariññā*) is indicated; by ‘fully understanding’ (*parijānaṃ*), full understanding by scrutinization (*tīraṇapariññā*); by ‘becoming dispassionate’ and ‘abandoning’, the full understanding of abandonment (*pahānapariññā*).

On the three kinds of full understanding, see **I,n.37**. In sutta usage, the distinction between *abhijānāti* and *parijānāti* is drawn more sharply than in the commentaries. In the suttas, *abhijānāti* and its cognates means direct knowledge of phenomena in accordance with the pattern established by the four noble truths. This knowledge is shared by both the *sekha* and the arahant. In contrast, *parijānāti* and its cognates is generally used only in relation to the arahant, and signifies the consummation of the knowledge initiated by *abhijānāti*. MN No. 1, for example, stresses that the *sekha* ‘has directly known’ (*abhiññāya*) each of the twenty-four bases of ‘conceiving,’ but still must train further in order to fully understand it (*taṃ pariññeyyaṃ tassa*).

⁴³ The next three suttas are composed on the pattern of **14:31–33**. Just below, **22:29–30** correspond to **14:35–36**. SA explains that in the former three texts, the four truths are discussed (see **II,n.245**); in the latter two, the round of becoming and its cessation.

‘Bhikkhus, I set out seeking the escape from form. I discovered the escape from form. I have clearly seen with wisdom whatever escape there is from form.

‘Bhikkhus, I set out seeking the gratification in ... the danger in ... the escape from feeling ... from perception ... from volitional constructions ... from consciousness. I discovered the escape from consciousness. I have clearly seen with wisdom whatever escape there is from consciousness.

‘So long, bhikkhus, as I did not directly know as they really are the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of these five aggregates subject to clinging, I did not claim to have awakened to the unsurpassed perfect enlightenment in this world with ... (as above) ... its devas and humans.

‘The knowledge and vision arose in me: “Unshakeable is my liberation of mind: this is my last birth: now there is no more re-becoming.”’

28 (7) Gratification (3)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, if there was no gratification in form, [30] beings would not become enamoured with it: but because there is gratification in form, beings become enamoured with it. If there was no danger in form, beings would not become disenchanted with it: but because there is danger in form, beings become disenchanted with it. If there was no escape from form, beings would not escape from it: but because there is an escape from form, beings escape from it.

‘Bhikkhus, if there was no gratification in feeling ... in perception ... in volitional constructions ... in consciousness, beings would not become enamoured with it: ... but because there is an escape from consciousness, beings escape from it.

‘So long, bhikkhus, as beings have not directly known as they really are the gratification as gratification, the danger as danger, and the escape as escape in the case of these five aggregates subject to clinging, they have not escaped from this world with its devas, Māra, [31] and Brahmā, from this generation with its recluses and brahmins, its devas and humans: they have not become detached from it, released from it, nor do they dwell with a mind rid of barriers. But when beings have directly known all this as it really is, then they have escaped from this world with ... its devas and humans: they have become detached from it, released from it, and they dwell with a mind rid of barriers.’

29 (8) Delight

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, one who seeks delight in form seeks delight in suffering. One who seeks delight in suffering, I say, is not freed from suffering. One who seeks delight in feeling ... in perception ... in volitional constructions ... in consciousness seeks delight in suffering. One who seeks delight in suffering, I say, is not freed from suffering.

‘One who does not seek delight in form ... in consciousness does not seek delight in suffering. One who does not seek delight in suffering, I say, is freed from suffering.’

30 (9) Arising

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, the arising, continuation, production, [32] and manifestation of form is the arising of suffering, the continuation of disease, the manifestation of aging-and-death. The arising of feeling ... of perception ... of volitional constructions ... of consciousness is the arising of suffering, the continuation of disease, the manifestation of aging-and-death.

‘The cessation, subsiding, and passing away of form ... of consciousness is the cessation of suffering, the subsiding of disease, the passing away of aging-and-death.’

31 (10) The Root of Misery

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, I will teach you misery⁴⁴ and the root of misery. Listen to that....

‘And what, bhikkhus, is misery? Form is misery: feeling is misery: perception is misery: volitional constructions are misery: consciousness is misery. This is called misery.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the root of misery? It is this craving which leads to re-becoming, accompanied by delight and lust, seeking delight here and there: that is, craving for sensual pleasures, craving for becoming, craving for disbecoming. This is called the root of misery.’

32 (11) The Fragile

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, I will teach you the fragile⁴⁵ and the unfragile. Listen to that....

⁴⁴ *Agha*, glossed *dukkha* by SA.

⁴⁵ *Pabhaṅga*, glossed *pabhijjanasabhāva*, ‘subject to break apart.’ SA: Here the characteristic of impermanence is discussed.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the fragile, and what is the unfragile? [33] Form is the fragile: its cessation, subsiding, passing away is the unfragile. Feeling is the fragile ... Perception is the fragile ... Volitional constructions are the fragile ... Consciousness is the fragile: its cessation, subsiding, passing away is the unfragile.’

IV. Not Yours

33 (1) Not Yours (1)

Setting at Sāvaththī. ‘Bhikkhus, whatever is not yours, abandon it. When you have abandoned it, that will lead to your welfare and happiness for a long time. And what is it, bhikkhus, that is not yours? Form is not yours: abandon it. When you have abandoned it, that will lead to your welfare and happiness.⁴⁶ Feeling is not yours ... Perception is not yours ... [34] Volitional constructions are not yours ... Consciousness is not yours: abandon it. When you have abandoned it, that will lead to your welfare and happiness.

‘Suppose, bhikkhus, people were to carry off the grass, sticks, branches, and foliage in this Jeta’s Grove, or to burn them, or to do with them as they wish. Would you think: “People are carrying us off, or burning us, or doing with us as they wish”?’

‘No, venerable sir. For what reason? Because, venerable sir, that is neither our self nor what belongs to our self.’

‘So too, bhikkhus, form is not yours ... consciousness is not yours: abandon it. When you have abandoned it, that will lead to your welfare and happiness for a long time.’

34 (2) Not Yours (2)

(This sutta is identical with the preceding one except that it omits the simile.)

35 (3) A Certain Bhikkhu (1)

Setting at Sāvaththī. [35] Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him: ‘Venerable sir, it would be good if the Blessed One would teach me the Dhamma in brief, so that, having heard the Dhamma from the Blessed One, I might dwell alone, withdrawn, diligent, ardent, and resolute.’

‘Bhikkhu, if one has an underlying tendency towards something, then one is reckoned in terms of it.⁴⁷ If one does not have an underlying tendency towards something, then one is not reckoned in terms of it.’

‘Understood, Blessed One! Understood, Sublime One!’

‘In what way, bhikkhu, do you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief?’

‘If, venerable sir, one has an underlying tendency towards form, then one is reckoned in terms of it. If one has an underlying tendency towards feeling, then one is reckoned in terms of it. If one has an underlying tendency towards perception, then one is reckoned in terms of it. If one has an underlying tendency towards volitional constructions, then one is reckoned in terms of them. If one has an underlying tendency towards consciousness, then one is reckoned in terms of it.

‘If, venerable sir, one does not have an underlying tendency towards form, then one is not reckoned in terms of it. If one does not have an underlying tendency towards feeling ... towards perception ... towards volitional constructions ... towards consciousness, then one is not reckoned in terms of it.

‘It is in such a way, venerable sir, that I understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by the Blessed One in brief.’

‘Good, good, bhikkhu! It is good that you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief. If, bhikkhu, one has an underlying tendency towards form ... *(as above in full)* ... then one is not reckoned in terms of it. It is in such a way that the meaning of what was stated by me in brief should be understood in detail.’

Then that bhikkhu, having delighted and rejoiced in the Blessed One’s statement, [36] rose from his seat, and, after paying homage to the Blessed One, keeping him on his right, he departed.

⁴⁶ The parallel at MN I 140,33–141,19 includes *dīgharattam*, ‘for a long time’; **35:101** also omits this. SA says that form, etc., is abandoned by the abandoning of desire and lust, confirmed by **22:111**.

⁴⁷ *Yam kho bhikkhu anuseti tena saṅkham gacchati*. The verb *anuseti* implies *anusaya*, the seven underlying tendencies (see **45:175**), or, more simply, the three underlying tendencies of lust, aversion, and ignorance (see **36:3**). SA: If one has an underlying tendency towards form by way of sensual lust, etc., then one is described in terms of that same underlying tendency as ‘lustful, hating, deluded.’ But when that underlying tendency is absent, one is not reckoned thus.

I prefer to think that one is reckoned, not by way of the defilement (though that too is possible), but more prominently by way of the aggregate with which one identifies. One who inclines to form is reckoned a ‘physical’ person, one who inclines to feeling a ‘hedonist,’ etc., one who inclines to perception an aesthete (or fact-gatherer?), one who inclines to volition an enterprising person, one who inclines to consciousness a thinker.

Then, dwelling alone, withdrawn, diligent, ardent, and resolute, that bhikkhu, by realizing it for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life entered and dwelt in that unsurpassed goal of the holy life for the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth from the household life into homelessness. He directly knew: ‘Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this world.’ And that bhikkhu became one of the arahants.⁴⁸

36 (4) A Certain Bhikkhu (2)

Setting at Sāvathī. Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him: ‘Venerable sir, it would be good if the Blessed One would teach me the Dhamma in brief, so that, having heard the Dhamma from the Blessed One, I might dwell alone, withdrawn, diligent, ardent, and resolute.’

‘Bhikkhu, if one has an underlying tendency towards something, then one is measured in accordance with it:⁴⁹ if one is measured in accordance with something, then one is reckoned in terms of it. If one does not have an underlying tendency towards something, then one is not measured in accordance with it: if one is not measured in accordance with something, then one is not reckoned in terms of it.’

‘Understood, Blessed One! Understood, Sublime One!’

‘In what way, bhikkhu, do you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief?’

‘If, venerable sir, one has an underlying tendency towards form, then one is measured in accordance with it: if one is measured in accordance with it, then one is reckoned in terms of it. If one has an underlying tendency towards feeling ... towards perception ... towards volitional constructions ... towards consciousness, then one is measured in accordance with it: if one is measured in accordance with it, then one is reckoned in terms of it.

‘If, venerable sir, one does not have an underlying tendency towards form, then one is not measured in accordance with it: [37] if one is not measured in accordance with it, then one is not reckoned in terms of it. If one does not have an underlying tendency towards feeling ... towards perception ... towards volitional constructions ... towards consciousness, then one is not measured in accordance with it: if one is not measured in accordance with it, then one is not reckoned in terms of it.

‘It is in such a way, venerable sir, that I understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by the Blessed One in brief.’

‘Good, good, bhikkhu! It is good that you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief. If, bhikkhu, one has an underlying tendency towards form ... (*as above in full*) ... then one is not reckoned in terms of it. It is in such a way that the meaning of what was stated by me in brief should be understood in detail.’

Then that bhikkhu, having delighted and rejoiced in the Blessed One’s words, rose from his seat ... And that bhikkhu became one of the arahants.

37 (5) Ānanda (1)

Setting at Sāvathī. Then the Venerable Ānanda approached the Blessed One.... The Blessed One then said to the Venerable Ānanda as he was sitting to one side:

‘If, Ānanda, they were to ask you: “Friend Ānanda, what are the things of which an arising is discerned, a vanishing is discerned, an alteration of that which stands is discerned?”—being asked thus, how would you answer?’⁵⁰ [38]

⁴⁸ See I,n.376.

⁴⁹ SA explains *anumīyati* as if it were equivalent to Skt *anumṛyate*, ‘to die along with’: ‘When the underlying tendency is dying, the form to which it tends dies along with it (*anumarati!*); for when the object is breaking up, the mental factors that take it as object cannot persist.’ This of course is ludicrous. There can be no doubt that *anumīyati* is from *anu + mā*; CPD defines the verb as meaning ‘to be measured after,’ which I follow here. This statement then sheds light on the famous passage at 44:1 (IV 376,20–25 = MN I 487–88) declaring that the Tathāgata, freed from reckoning in terms of form, etc. (*rūpasāṅkhā-vimutto*), is immeasurable (*appameyyo*) like the great ocean.

⁵⁰ *Uppāda, vaya, thitassa aññathattaṃ*. At AN I 152,6–10 these are called the three constructed characteristics of the constructed (*tīṇi saṅkhatassa saṅkhata-lakkhaṇāni*). The commentaries identify them with the three sub-moments in the momentary lifespan of a *dhamma*: arising (*uppāda*), persistence or presence (*thiti*), and dissolution (*bhaṅga*). (For more on this, see CMA 4:6). SA explains *thitassa aññathatta* as the aging (or decay) of the persisting living entity (*dharamānassa jīvamānassa jarā*), namely, of the life faculty. The commentator mentions the opinion held by some teachers that it is not possible to posit a moment of decay in the case of the mental phenomena (feeling, etc.) [ST: because of the extreme brevity of the moment, decay being quickly overtaken by dissolution], but he rejects this view on the basis of the sutta itself. ST proposes a logical argument for the sub-moment of presence: ‘Just as a stage of dissolution distinct from the stage of arising is admitted, for otherwise it would follow that an entity dissolves in the very act of arising, so we must admit, as distinct from the stage of dissolution, a stage when an entity ‘confronts its own dissolution’ (*bhaṅgābhimukhāvattā*); for something cannot break up unless it has confronted its own dissolution.’

‘Venerable sir, if they were to ask me this, I would answer thus: “Friends, with form an arising is discerned, a vanishing is discerned, an alteration of that which stands is discerned. With feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness an arising is discerned, a vanishing is discerned, an alteration of that which stands is discerned. These, friends, are the things of which an arising is discerned, a vanishing is discerned, an alteration of that which stands is discerned.” Being asked thus, venerable sir, I would answer in such a way.’

‘Good, good, Ānanda! With form, Ānanda, an arising is discerned, a vanishing is discerned, an alteration of that which stands is discerned. With feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness an arising is discerned, a vanishing is discerned, an alteration of that which stands is discerned. These, Ānanda, are the things of which an arising is discerned, a vanishing is discerned, an alteration of that which stands is discerned. Being asked thus, Ānanda, you should answer in such a way.’

38 (6) Ānanda (2)

Setting at Sāvaththī.... The Blessed One then said to the Venerable Ānanda as he was sitting to one side:

‘If, Ānanda, they were to ask you: “Friend Ānanda, what are the things of which an arising was discerned, a vanishing was discerned, an alteration of that which stands was discerned? What are the things of which an arising will be discerned, a vanishing will be discerned, an alteration of that which stands will be discerned? What are the things of which an arising is discerned, a vanishing is discerned, an alteration of that which stands is discerned?”—being asked thus, Ānanda, how would you answer?’

‘Venerable sir, if they were to ask me this, [39] I would answer thus: “Friends, with form that has passed, ceased, changed, an arising was discerned, a vanishing was discerned, an alteration of that which stands was discerned. With feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness that has passed, ceased, changed, an arising was discerned, a vanishing was discerned, an alteration of that which stands was discerned. It is of these things, friends, that an arising was discerned, that a vanishing was discerned, that an alteration of that which stands was discerned.

“‘Friends, with form that has not been produced, not become manifest, an arising will be discerned, a vanishing will be discerned, an alteration of that which stands will be discerned. With feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness that has not been produced, not become manifest, an arising will be discerned, a vanishing will be discerned, an alteration of that which stands will be discerned. It is of these things, friends, that an arising will be discerned, that a vanishing will be discerned, that an alteration of that which stands will be discerned.

“‘Friends, with form that has been produced, that has become manifest, an arising is discerned, a vanishing is discerned, an alteration of that which stands is discerned. With feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness that has been produced, that has become manifest, an arising is discerned, a vanishing is discerned, an alteration of that which stands is discerned. It is of these things, friends, that an arising is discerned, that a vanishing is discerned, that an alteration of that which stands is discerned.”

‘Being asked thus, venerable sir, I would answer in such a way.’

‘Good, good, Ānanda!’

(*The Buddha here repeats the entire answer of the Venerable Ānanda, concluding:*) [40]

‘Being asked thus, Ānanda, you should answer in such a way.’

39 (7) In Accordance with the Dhamma (1)

Setting at Sāvaththī. ‘Bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu is practising in accordance with the Dhamma,⁵¹ this is what accords with the Dhamma: he should dwell engrossed in disenchantment with form, he should dwell engrossed in disenchantment with feeling, with perception, with volitional constructions, with consciousness.⁵² One who dwells engrossed in disenchantment with form ... engrossed in disenchantment with consciousness, fully understands form, feeling, perception, volitional constructions, and consciousness. One who fully understands form ... consciousness is freed from form, freed from [41] feeling, freed from perception, freed from volitional constructions, freed from consciousness. He is freed from birth, from aging-and-death, from sorrow, from lamentation, from pain, from displeasure, from despair. He is freed from suffering, I say.’

⁵¹ *Dhammānudhammapaṭipanna*. SA: He is practising the preliminary portion of the practice (*pubbabhāga-paṭipadā*) that is in conformity with the ninefold supramundane Dhamma (the four paths, their fruits, and Nibbāna). Cp. **II,n.34**.

⁵² *Rūpe nibbidābahulaṃ vihareyya*. *Nibbidā*, ‘disenchantment,’ is usually taken to refer to an advanced level of insight, which follows knowledge and vision of things as they really are (see **12:23** and **II,n.69**). SA explains ‘fully understands’ by way of the three kinds of full understanding (see **n.42**), and ‘is freed’ (*parimuccati*) as meaning ‘freed through the full understanding of abandonment arisen at the moment of the path.’ I would understand these terms somewhat differently: the former as the arahant’s full knowledge of the first noble truth, the latter as the liberation from future rebirth ensured by the eradication of the taints.

40 (8) In Accordance with the Dhamma (2)

Setting at Sāvattḥī. ‘Bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu is practising in accordance with the Dhamma, this is what accords with the Dhamma: he should dwell contemplating impermanence in form ... (*as above*) ... He is freed from suffering, I say.’

41 (9) In Accordance with the Dhamma (3)

... ‘he should dwell contemplating suffering in form ... (*as above*) ... He is freed from suffering, I say.’

42 (10) In Accordance with the Dhamma (4)

... ‘he should dwell contemplating non-self in form ... (*as above*) ... He is freed from suffering, I say.’

V. With Yourselves as an Island**43 (1) With Yourselves as an Island**

[42] Setting at Sāvattḥī. ‘Bhikkhus, dwell with yourselves as an island, with yourselves as a refuge, with no other refuge: with the Dhamma as an island, with the Dhamma as a refuge, with no other refuge.⁵³ When you dwell with yourselves as an island, with yourselves as a refuge, with no other refuge: with the Dhamma as an island, with the Dhamma as a refuge, with no other refuge, the basis itself should be investigated thus:⁵⁴ “From what are sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair born? How are they produced?”

‘And, bhikkhus, from what are sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair born? How are they produced? Here, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling, who does not get to see the noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who does not get to see superior persons and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. That form of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of form, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.

‘He regards feeling as self ... perception as self ... volitional constructions as self ... consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. [43] That consciousness of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of consciousness, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair.

‘But, bhikkhus, when one has understood the impermanence of form, its change, fading away, and cessation, and when one sees as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “In the past and also now all form is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change,” then sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair are abandoned. With their abandonment, one does not become agitated.⁵⁵ Being unagitated, one dwells happily. A bhikkhu who dwells happily is said to be quenched in that respect.⁵⁶

‘When one has understood the impermanence of feeling ... of perception ... of volitional constructions ... of consciousness, its change, fading away, and cessation, and when one sees as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “In the past and also now all consciousness is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change,” then sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair are abandoned. With their abandonment, one does not become agitated. Being unagitated, one dwells happily. A bhikkhu who dwells happily is said to be quenched in that respect.’

⁵³ These words are identical with the Buddha’s famous injunction to Ānanda in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (at DN II 100,20–24). In explaining the expression *attadīpa*, ‘with self as island,’ SA says: ‘What is meant by ‘self’? The mundane and supra-mundane Dhamma (*ko pan’ettha attā nāma? lokiyalokuttaro dhammo*). Therefore he says next, ‘with the Dhamma as an island,’ etc.’

⁵⁴ The Ce reading seems best: *yoni yeva upaparikkhitabbā*. Be omits *yeva* and Ee treats *yoni* as a masculine noun. SA glosses *yoni* with *kāraṇa*, ‘cause,’ and refers to MN III 142,22–24: *yoni h’esā Bhūmija phalassa adhigamāya*; ‘For this, Bhūmija, is the basis for the achievement of the fruit.’ See too 35:239 (IV 175,27–28) and AN II 76,24–25. ST offers an etymology: *yavati etasmā phalaṃ pasavatī ti yoni*. At 22:95 we repeatedly find the phrase *yoniso upaparikkhati*, ‘properly investigates,’ and it is quite possible that here too *yoniso* was the original reading.

⁵⁵ *Na paritassati*. See n.33 above and II,n.137.

⁵⁶ *Tadaṅganibbuto ti vuccati*. *Nibbuto* is the past participle generally used to describe one who has attained Nibbāna (see Introduction, p.??). Here, however, the prefix *tadaṅga-* qualifies that implication, suggesting that he has not actually attained Nibbāna but has only simulated such attainment. One might have rendered this expression ‘one who has attained Nibbāna in that respect,’ i.e., only in respect of a particular freedom. SA: He is ‘quenched in that respect’ because of the quenching of the defilements with respect to (or: through the factor of) insight. In this sutta it is only insight (*vipassanā va*) that is discussed.

44 (2) The Way

Setting at Sāvathī. [44] ‘Bhikkhus, I will teach you the way leading to the origination of identity and the way leading to the cessation of identity. Listen to that....

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the way leading to the origination of identity? Here, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling ... regards form as self ... feeling as self ... perception as self ... volitional constructions as self ... consciousness as self ... or self as in consciousness. This, bhikkhus, is called the way leading to the origination of identity. When it is said, “The way leading to the origination of identity,” the meaning here is this: a way of regarding things that leads to the origination of suffering.⁵⁷

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the way leading to the cessation of identity? Here, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple ... does not regard form as self ... nor feeling as self ... nor perception as self ... nor volitional constructions as self ... nor consciousness as self ... nor self as in consciousness. This, bhikkhus, is called the way leading to the cessation of identity. When it is said, “The way leading to the cessation of identity,” the meaning here is this: a way of regarding things that leads to the cessation of suffering.’

45 (3) Impermanent (1)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. [45] What is suffering is non-self. What is non-self should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.” When one sees this thus as it really is with correct wisdom, the mind becomes dispassionate and is liberated from the taints by non-clinging.⁵⁸

‘Feeling is impermanent.... Perception is impermanent.... Volitional constructions are impermanent.... Consciousness is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is non-self. What is non-self should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.” When one sees this thus as it really is with correct wisdom, the mind becomes dispassionate and is liberated from the taints by non-clinging.

‘If, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu’s mind has become dispassionate towards the form element, it is liberated from the taints by non-clinging. If his mind has become dispassionate towards the feeling element ... towards the perception element ... towards the volitional constructions element ... towards the consciousness element, it is liberated from the taints by non-clinging.

‘By being liberated, it is steady: by being steady, it is content: by being content, he is not agitated. Being unagitated, he personally attains Nibbāna. He understands: “Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this world.”⁵⁹

46 (4) Impermanent (2)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is impermanent.... Feeling is impermanent.... Perception is impermanent.... Volitional constructions are impermanent.... Consciousness is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is non-self. What is non-self should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘When one sees this thus as it really is with correct wisdom, one holds no more views concerning the past. When one holds no more views concerning the past, [46] one holds no more views concerning the future. When one holds no more views concerning the future, one has no more obstinate grasping.⁶⁰ When one has no more

⁵⁷ *Dukkhasamudayagāminī samanupassanā*. Identity view (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*) is so called because the five aggregates of clinging, which constitute personal identity (*sakkāya*), are also the most basic manifestation of suffering (*dukkha*), as declared in the first noble truth: *saṅkhittena pañc’upādānakkhandhā dukkhā* (see 56:11). According to SA, *samanupassanā* is here equivalent to views (*diṭṭhi*), while in the following passage on the cessation of suffering it denotes the knowledge of the four paths along with insight.

⁵⁸ SA: Seeing with proper wisdom is the wisdom of the path together with insight. The mind becomes dispassionate (*viraj-jati*) at the moment of the path, and is liberated (*vimuccati*) at the moment of the fruit.

⁵⁹ SA: It is *steady* (*thitam*) because there is no further work to be done; and *content* (*santussitam*) because what was to be attained has been attained.

It is noteworthy that the passage makes an unexpected transition from impersonal neuter nominatives (describing the bhikkhu’s mind, *cittam*) to verbs that imply a personal subject (*na paritassati*, *parinibbāyati*, *pajānāti*).

⁶⁰ The two expressions, ‘views concerning the past’ (*pubbāntānudiṭṭhiyo*) and ‘views concerning the future’ (*aparāntānudiṭṭhiyo*), clearly allude to the Brahmajāla Sutta (DN No. 1), which describes the famous sixty-two speculative views, eighteen about the past and forty-four about the future. SA confirms this, and explains that at this point the first path has been shown [SṬ: by showing the complete abandonment of views]. The following passage shows the three higher paths and fruits; or, alternatively, the former passage shows the abandoning of views by way of mere insight, the sequel the four paths along with insight.

obstinate grasping, the mind becomes dispassionate towards form, feeling, perception, volitional constructions, and consciousness, and is liberated from the taints by non-clinging.

‘By being liberated, it is steady: by being steady, it is content: by being content, one is not agitated. Being unagitated, one personally attains Nibbāna. One understands: “Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this world.”’

47 (5) Ways of Regarding Things

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, those recluses and brahmins who regard (anything as) self in various ways all regard (as self) the five aggregates subject to clinging, or a certain one among them. What five?’

‘Here, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling ... regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. He regards feeling as self ... perception as self ... volitional constructions as self ... consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness.

‘Thus this way of regarding things and (the notion) “I am” have not vanished in him.⁶¹ As “I am” has not vanished, there takes place a descent of the five faculties—of the eye faculty, the ear faculty, the nose faculty, the tongue faculty, the body faculty.⁶² There is, bhikkhus, the mind, there are mental phenomena, there is the element of ignorance. When the uninstructed worldling is contacted by a feeling born of ignorance-contact, “I am” occurs to him: “I am this” occurs to him: “I will be” and “I will not be,” and “I will be material” and “I will be immaterial,” and “I will be percipient” and “I will be non-percipient” and “I will be neither percipient nor non-percipient”—these occur to him.⁶³ [47]

‘The five faculties remain right there, bhikkhus, but in regard to them the instructed noble disciple abandons ignorance and arouses true knowledge. With the fading away of ignorance and the arising of true knowledge, “I am” does not occur to him: “I am this” does not occur to him: “I will be” and “I will not be,” and “I will be material” and “I will be immaterial,” and “I will be percipient” and “I will be non-percipient” and “I will be neither percipient nor non-percipient”—these do not occur to him.’

48 (6) Aggregates

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, I will teach you the five aggregates and the five aggregates subject to clinging. Listen to that....

For ‘obstinate grasping,’ the Ce reading *thāmasā parāmāso* is superior to Be’s *thāmaso parāmāso* and Ee’s *thāmaso parāmāso*; this reading is confirmed by MN I 130,34, 257,4, etc. SA glosses ‘obstinate grasping’ as the obstinacy of views (*diṭṭhi-thāmaso*) and the grasping of views (*diṭṭhi-parāmāso*), apparently misconstruing *thāmasā*, an instrumental used adverbially, as an independent noun.

⁶¹ I read with Be and Ce: *asmī ti c’assa avigataṃ hoti*. Ee, and many mss, read *adhigataṃ* for *avigataṃ*. That the latter reading must be correct is proved by AN III292,16–17, where we find the positive *asmī ti kho me vigataṃ*. This same argument applies to the reading at 22:89 below (III 128–30), despite the prevalence of *adhigataṃ* there.

SA explains ‘this way of regarding things’ as regarding with views (*diṭṭhi-samanupassanā*), and ‘the notion ‘I am’ as the ‘triple proliferation’ (*papañcattaya*) of craving, conceit, and views. The two differ in that ‘regarding’ is a conceptually formulated view, the notion ‘I am’ a subtler manifestation of ignorance expressive of desire and conceit; see the important discussion at 22:89. The view of self is eliminated by the path of stream-entry; the notion ‘I am’ is fully eradicated only by the path of arahantship.

⁶² I take this terse sentence to be describing the rebirth process contingent upon the persistence of the delusion of personal selfhood. Elsewhere ‘descent’ (*avakkanti*)—of consciousness, or of name-and-form—indicates the commencement of a new existence (as at 12:39, 58, 59). SA: When there is this group of defilements, there is the production of the five faculties conditioned by defilements and kamma.

⁶³ I interpret this whole passage as a demonstration of how the new kammically active phase of becoming commences through the renewal of conceiving in terms of the notion ‘I am’ and speculative views of selfhood. SA identifies ‘mind’ (*mano*) with the kamma-mind (*kammamano*) and ‘mental phenomena’ (*dhammā*) with its objects, or the former as the *bhavaṅga* and advertent consciousness. *Ignorance contact* (*avijjāsamphassa*) is the contact associated with ignorance (*avijjāsampayuttaphassa*).

Ignorance is the most fundamental condition underlying this process, and when this is activated by feeling it gives rise to the notion ‘I am’ (a manifestation of craving and conceit). The idea ‘I am this’ arises subsequently, when the vacuous ‘I’ is given a content by being identified with one or another of the five aggregates. Finally, full eternalist and annihilationist views originate when the imagined self is held either to survive death or to undergo destruction at death. This passage thus presents us with an alternative version of dependent origination, where the ‘way of regarding things’ and notion ‘I am’ belong to the causally active side of the past existence; the five faculties to the resultant side of the present existence; and the recurrence of the notion ‘I am’ to the causal side of the present existence. This will in turn generate re-becoming in the future.

‘And what, bhikkhus, are the five aggregates? Whatever kind of form there is, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near: this is called the form aggregate.⁶⁴ Whatever kind of feeling there is ... is called the feeling aggregate. Whatever kind of perception there is ... is called the perception aggregate. Whatever kind of volitional constructions there are ... is called the volitional constructions aggregate. Whatever kind of consciousness there is, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near: this is called the consciousness aggregate. These, bhikkhus, are called the five aggregates.

‘And what, bhikkhus, are the five aggregates subject to clinging? Whatever kind of form there is, whether past, future, or present ... far or near, that is tainted, that can be clung to: this is called the form aggregate subject to clinging. Whatever kind of feeling there is ... that is tainted, that can be clung to: this is called the feeling aggregate subject to clinging. Whatever kind of perception there is ... that is tainted, that can be clung to: this is called the perception aggregate subject to clinging. Whatever kind of volitional constructions there are ... that are tainted, that can be clung to: this is called the volitional constructions aggregate subject to clinging. [48] Whatever kind of consciousness there is, whether past, future, or present ... far or near, that is tainted, that can be clung to: this is called the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. These, bhikkhus, are called the five aggregates subject to clinging.’⁶⁵

49 (7) Soṇa (1)

Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Rājagaha in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrel Sanctuary. Then Soṇa the householder’s son approached the Blessed One.... The Blessed One then said to Soṇa the householder’s son:

‘Soṇa, when any recluses and brahmins, on the basis of form—which is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change—regard themselves thus: “I am superior,” or “I am equal,” or “I am inferior,” what is that due to apart from not seeing things as they really are?’⁶⁶

‘When any recluses and brahmins, on the basis of feeling ... on the basis of perception ... on the basis of volitional constructions ... on the basis of consciousness—which is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change—regard themselves thus: “I am superior,” or “I am equal,” or “I am inferior,” what is that due to apart from not seeing things as they really are?

‘Soṇa, when any recluses and brahmins do not, on the basis of form—which is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change—regard themselves thus: “I am superior,” or “I am equal,” [49] or “I am inferior,” what is that due to apart from seeing things as they really are?

‘When any recluses and brahmins do not, on the basis of feeling ... on the basis of perception ... on the basis of volitional constructions ... on the basis of consciousness—which is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change—regard themselves thus: “I am superior,” or “I am equal,” or “I am inferior,” what is that due to apart from seeing things as they really are?

⁶⁴ The word *khandha*, aggregate, is glossed in the commentaries with *rāsi*, ‘group.’ Each aggregate includes all instances of the particular phenomenological type that share its defining characteristic. The eleven categories into which each aggregate is classified are analysed at Vibh 1–12.

⁶⁵ The key terms distinguishing the *pañc’upādānakkhandhā* from the *pañcakkhandhā* are *sāsava upādāniya*, ‘with taints and subject to clinging.’ As a matter of logic, the *pañc’upādānakkhandhā* are included within the *pañcakkhandhā*, for all members of the former set must also be members of the latter set. However, the fact that a distinction is drawn between them implies that there are *khandha* which are *anāsava anupādāniya*, ‘untainted and not subject to clinging.’ On first thought it would seem that the ‘bare aggregates’ are those of the arahant, for the arahant has eliminated the *āsava* and *upādāna*. However, in the Abhidhamma all *rūpa* is classified as *sāsava* and *upādāniya*, and so too the resultant (*vipāka*) and functional (*kiriya*) mental aggregates of the arahant (see Dhs §§1103, 1219). The only aggregates classed as *anāsava* and *anupādāniya* are the four mental aggregates occurring on the cognitive occasions of the four supramundane paths and fruits (see Dhs §§1104, 1220). The reason for this is that *sāsava* and *upādāniya* do not mean ‘accompanied by taints and by clinging,’ but ‘capable of being taken as the objects of the taints and of clinging,’ and the arahant’s mundane aggregates can be taken as objects of the taints and clinging *by others* (see DhsA 347). For a detailed study of this problem, see Bodhi, ‘Aggregates and Clinging Aggregates.’ *Pāli Buddhist Review* (1:2, May 1976).

SA: Among the five aggregates the form aggregate is of the sense sphere, the other four aggregates are of the four planes (sense sphere, form sphere, formless sphere, supramundane). *With taints (sāsava)* means: what becomes a condition for the taints by way of object; so too *that can be clung to (upādāniya)* means what becomes a condition for clinging [SṬ: by being made its object]. Among the aggregates subject to clinging, stated by way of the practice of insight, the form aggregate is sense sphere, the others pertain to the three planes (i.e., excluding only the supramundane).

⁶⁶ This is the threefold conceit: superiority, equality, and inferiority.

‘What do you think, Soṇa, is form permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?’ – ‘Suffering, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self”?’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Is feeling permanent or impermanent?... Is perception permanent or impermanent?... Are volitional constructions permanent or impermanent?... Is consciousness permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?’ – ‘Suffering, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self”?’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Therefore, Soṇa, any kind of form whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, all form should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘Any kind of feeling whatsoever ... Any kind of perception whatsoever ... Any kind of volitional constructions whatsoever ... Any kind of consciousness whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, [50] internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, all consciousness should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘Seeing thus, Soṇa, the instructed noble disciple becomes disenchanted with form, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with volitional constructions, disenchanted with consciousness. Being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion (his mind) is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: “It’s liberated.” He understands: “Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this world.”’

50 (8) Soṇa (2)

Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Rājagaha in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrel Sanctuary. Then Soṇa the householder’s son approached the Blessed One.... The Blessed One then said to Soṇa the householder’s son:

‘Soṇa, those recluses or brahmins who do not understand form, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation: who do not understand feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation: these I do not consider to be recluses among recluses or brahmins among brahmins, and these venerable ones do not, by realizing it for themselves with direct knowledge, in this very life enter and dwell in the goal of recluseship or the goal of brahminhood.⁶⁷

‘But, Soṇa, those recluses and brahmins who understand form, [51] its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation: who understand feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation: these I consider to be recluses among recluses and brahmins among brahmins, and these venerable ones, by realizing it for themselves with direct knowledge, in this very life enter and dwell in the goal of recluseship and the goal of brahminhood.’

51 (9) Destruction of Delight (1)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu sees as impermanent form which is actually impermanent: that is his right view. Seeing rightly, he becomes disenchanted. With the destruction of delight comes the destruction of lust: with the destruction of lust comes the destruction of delight. With the destruction of delight and lust the mind is liberated and is said to be well liberated.⁶⁸

‘A bhikkhus sees as impermanent feeling which is actually impermanent ... perception which is actually impermanent ... volitional constructions which are actually impermanent ... consciousness which is actually impermanent: that is his right view.... With the destruction of delight and lust the mind is liberated and is said to be well liberated.’

⁶⁷ This passage applies the formula for the four noble truths to each of the five aggregates, in accordance with the Buddha’s statement, ‘the five aggregates subject to clinging are suffering’ (56:11). See 12:13 and II,n.27.

⁶⁸ SA: The mutual destruction of delight (*nandi*) and lust (*rāga*) is stated to show that there is actually no difference between in their denotation. Or else: One abandons delight by becoming disenchanted by means of contemplation of disenchantment (*nibbidānupassanā*); one abandons lust by becoming dispassionate by means of the contemplation of dispassion (*virāgānupassanā*). To this extent, having set up insight [ST: with the phrase, ‘with the destruction of delight comes the destruction of lust,’ which consummates the function of insight], by the phrase ‘with the destruction of lust comes the destruction of delight’ he shows the path; and by the phrase ‘with the destruction of delight and lust the mind is liberated’ the fruit is shown.

52 (10) Destruction of Delight (2)

Setting at Sāvattḥī. [52] ‘Bhikkhus, attend properly to form. Recognize the impermanence of form as it really is. When a bhikkhu attends properly to form and recognizes the impermanence of form as it really is, he becomes disenchanted with form. With the destruction of delight comes the destruction of lust: with the destruction of lust comes the destruction of delight. With the destruction of delight and lust the mind is liberated and is said to be well liberated.

‘Bhikkhus, attend properly to feeling ... to perception.... to volitional constructions ... to consciousness.... With the destruction of delight and lust the mind is liberated and is said to be well liberated.’

VI. Engagement**53 (1) Engaged**

[53] Setting at Sāvattḥī. ‘Bhikkhus, one who is engaged is unliberated:⁶⁹ one who is disengaged is liberated. Consciousness, bhikkhus, while standing, might stand engaged with form: based upon form, established upon form, with a sprinkling of delight, it might come to growth, increase, and expansion. Or consciousness, while standing, might stand [engaged with feeling ... engaged with perception ...] engaged with volitional constructions: based upon volitional constructions, established upon volitional constructions, with a sprinkling of delight, it might come to growth, increase, and expansion.⁷⁰

‘Bhikkhus, though someone might say: “Apart from form, apart from feeling, apart from perception, apart from volitional constructions, I will make known the coming and going of consciousness, its passing away and rebirth, its growth, increase, and expansion”—that is impossible.

‘Bhikkhus, if a bhikkhu has abandoned lust for the form element, with the abandoning of lust the basis is cut off: there is no support for (the establishing of) consciousness.⁷¹ If he has abandoned lust for the feeling element ... for the perception element ... for the volitional constructions element ... for the consciousness element, with the abandoning of lust the basis is cut off: there is no support for (the establishing of) consciousness.

‘When that consciousness is unestablished, not coming to growth, not constructing, [54] it is liberated.⁷² By being liberated, it is steady: by being steady, it is content: by being content, he is not agitated. Being unagitated, he personally attains Nibbāna. He understands: “Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this world.”’

54 (2) Seeds

Setting at Sāvattḥī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these five kinds of seeds. What five? Root-seeds, stem-seeds, joint-seeds, cutting-seeds, and germ seeds as the fifth.⁷³ If these five kinds of seeds are unbroken, unspoilt, undamaged by wind and sun, fertile, securely planted, but there is no earth or water, would these five kinds of seeds come to growth, increase, and expansion?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘If these five kinds of seeds are broken, spoilt, damaged by wind and sun, unfertile, not securely planted, but there is earth and water, would these five kinds of seeds come to growth, increase, and expansion?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

⁶⁹ I read *upayo* with Be and Ce, as against Ee’s *upāyo*. Here it seems the noun is being used as a virtual present participle. SA: *Engaged*: one who has approached (*upagato*) the five aggregates by way of craving, conceit, and views.

⁷⁰ I translate in accordance with Ce. Be and Ee have omitted the clauses on *vedanā* and *saññā*, apparently an old scribal error. I also read *nandūpasecana*, with Be and Ce, as against Ee’s *nandupasevana*. Though SA does not offer a gloss, the Be-Ce reading can claim support from the underlying metaphor of vegetation, which is made explicit in the simile in the next sutta. In the simile *nandirāga* is compared to the water element.

Again, we find here still another indication of how consciousness grows and evolves in dependence on the other four aggregates. This sutta and the next should be compared with 12:38–40, 12:64, and 22:3. As to why consciousness is not ‘engaged’ with itself, see above n.19.

⁷¹ SA: *The basis is cut off (vocchijjatārammaṇam)*: the basis (or object) is cut off through the lack of any ability to precipitate rebirth. SṬ: The basis (or object), which is the condition for rebirth by way of the sign of kamma, etc., is ‘cut off’ by way of (the cutting off of) the kamma that generates rebirth.

SṬ thus takes *ārammaṇa* here in the sense dominant in the Abhidhamma, i.e., as the object of rebirth consciousness (see CMA 3:17). However, I understand the word in the older sense of ‘basis,’ elsewhere glossed simply as *paccaya*; see II,n.112. SA’s explanation need not entail the interpretation proposed by SṬ.

⁷² *Anabhisankhacca vimuttaṃ*. The ‘non-constructing consciousness’ is the consciousness that does not fashion volitional constructions (*saṅkhāra*). SA says it is ‘liberated’ because it does not construct rebirth.

⁷³ The five kinds of ‘seeds’ (*bīja*) are actually five means of propagation. SA gives examples of the five kinds drawn from Vin IV 35.

‘If these five kinds of seeds are unbroken, unspoilt, undamaged by wind and sun, fertile, securely planted, and there is earth and water, would these five kinds of seeds come to growth, increase, and expansion?’

‘Yes, venerable sir.’

‘Bhikkhus, the four stations of consciousness should be seen as like the earth element. Delight and lust should be seen as like the water element. Consciousness together with its nutriment should be seen as like the five kinds of seeds.’⁷⁴

‘Consciousness, bhikkhus, while standing, might stand engaged with form: [55] based upon form, established upon form, with a sprinkling of delight, it might come to growth, increase, and expansion. Or consciousness, while standing, might stand engaged with feeling ... engaged with perception ... engaged with volitional constructions: based upon volitional constructions, established upon volitional constructions, with a sprinkling of delight, it might come to growth, increase, and expansion.’

(The rest of this sutta is identical with the preceding one.)

55 (3) Inspired Utterance

Setting at Sāvathī. There the Blessed One uttered this inspired utterance: “‘It might not be, and it might not be for me: it will not be, (and) there will not be for me’”: [56] resolving thus, a bhikkhu can cut off the lower fetters.’⁷⁵

⁷⁴ For a poetic version of the vegetation simile, see 5:9; for an elaboration of the comparison of consciousness to a seed, AN I 223–24.

⁷⁵ SA: The Blessed One uttered this inspired utterance because he was aroused by powerful joy while reviewing the emancipating nature (*niyyānikabhāva*) of the Teaching. The five lower fetters (*pañcorambhāgiyāni saṃyojanāni*) are: identity view, doubt, distorted grasp of rules and vows, sensual lust, and ill will.

The formula for resolution recommended by the Buddha is found in the suttas in two versions, one used by the annihilationists, the other the Buddha’s adaptation of this; ~~as the two versions differ only with respect to two verb forms, they are sometimes confounded in the various recensions. From the commentarial glosses, it appears that the confusion had already set in before the age of the commentaries~~ [once again, the venerable translator suggests that the learned elders of yore were of such uniform illiteracy that only when (over two thousand years later) a most superior American scholar appeared in the world, could those venerable elders’ confusion and ignorance at last could be shown up for what it was, and the matter be satisfactorily resolved]. Readings also differ among several editions of the same text. Generally I prefer the readings in Ce, though in relation to the present sutta Ce follows the lemma and gloss of SA, which has adopted the first phrase in its annihilationist variant (though not interpreted as such). This ~~corruption~~ [variance: to speak of corruption is a sign of disrespect, which furthermore corrupts the reader’s faith] was probably already present in the text available to the commentators.

The annihilationist version—explicitly identified as *uccheda-dīṭṭhi* at 22:81 [81 (9) Pārileyya] and classed among the wrong views at 22:152 [152 (3) The Self] and 24:4—reads: *no c’assaṃ no ca me siyā, na bhavissāmi na me bhavissati*. At AN V 63–64 the Buddha describes this creed as the highest of outsider views (*etadaggaṃ bāhirakānaṃ dīṭṭhigatānaṃ*), the reason being that one who accepts such a view will not be attracted to becoming nor averse to the cessation of becoming. It is problematic how the optative clause in the annihilationist version should be interpreted; perhaps it can be read as an assertion that personal existence, along with its world, is utterly fortuitous (‘It might not have been and it might not have been mine’). The clause in the future tense is clearly asserting that personal existence and its world will terminate at death.

The Buddha transformed this formula into a theme for contemplation consonant with his own teaching by replacing the first person verbs with their third person counterparts: *No c’assa no ca me siyā, na bhavissati na me bhavissati*. The change of person shifts the stress from the view of self implicit in the annihilationist version (‘I will be annihilated’) to an impersonal perspective that harmonizes with the *anattā* doctrine. In the present sutta, resolving (*adhimuccamāno*) on the formula is said to culminate in the destruction of the five lower fetters, that is, in the stage of non-returning (*anāgāmitā*). Elsewhere the formula includes a rider, *yad atthi yaṃ bhūtaṃ taṃ pajahāmi*, ‘what exists, what has come to be, that I am abandoning.’ Contemplation of this is said to lead to equanimity. At MN II 264–65 practice guided by the full formula (with the rider) culminates in rebirth in the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception (if the meditator clings to the equanimity) or in Nibbāna (if there is no clinging to the equanimity). At AN IV 70–74, resolution guided by the formula, again with the rider, leads to one of the five levels of non-returning or to arahantship. At Ud 78 the shorter formula is applied to mindfulness of the body; one who dwells thus gradually crosses attachment, i.e., wins arahantship.

It may be significant that in the Nikāyas themselves the precise meaning of the formula is never explicated, which suggests it may have functioned as an open-ended guide to reflection to be filled in by the meditator’s personal intuition [the number of things that are not explained ‘in the Nikāyas’ is vast, which means the absence of an explanation is of no consequence whatsoever.]. As to the actual word meaning, the commentaries take the opening particle *c’* to represent *ce*, ‘if,’ glossed *sace* by SA and *yadi* by ST. On this basis they interpret each part of the formula as a conditional. SA explains the formula in the present sutta on the basis of the questionable reading *c’assaṃ*, though its second alternative [since there are only two, ‘second alternative’ is a nonsense] conforms to the superior reading [superior?] *c’assa*. I translate very literally, rendering the lemma in the way favoured by the explanation: ‘If I were not, it would not be for me: If I were not (*sace ahaṃ na bhaveyyaṃ*), neither would there be my belongings (*mama parikkhāro*). Or else: If in my past there had not been kammic construction (*kammābhisankhāro*), now there would not be for me these five aggregates. *I will not be, (and) it will not be for me: I will*

When this was said, a certain bhikkhu said to the Blessed One: ‘But how, venerable sir, can a bhikkhu, resolving thus: “It might not be, and it might not be for me: it will not be, (and) there will not be for me,” cut off the lower fetters?’

‘Here, bhikkhu, the uninstructed worldling, who does not get to see the noble ones ... regards form as self ... or self as in consciousness.

‘He does not understand as it really is impermanent form as “impermanent form” ... impermanent feeling as “impermanent feeling” ... impermanent perception as “impermanent perception” ... impermanent volitional constructions as “impermanent volitional constructions” ... impermanent consciousness as “impermanent consciousness.”

‘He does not understand as it really is painful form as “painful form” ... painful feeling as “painful feeling” ... painful perception as “painful perception” ... painful volitional constructions as “painful volitional constructions” ... painful consciousness as “painful consciousness.”

‘He does not understand as it really is selfless form as “selfless form” ... selfless feeling as “selfless feeling” ... selfless perception as “selfless perception” ... selfless volitional constructions as “selfless volitional constructions” ... selfless consciousness as “selfless consciousness.”

‘He does not understand as it really is constructed form as “constructed form” ... constructed feeling as “constructed feeling” ... constructed perception as “constructed perception” ... constructed volitional constructions as “constructed volitional constructions” ... constructed consciousness as “constructed consciousness.”

‘He does not understand as it really is: “Form will disbecome” ... “Feeling will disbecome” ... “Perception will disbecome” ... “Volitional constructions will disbecome” ... “Consciousness will disbecome.”⁷⁶ [57]

‘The instructed noble disciple, bhikkhu, who gets to see the noble ones ... does not regard form as self ... or self as in consciousness.

‘He understands as it really is impermanent form as “impermanent form” ... impermanent consciousness as “impermanent consciousness.”

‘He understands as it really is painful form as “painful form” ... painful consciousness as “painful consciousness.”

‘He understands as it really is selfless form as “selfless form” ... selfless consciousness as “selfless consciousness.”

‘He understands as it really is constructed form as “constructed form” ... constructed consciousness as “constructed consciousness.”

‘He understands as it really is: “Form will disbecome” ... “Feeling will disbecome” ... “Perception will disbecome” ... “Volitional constructions will disbecome” ... “Consciousness will disbecome.”

now so strive that there will not be any kammic construction of mine producing the aggregates in the future; when that is absent, there will be for me no future rebirth.’

I part with the commentaries on the meaning of *c’*, which I take to represent *ca*; the syntax of the phrase as a whole clearly requires this [there is no such thing as a syntax in Pali ‘clearly’ requiring anything, as the variety in syntax is quite fluid: this is normal in ancient texts]. The Skt parallels actually contain *ca* [when there is a choice, the venerable translator makes a habit of always taking the Sanskrit reading as the right one] (e.g., at Uv 15:4, parallel to Ud 78 [which is discussed by UA in the way that SA discusses this one]). If we accept this reading, then (in the present sutta) the first ‘it’ can be taken to refer to the personal five aggregates, the second to the world apprehended through the aggregates. For the worldling this dyad is misconstrued as the duality of self and world; for the noble disciple it is simply the duality of impersonal internal and external phenomena. On this basis I would interpret the formula thus: ‘The five aggregates can be terminated, and the world presented by them can be terminated. I will so strive that the five aggregates will be terminated, (and) so that the world presented by them will be terminated.’ [what is being suggested is that ‘It might not be, and it might not be for me’ could refer to an ability or capacity, as in ‘can’ <the very word used by the translator in his ‘interpretation’>. But such a use of ‘might’ is highly unidiomatic, and may have been suggested by the translator’s advisors because they are non-native speakers of English. It is not unusual for the translator to make so little use of a standard English dictionary as to come up with such bizarre usages.] Alternatively, the first ‘it’ might be taken to refer to craving, and the second to the five aggregates arisen through craving. In the additional rider, ‘what exists, what has come to be’ denotes the presently existent set of five aggregates, and these are being abandoned through the abandonment of the cause for their continued re-manifestation, namely, craving or desire-and-lust. [All this idle speculation, with a confused and bizarre reading, merely because the translator wants to show off and follow the Sanskrit version rather than the Pali commentary. Very bothersome and confusing for the readers.]

My [mis]understanding of this passage has been largely shaped by suggestions from VĀT and discussions with Bhikkhu Vappa. I am also indebted to Peter Skilling for information on the Skt and Tibetan versions of the formula.

⁷⁶ *Rūpaṃ vibhaviṣati*, etc. SA glosses: *rūpaṃ bhijjissati*, ‘form will break up,’ and SṬ: *rūpaṃ vinasissati*, ‘form will perish.’ In the Introduction (p.??) I have explained my reasons for rendering *vibhavati* and derivatives by the makeshift ‘disbecome.’ The commentators seem to understand ‘disbecoming’ here as the incessant momentary cessation of the aggregates, but I believe the verb refers to the final cessation of the aggregates with the attainment of the *anupādisesa-nibbānadhātu*. This meaning links up better with the opening formula, and also seems supported by Th 715: *saṅkhārā vibhaviṣanti, tattha kā paridevanā*.

‘With the disbecoming of form, with the disbecoming of feeling ... of perception ... of volitional constructions ... of consciousness, that bhikkhu, resolving thus: “It might not be, and it might not be for me: it will not be, (and) there will not be for me,” can cut off the lower fetters.’⁷⁷

‘Resolving thus, venerable sir, a bhikkhu can cut off the lower fetters. But how should one know, how should one see, for the immediate destruction of the taints to occur?’⁷⁸

‘Here, bhikkhu, the uninstructed worldling becomes frightened over an unfrighting matter. For this is frightening to the uninstructed worldling: “If there were not, there would not be for me: there will not be, (so) there will not be for me.” But the instructed noble disciple does not become frightened over an unfrighting matter. For this is not frightening to the noble disciple: “If there were not, there would not be for me: there will not be, (so) there will not be for me.”’⁷⁹ [58]

‘Consciousness, bhikkhu, while standing, might stand engaged with form ... engaged with feeling ... engaged with perception ... engaged with volitional constructions: based upon volitional constructions, established upon volitional constructions, with a sprinkling of delight, it might come to growth, increase, and expansion.

‘Bhikkhu, though someone might say: “Apart from form, apart from feeling, apart from perception, apart from volitional constructions, I will make known the coming and going of consciousness, its passing away and rebirth, its growth, increase, and expansion”—that is impossible.

‘Bhikkhu, if a bhikkhu has abandoned lust for the form element, with the abandoning of lust the basis is cut off: there is no support for (the establishing of) consciousness. If he has abandoned lust for the feeling element ... for the perception element ... for the volitional constructions element ... for the consciousness element, with the abandoning of lust the basis is cut off: there is no support for (the establishing of) consciousness.

‘When that consciousness is unestablished, not coming to growth, not constructing, it is liberated. By being liberated, it is steady: by being steady, it is content: by being content, he is not agitated. Being unagitated, he personally attains Nibbāna. He understands: “Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this world.”

‘It is, bhikkhu, for one who knows thus, for one who sees thus, that the immediate destruction of the taints occurs.’

56 (4) Phases of Clinging

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these five aggregates subject to clinging. What five? The form aggregate subject to clinging, [59] the feeling aggregate subject to clinging, the perception aggregate subject to clinging, the volitional constructions aggregate subject to clinging, the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging.

‘So long as I did not directly know as they really are the five aggregates subject to clinging in four phases,⁸⁰ I did not claim to have awakened to the unsurpassed perfect enlightenment in this world with its devas, Māra, and Brahmā, in this generation with its recluses and brahmins, its devas and humans. But when I directly knew all this as it really is, then I claimed to have awakened to the unsurpassed perfect enlightenment in this world with ... its devas and humans.

⁷⁷ SA: *With the disbecoming of form (rūpassa vibhavā)*: by the seeing of disbecoming, together with insight [SṬ: for the word ‘disbecoming’ in the text is stated by elision of the word ‘seeing’]. For the four paths together with insight are called ‘the seeing of the disbecoming of form, etc.’ This is said with reference to that.

On the interpretation that I prefer (as stated in the preceding note), ‘the disbecoming of form,’ etc., refers to the ultimate cessation of the aggregates in Nibbāna, and thus the realization that such cessation takes place functions as the spur implicit in the meditation formula that inspires the bhikkhu to break the five fetters.

⁷⁸ *Anantarā āsavānaṃ khaya*. Here ‘the destruction of the taints’ refers to arahantship, and it seems the bhikkhu is asking how arahantship can be attained directly, without being detained at the stage of non-returner. SA explains that there are two types of immediacy (*anantara*), proximate and distant. Insight is the proximate immediate cause for the path (since the supramundane path arises when insight has reached its peak), and the distant immediate cause for the fruit (since the fruit directly follows the path). Thus the bhikkhu is asking: ‘How should one know and see, with insight as the immediate cause, to attain the fruit of arahantship called ‘the destruction of the taints’?’

⁷⁹ SA: The worldling becomes frightened with the arising of weak insight (*dubbalavipassanā*); for he cannot overcome self-love and thus he becomes afraid, thinking, ‘Now I will be annihilated and won’t exist any more.’ He sees himself falling into an abyss (see MN I 136–37 and n.182 below). But when strong insight occurs to the instructed noble disciple, he doesn’t become frightened but thinks, ‘It is constructions only that arise, constructions only that cease.’ SṬ: When the good worldling sees, with the knowledge of appearance as fearful (*bhayat’upaṭṭhāna-ñāna*), that formations are fearful, he doesn’t become afraid.

⁸⁰ *Catuparivaṭṭa*, lit. ‘four turnings.’ SṬ: By way of turning round the four noble truths with respect to each of the five aggregates.

‘And how, bhikkhus, are there four phases? I directly knew form, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation. I directly knew feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is form? The four great elements and the form derived from the four great elements: this is called form. With the arising of nutriment there is the arising of form. With the cessation of nutriment there is the cessation of form. This noble eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation of form: that is, right view ... right concentration.⁸¹

‘Whatever recluses and brahmins, having directly known thus form, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, are practising for the purpose of disenchantment with form, for its fading away and cessation, they are practising well. Those who are practising well have gained a foothold in this Dhamma and Discipline.⁸²

‘And whatever recluses and brahmins, having directly known thus form, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, through disenchantment with form, through its fading away and cessation, are liberated by non-clinging, they are well liberated. Those who are well liberated are consummate ones. As to those consummate ones, there is no round for describing them.⁸³

‘And what, bhikkhus, is feeling? [60] There are these six classes of feeling: feeling born of eye-contact, feeling born of ear-contact, feeling born of nose-contact, feeling born of tongue-contact, feeling born of body-contact, feeling born of mind-contact. This is called feeling. With the arising of contact there is the arising of feeling.⁸⁴ With the cessation of contact there is the cessation of feeling. This noble eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation of feeling: that is, right view ... right concentration.

‘Whatever recluses and brahmins, having directly known thus feeling, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, are practising for the purpose of disenchantment with feeling, for its fading away and cessation, they are practising well. Those who are practising well have gained a foothold in this Dhamma and Discipline.

‘And whatever recluses and brahmins, having directly known thus feeling ... and the way leading to its cessation ... As to those consummate ones, there is no round for describing them.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is perception? There are these six classes of perception: perception of forms, perception of sounds, perception of odours, perception of tastes, perception of tactile objects, perception of mental phenomena. This is called perception. With the arising of contact there is the arising of perception. With the cessation of contact there is the cessation of perception. This noble eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation of perception: that is, right view ... right concentration.

‘Whatever recluses and brahmins ... As to those consummate ones, there is no round for describing them.

‘And what, bhikkhus, are volitional constructions? There are these six classes of volition:⁸⁵ volition regarding forms, volition regarding sounds, volition regarding odours, volition regarding tastes, volition regarding tactile objects, volition regarding mental phenomena. These are called volitional constructions. With the arising of contact there is the arising of volitional constructions. With the cessation of contact there is the cessation of voli-

⁸¹ The form derived from (*upādāya rūpaṃ*) the four great elements includes the five sense faculties, four sense objects (the tactile object being assigned to three great elements, excluding the water element), the space element, sexual determination, physical nutriment (= edible food), etc.; see CMA 6:2–5. On nutriment as a condition for the physical body, see **II,n.18**. In this sutta the proximate condition for the origination of each of the five aggregates is shown, in contrast with **22:5 <5 (5) Concentration>**, which shows the distal or remote condition for the five aggregates collectively. For the distinction of the two types of conditions, see **II,n.58**.

⁸² This paragraph shows the *sekha*, the trainees, who have directly known the four noble truths and are practising for attainment of Nibbāna, the ultimate cessation of the five aggregates. For this reason the *sekha* are said to have ‘gained a foothold (*gādhanti*) in this Dhamma and Discipline,’ in contrast to the arahants, who have completed their work.

⁸³ This paragraph shows the *asekha*, those beyond training, the arahants. SA: They are *well liberated* (*suviṃuttā*) by the liberation of the fruit of arahantship; *consummate ones* (*kevalino*), complete, having done all their duties. *There is no round for describing them* (*vaṭṭaṃ tesaṃ natthi paññāpanāya*): there is no remaining round for the description of them.

On ‘consummate one,’ see **I,n.446**. On the idea of the arahant as beyond description or free from reckoning, see **22:35** and **n.47** above. The expression *vaṭṭaṃ tesaṃ natthi paññāpanāya* recurs at **44:6** (IV 391,10); see too DN II 63,30–64,1. The phrase might also have been translated, ‘There is no round for their manifestation.’

⁸⁴ Contact (*phassa*) is the coming together of sense object and consciousness via a sense faculty. When this occurs, the other mental factors come into play, most notably feeling, perception, and volition.

⁸⁵ The fact that there is a difference between the name of the aggregate (*saṅkhārakkhandha*) and the term of definition (*sañcetanā*) suggests that this aggregate has a wider compass than the others. In the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and the commentaries, the *saṅkhārakkhandha* is treated as an ‘umbrella category’ comprising all mental factors other than feeling and perception. Volition is mentioned only as the most important factor in this aggregate, not as its exclusive constituent.

tional constructions. This noble eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation of volitional constructions: that is, right view ... right concentration.

‘Whatever recluses and brahmins ... [61] ... As to those consummate ones, there is no round for describing them.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is consciousness? There are these six classes of consciousness: eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, mind-consciousness. This is called consciousness. With the arising of name-and-form there is the arising of consciousness. With the cessation of name-and-form there is the cessation of consciousness. This noble eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation of consciousness: that is, right view ... right concentration.’⁸⁶

‘Whatever recluses and brahmins, having directly known thus consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, are practising for the purpose of disenchantment with consciousness, for its fading away and cessation, they are practising well. Those who are practising well have gained a foothold in this Dhamma and Discipline.

‘And whatever recluses and brahmins, having directly known thus consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, through disenchantment with consciousness, through its fading away and cessation, are liberated by non-clinging, they are well liberated. Those who are well liberated are consummate ones. For those consummate ones there is no round coming to manifestation.’

57 (5) The Seven Cases

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is skilled in seven cases and a triple investigator is called, in this Dhamma and Discipline, a consummate one, one who has fully lived the holy life, the highest kind of person.’⁸⁷

‘And how, bhikkhus, is a bhikkhu skilled in seven cases? [62] Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands form, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation: he understands the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of form.

‘He understands feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation: he understands the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of consciousness.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is form? The four great elements and the form derived from the four great elements: this is called form. With the arising of nutriment there is the arising of form. With the cessation of nutriment there is the cessation of form. This noble eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation of form: that is, right view ... right concentration.

‘The pleasure and joy that arise in dependence on form: this is the gratification in form. That form is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this is the danger in form. The removal and abandonment of desire and lust for form: this is the escape from form.

‘Whatever recluses and brahmins, having directly known thus form, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, having directly known thus the gratification, the danger, and [63] the escape in the case of form, are practising for the purpose of disenchantment with form, for its fading away and cessation, they are practising well. Those who are practising well have gained a foothold in this Dhamma and Discipline.

‘And whatever recluses and brahmins, having directly known thus form, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, having directly known thus the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of form, through disenchantment with form, through its fading away and cessation, are liberated by non-clinging, they are well liberated. Those who are well liberated are consummate ones. As to those consummate ones, there is no round for describing them.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is feeling? There are these six classes of feeling: feeling born of eye-contact ... (*as in preceding sutta*) ... feeling born of mind-contact. This is called feeling. With the arising of contact there is the arising of feeling. With the cessation of contact there is the cessation of feeling. This noble eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation of feeling: that is, right view ... right concentration.

‘The pleasure and joy that arise in dependence on feeling: this is the gratification in feeling. That feeling is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this is the danger in feeling. The removal and abandonment of desire and lust for feeling: this is the escape from feeling.

⁸⁶ It is significant that while contact is the proximate condition for feeling, perception, and volitional constructions, name-and-form in its entirety is the proximate condition for consciousness. This ties up with the idea, as stated in 22:3, that the other four aggregates are the ‘home’ of consciousness. See too in this connection 12:65 and 12:67.

⁸⁷ The seven cases (*sattatṭhānā*) are obtained by merging the tetrad of the preceding sutta with the triad of 22:26. SA: This sutta is a statement of both congratulations (*ussadanandīya*) and enticement (*palobhanīya*). For just as a king who has won a battle rewards and honours his victorious warriors in order to inspire the other soldiers to become heroes, so the Blessed One extols and praises the arahants in order to inspire the others to attain the fruit of arahantship.

‘Whatever recluses and brahmins, having directly known thus feeling, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, having directly known thus the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of feeling, are practising for the purpose of disenchantment with feeling, for its fading away and cessation, they are practising well. Those who are practising well have gained a foothold in this Dhamma and Discipline.

‘And whatever recluses and brahmins, having directly known thus feeling ... and the escape in the case of feeling ... As to those consummate ones, there is no round for describing them.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is perception? There are these six classes of perception: perception of forms ... perception of mental phenomena. This is called perception. With the arising of contact there is the arising of perception. With the cessation of contact there is the cessation of perception. This noble eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation of perception: that is, right view ... right concentration.

‘The pleasure and joy that arise in dependence on perception: this is the gratification in perception. That perception is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this is the danger in perception. The removal and abandonment of desire and lust for perception: this is the escape from perception.

‘Whatever recluses and brahmins ... As to those consummate ones, there is no round for describing them.

‘And what, bhikkhus, are volitional constructions? There are these six classes of volition: volition regarding forms ... volition regarding mental phenomena. This is called volitional constructions. With the arising of contact there is the arising of volitional constructions. With the cessation of contact there is the cessation of volitional constructions. [64] This noble eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation of volitional constructions: that is, right view ... right concentration.

‘The pleasure and joy that arise in dependence on volitional constructions: this is the gratification in volitional constructions. That volitional constructions are impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this is the danger in volitional constructions. The removal and abandonment of desire and lust for volitional constructions: this is the escape from volitional constructions.

‘Whatever recluses and brahmins ... As to those consummate ones, there is no round for describing them.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is consciousness? There are these six classes of consciousness: eye-consciousness ... mind-consciousness. This is called consciousness. With the arising of name-and-form there is the arising of consciousness. With the cessation of name-and-form there is the cessation of consciousness. This noble eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation of consciousness: that is, right view ... right concentration.

‘The pleasure and joy that arise in dependence on consciousness: this is the gratification in consciousness. That consciousness is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this is the danger in consciousness. The removal and abandonment of desire and lust for consciousness: this is the escape from consciousness.

‘Whatever recluses and brahmins, having directly known thus consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, having directly known thus the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of consciousness, are practising for the purpose of disenchantment with consciousness, for its fading away and cessation, they are practising well. Those who are practising well have gained a foothold in this Dhamma and Discipline. [65]

‘And whatever recluses and brahmins, having directly known thus consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, having directly known the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of consciousness, through disenchantment with consciousness, through its fading away and cessation, are liberated by non-clinging, they are well liberated. Those who are well liberated are consummate ones. As to those consummate ones, there is no round for describing them.

‘It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that a bhikkhu is skilled in seven cases.

‘And how, bhikkhus, is a bhikkhu a triple investigator? Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu investigates by way of the elements, by way of the sense bases, and by way of dependent origination. It is in such a way that a bhikkhu is a triple investigator.⁸⁸

‘Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is skilled in these seven cases and a triple investigator is called, in this Dhamma and Discipline, a consummate one, one who has fully lived the holy life, the highest kind of person.’

58 (6) The Fully Enlightened One

Setting at Sāvattihī. ‘Bhikkhus, the Tathāgata, the Arahant, the Fully Enlightened One, liberated by non-clinging through disenchantment with form, through its fading away and cessation, is called a Fully Enlightened

⁸⁸ A triple investigator (*tividhūpaparikkhī*). This may be understood by way of the Dhātu-saṃyutta (ch.14), the Saḷāyatana-saṃyutta (ch.35), and the Nidāna-saṃyutta (ch.12). See too MN No. 115, where skill in the elements, sense bases, and dependent origination is explained in detail, augmented by the skill of knowing the possible and the impossible.

One. A bhikkhu liberated by wisdom, liberated by non-clinging through disenchantment with form, through its fading away and cessation, is called one liberated by wisdom.⁸⁹

‘The Tathāgata, the Arahant, the Fully Enlightened One, liberated by non-clinging through disenchantment with feeling ... with perception ... with volitional constructions ... with consciousness, through its fading away [66] and cessation, is called a Fully Enlightened One. A bhikkhu liberated by wisdom, liberated by non-clinging through disenchantment with feeling ... with perception ... with volitional constructions ... with consciousness, through its fading away and cessation, is called one liberated by wisdom.

‘Therein, bhikkhus, what is the distinction, what is the disparity, what is the difference between the Tathāgata, the Arahant, the Fully Enlightened One, and a bhikkhu liberated by wisdom?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One, guided by the Blessed One, take recourse in the Blessed One. It would be good if the Blessed One would clear up the meaning of this statement. Having heard it from him, the bhikkhus will remember it.’

‘Then listen and attend carefully, bhikkhus, I will speak.’

‘Yes, venerable sir,’ the bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

‘The Tathāgata, bhikkhus, the Arahant, the Fully Enlightened One, is the originator of the path unarisen before, the producer of the path unproduced before, the declarer of the path undeclared before. He is the knower of the path, the discoverer of the path, the one skilled in the path. And his disciples now dwell following that path and become possessed of it afterwards.

‘This, bhikkhus, is the distinction, the disparity, the difference between the Tathāgata, the Arahant, the Fully Enlightened One, and a bhikkhu liberated by wisdom.’

59 (7) The Characteristic of Non-self

Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Bārāṇasī in the Deer Park at Isipatana.⁹⁰ There the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus of the group of five thus: ‘Bhikkhus!’

‘Venerable sir!’ those bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

‘Bhikkhus, form is non-self. For if, bhikkhus, form were self, this form would not lead to affliction, and it would be possible to decree to form: “Let my form be thus: let my form not be thus.” But because form is non-self, form leads to affliction, and it is not possible to decree to form: “Let my form be thus: let my form not be thus.”⁹¹

‘Feeling is non-self.... [67] ... Perception is non-self.... Volitional constructions are non-self.... Consciousness is non-self. For if, bhikkhus, consciousness were self, this consciousness would not lead to affliction, and it would be possible to decree to consciousness: “Let my consciousness be thus: let my consciousness not be thus.” But because consciousness is non-self, consciousness leads to affliction, and it is not possible to decree to consciousness: “Let my consciousness be thus: let my consciousness not be thus.”

‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?’ – ‘Suffering, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self?”’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Is feeling permanent or impermanent?... Is perception permanent or impermanent?... Are volitional constructions permanent or impermanent?... Is consciousness permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?’ – [68] ‘Suffering, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self?”’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Therefore, bhikkhus, any kind of form whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, all form should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

⁸⁹ It seems that here *bhikkhu paññāvimutto* should be understood as any arahant disciple, not specifically as the *paññāvimutta* contrasted with the *ubhatobhāgavimutta* type, as in MN I 477–78. See II,n.211.

⁹⁰ This is the second discourse of the Buddha, recorded at Vin I 13–14. The five bhikkhus are the first five disciples, who at this point are still *sekha*. They attain arahantship by the end of the discourse. SA: Following the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (the first sermon), given on the full moon day of Āsaḷha (July), the five were gradually established in the fruit of stream-entry. On the fifth of the following fortnight, he addressed them, thinking, ‘Now I will teach them the Dhamma for the destruction of the taints.’

⁹¹ The sutta offers two ‘arguments’ for the *anattā* thesis. The first demonstrates the selfless nature of the five aggregates on the ground that they are insusceptible to the exercise of mastery (*avasavattitā*). If anything is to count as our ‘self’ it must be subject to our volitional control; since, however, we cannot bend the five aggregates to our will, they are all subject to affliction and therefore cannot be our self. For a fuller presentation of the argument, see MN I 230–33. The second argument for *anattā* is introduced just below, beginning with the words ‘What do you think?...’ This argument demonstrates the characteristic of non-self on the basis of the other two characteristics, impermanence and suffering, taken conjointly.

‘Any kind of feeling whatsoever ... Any kind of perception whatsoever ... Any kind of volitional constructions whatsoever ... Any kind of consciousness whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, all consciousness should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple becomes disenchanted with form, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with volitional constructions, disenchanted with consciousness. Being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion (his mind) is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: “It’s liberated.” He understands: “Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this world.”

That is what the Blessed One said. Being pleased, those bhikkhus delighted in the Blessed One’s statement. And while this discourse was being spoken, the minds of the bhikkhus of the group of five were liberated from the taints by non-clinging.

60 (8) Mahāli

Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Vesālī in the Great Wood in the Hall with the Peaked Roof. Then Mahāli the Licchavi approached the Blessed One [69] ... and said to him:

‘Venerable sir, Pūraṇa Kassapa speaks thus: “There is no cause or condition for the defilement of beings: beings are defiled without cause or condition. There is no cause or condition for the purification of beings: beings are purified without cause or condition.” What does the Blessed One say about this?’⁹²

‘There is, Mahāli, a cause and condition for the defilement of beings: beings are defiled with cause and condition. There is a cause and condition for the purification of beings: beings are purified with cause and condition.’

‘But, venerable sir, what is the cause and condition for the defilement of beings? How is it that beings are defiled with cause and condition?’

‘If, Mahāli, this form was exclusively suffering, immersed in suffering, steeped in suffering, and if it was not (also) steeped in pleasure, beings would not become enamoured with it. But because form is pleasurable, immersed in pleasure, steeped in pleasure, and is not steeped (only) in suffering, beings become enamoured with it.⁹³ By being enamoured with it, they are captivated by it, and by being captivated by it they are defiled. This, Mahāli, is a cause and condition for the defilement of beings: it is thus that beings are defiled with cause and condition.

‘If, Mahāli, this feeling was exclusively suffering ... If this perception ... these volitional constructions ... [70] ... this consciousness was exclusively suffering ... beings would not become enamoured with it. But because consciousness is pleasurable ... beings become enamoured with it. By being enamoured with it, they are captivated by it, and by being captivated by it they are defiled. This too, Mahāli, is a cause and condition for the defilement of beings: it is thus that beings are defiled with cause and condition.’

‘But, venerable sir, what is the cause and condition for the purification of beings? How is it that beings are purified with cause and condition?’

‘If, Mahāli, this form was exclusively pleasurable, immersed in pleasure, steeped in pleasure, and if it was not (also) steeped in suffering, beings would not become disenchanted with it. But because form is suffering, immersed in suffering, steeped in suffering, and is not steeped (only) in pleasure, beings become disenchanted with it. Being disenchanted, they become dispassionate, and through dispassion they are purified. This, Mahāli, is a cause and condition for the purification of beings: it is thus that beings are purified with cause and condition.

‘If, Mahāli, this feeling was exclusively pleasurable ... If this perception ... these volitional constructions ... this consciousness was exclusively pleasurable ... beings would not become disenchanted with it. But because consciousness is suffering ... beings become disenchanted with it. Being disenchanted, they become dispassionate, and through dispassion they are purified. [71] This too, Mahāli, is a cause and condition for the purification of beings: it is thus that beings are purified with cause and condition.’

61 (9) Burning

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is burning, feeling is burning, perception is burning, volitional constructions are burning, consciousness is burning.⁹⁴ Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple becomes dis-

⁹² In the Sāmaññaphala Sutta this view is ascribed to the Ājīvika teacher Makkhali Gosāla (DN 53,24–28). The same source ascribes to Pūraṇa Kassapa the theory of the inefficacy of action (*akiriya-vāda*; DN I 52,21–53), stated at 24:6 but without ascription. At 46:56 a different form of the non-causality doctrine (*ahetukavāda*) is ascribed to Pūraṇa Kassapa.

⁹³ See 14:34.

⁹⁴ This is a compressed version of the fuller Āditta Sutta at 35:28, which applies the metaphor of burning to the twelve sense bases. I would guess that the present sutta was composed by simply replacing the sense bases with the aggregates, and was

enchanted with form, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with volitional constructions, disenchanted with consciousness. Being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion (his mind) is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: “It’s liberated.” He understands: “Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this world.”

62 (10) Pathways of Language

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these three pathways of language, pathways of designation, pathways of description,⁹⁵ that are unmixed, that were never mixed, that are not being mixed, that will not be mixed, that are not rejected by wise recluses and brahmins. What three?’

‘Whatever form, bhikkhus, has passed, ceased, changed: the term, label, and description “was” applies to it, not the term “is” or the term “will be.”

‘Whatever feeling ... Whatever perception ... Whatever volitional constructions ... [72] Whatever consciousness has passed, ceased, changed: the term, label, and description “was” applies to it, not the term “is” or the term “will be.”

‘Whatever form, bhikkhus, has not arisen, has not become manifest: the term, label, and description “will be” applies to it, not the term “is” or the term “was.”

‘Whatever feeling ... Whatever perception ... Whatever volitional constructions ... Whatever consciousness has not arisen, has not become manifest: the term, label, and description “will be” applies to it, not the term “is” or the term “was.”

‘Whatever form, bhikkhus, has arisen, has become manifest: the term, label, and description “is” applies to it, not the term “was” or the term “will be.”

‘Whatever feeling ... Whatever perception ... Whatever volitional constructions ... Whatever consciousness has arisen, has become manifest: the term, label, and description “is” applies to it, not the term “was” or the term “will be.”

‘These, bhikkhus, are the three pathways of language, pathways of designation, pathways of description, that are unmixed, that were never mixed, that are not being mixed, [73] that will not be mixed, that are not rejected by wise recluses and brahmins.

‘Bhikkhus, even Vassa and Bañña of Ukkalā, proponents of non-causality, of the inefficacy of action, and of nihilism, did not think that these three pathways of language, pathways of designation, pathways of description should be criticized or scorned. For what reason? From fear of blame, attack, ridicule, and condemnation.’⁹⁶

VII. Arahants

63 (1) In Clinging

Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Sāvathī, in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park. Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:

‘Venerable sir, it would be good if the Blessed One would teach me the Dhamma in brief, so that, having heard the Dhamma from the Blessed One, I might dwell alone, withdrawn, diligent, ardent, and resolute.’

‘Bhikkhu, in clinging one is bound by Māra: by not clinging one is freed from the Evil One.’⁹⁷ [74]

then compressed so that it would not ‘steal the show’ from the more famous sutta, popularly known as the Fire Sermon, regarded by the Pāli tradition as the third formal discourse of the Buddha’s ministry.

⁹⁵ *Nirutti-pathā adhvācāna-pathā paññatti-pathā*. SA: Language (*nirutti*, linguistic expressions) is itself the pathway of language; or alternatively, language is called the pathway of language because it is the pathway for the communication of meanings to be understood through language. The other two terms should be understood in the same way; the three are synonyms.

Dhs §§1306–8 distinguishes between *nirutti*, *adhvācāna*, and *paññatti* on the one hand, and their respective *patha* on the other. There *nirutti* and the other two are treated as synonymous, but their respective *patha* are said to comprise *all phenomena* (*sabb’eva dhammā*). At DN II 63,28–64,2, name-and-form together with consciousness is said to be *adhvācāna-patha*, *nirutti-patha*, *paññatti-patha*. On the basis of these texts it seems that SA has gone astray here, and we should understand that the three pathways of language, etc., are the five aggregates pertaining to the three time periods, and the corresponding temporal ‘term, label, description’ applied to them is ‘language, designation, description.’

⁹⁶ SA explains *ukkalā* as residents of the country of Ukkala (also called Okkala, according to CPD corresponding to modern Orissa). SA treats *vasabhaññā* as a *dvanda*, *vasso ca bhañño ca*, and explains that the two held the three basic wrong views, found at 24:5–7. I read the last expression with Ce and Ee, *nindabyārosauparambhābhayā*. Be includes an additional term in the second place, *ghaṭṭana*, glossed *ghaṭṭanābhayena* by SA (Be and Ce), but not found in the other eds. See the parallel at MN III 78,12–16, which reads as Ce and Ee do here.

‘Understood, Blessed One! Understood, Sublime One!’

‘In what way, bhikkhu, do you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief?’

‘In clinging to form, venerable sir, one is bound by Māra: by not clinging to it one is freed from the Evil One. In clinging to feeling ... to perception ... to volitional constructions ... to consciousness one is bound by Māra: by not clinging to it one is freed from the Evil One.

‘It is in such a way, venerable sir, that I understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by the Blessed One in brief.’

‘Good, good, bhikkhu! It is good that you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief. In clinging to form, bhikkhu, one is bound by Māra ... (*as above in full*) ... by not clinging to it one is freed from the Evil One. It is in such a way that the meaning of what was stated by me in brief should be understood in detail.’

Then that bhikkhu, having delighted and rejoiced in the Blessed One’s words, rose from his seat, and, after paying homage to the Blessed One, keeping him on his right, he departed.

Then, dwelling alone, withdrawn, diligent, ardent, and resolute, that bhikkhu, by realizing it for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life entered and dwelt in that unsurpassed goal of the holy life for the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth from the household life into homelessness. He directly knew: ‘Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this world.’ And that bhikkhu became one of the arahants.

64 (2) In Conceiving

Setting at Sāvattḥī. Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One ... and said to him: [75]

‘Venerable sir, it would good if the Blessed One would teach me the Dhamma in brief....’

‘Bhikkhu, in conceiving one is bound by Māra: by not conceiving one is freed from the Evil One.’

‘Understood, Blessed One! Understood, Sublime One!’

‘In what way, bhikkhu, do you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief?’

‘In conceiving form, venerable sir, one is bound by Māra: by not conceiving it one is freed from the Evil One. In conceiving feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness one is bound by Māra: by not conceiving it one is freed from the Evil One.

‘It is in such a way, venerable sir, that I understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by the Blessed One in brief.’

‘Good, good, bhikkhu! It is good that you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief. In conceiving form, bhikkhu, one is bound by Māra ... (*as above in full*) ... by not conceiving it one is freed from the Evil One. It is in such a way that the meaning of what was stated by me in brief should be understood in detail.’

... And that bhikkhu became one of the arahants.

65 (3) In Seeking Delight

Setting at Sāvattḥī. Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One ... and said to him:

‘Venerable sir, it would good if the Blessed One would teach me the Dhamma in brief....’

‘Bhikkhu, in seeking delight one is bound by Māra: by not seeking delight one is freed from the Evil One.’

‘Understood, Blessed One! Understood, Sublime One!’

‘In what way, bhikkhu, do you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief?’

‘In seeking delight in form, venerable sir, one is bound by Māra: by not seeking delight in it one is freed from the Evil One. In seeking delight in feeling ... in perception ... in volitional constructions ... in consciousness one is bound by Māra: by not seeking delight in it one is freed from the Evil One. [76]

‘It is in such a way, venerable sir, that I understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by the Blessed One in brief.’

‘Good, good, bhikkhu! It is good that you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief. In seeking delight in form, bhikkhu, one is bound by Māra ... (*as above in full*) ... by not seeking delight in it one is freed from the Evil One. It is in such a way that the meaning of what was stated by me in brief should be understood in detail.’

... And that bhikkhu became one of the arahants.

66 (4) Impermanent

Setting at Sāvattḥī. Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One ... and said to him:

⁹⁷ SA: *Clinging (upādiyamāno)*: seizing by way of craving, conceit, and views. In the next two suttas, *conceiving (maññamāno)* and *seeking delight (abhiññamāno)* are explained in the same way.

‘Venerable sir, it would good if the Blessed One would teach me the Dhamma in brief.... ‘
 ‘Bhikkhu, you should abandon desire for whatever is impermanent.’
 ‘Understood, Blessed One! Understood, Sublime One!’
 ‘In what way, bhikkhu, do you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief?’
 ‘Form, venerable sir, is impermanent: I should abandon desire for it. Feeling is impermanent ... Perception is impermanent ... Volitional constructions are impermanent ... Consciousness is impermanent: I should abandon desire for it.
 ‘It is in such a way, venerable sir, that I understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by the Blessed One in brief.’
 ‘Good, good, bhikkhu! It is good that you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief. Form is impermanent ... Consciousness is impermanent: you should abandon desire for it. It is in such a way that the meaning of what was stated by me in brief should be understood in detail.’ [77]
 ... And that bhikkhu became one of the arahants.

67 (5) Suffering

(Opening as in preceding sutta:)

... ‘Bhikkhu, you should abandon desire for whatever is suffering.’...

68 (6) Non-self

... ‘Bhikkhu, you should abandon desire for whatever is non-self.’... [78]

69 (7) What Does Not Belong to Self

... ‘Bhikkhu, you should abandon desire for whatever does not belong to self.’... [79]

70 (8) Appears Tantalizing

... ‘Bhikkhu, you should abandon desire for whatever appears tantalizing.’...

71 (9) Rādha

Setting at Sāvattihī. Then the Venerable Rādha approached the Blessed One, [80] paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:⁹⁸

‘Venerable sir, how should one know, how should one see so that, in regard to this body with consciousness and in regard to all external signs, I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit no longer occur within?’

‘Any kind of form whatsoever, Rādha, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near—one sees all form as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘Any kind of feeling whatsoever ... Any kind of perception whatsoever ... Any kind of volitional constructions whatsoever ... Any kind of consciousness whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near—one sees all consciousness as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘When one knows and sees thus, Rādha, then in regard to this body with consciousness and in regard to all external signs, I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit no longer occur within.’

Then the Venerable Rādha ... became one of the arahants.

72 (10) Surādha

Setting at Sāvattihī. Then the Venerable Surādha approached the Blessed One ... and said to him:

‘Venerable sir, how should one know, how should one see so that, in regard to this body with consciousness and in regard to all external signs, the mind is rid of I-making, mine-making, and conceit, has transcended discrimination, and is peaceful and well liberated?’

‘Any kind of form whatsoever, Surādha, whether past, future, or present ... far or near—having seen all form as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self,” one is liberated by non-clinging.

‘Any kind of feeling whatsoever ... Any kind of perception whatsoever ... Any kind of volitional constructions whatsoever ... [81] Any kind of consciousness whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external,

⁹⁸ This sutta is identical with 18:21 (and 22:91), the next with 18:22 (and 22:92). The Venerable Rādha is the subject of the eponymic samyutta, ch.23.

gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near—having seen all consciousness as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self,” one is liberated by non-clinging.

‘When one knows and sees thus, Surādha, then in regard to this body with consciousness and in regard to all external signs, the mind is rid of I-making, mine-making, and conceit, has transcended discrimination, and is peaceful and well liberated.’

Then the Venerable Surādha ... became one of the arahants.

VIII. Being Devoured

73 (1) Gratification

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling does not understand as it really is the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of form: he does not understand this in the case of feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness.

‘But, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple [82] understands as it really is the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of form: he understands this in the case of feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness.’

74 (2) Origin (1)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling does not understand as it really is the origin and the passing away, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of form: he does not understand this in the case of feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness.

‘But, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple understands as it really is the origin and the passing away, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of form: he understands this in the case of feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness.’

75 (3) Origin (2)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple understands as it really is the origin and the passing away, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of form: he understands this in the case of feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness.’

76 (4) Arahants (1)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is non-self. What is non-self [83] should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘Feeling is impermanent.... Perception is impermanent.... Volitional constructions are impermanent.... Consciousness is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering is non-self. What is non-self should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple becomes disenchanted with form, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with volitional constructions, disenchanted with consciousness. Being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion (his mind) is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: “It’s liberated.” He understands: “Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this world.”

‘To whatever extent, bhikkhus, there are abodes of beings, even up to the pinnacle of becoming,⁹⁹ these are the foremost in the world, these are the best, that is, arahants.’

This is what the Blessed One said. Having said this, the Sublime One, the Teacher, further said this:

‘Happy indeed are the arahants!

No craving can be found in them.

Cut off is the conceit “I am,”

Burst asunder is delusion’s net.

They have reached the unstirred state,¹⁰⁰

Limpid are their minds:

⁹⁹ Nine abodes of beings (*sattāvāsa*) are enumerated at AN IV 401 (= DN III 263). The ‘peak of becoming’ (*bhavagga*) is presumably the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, the highest realm of sentient existence. The term is used in this sense at Vibh 426,?? and regularly in the commentaries.

¹⁰⁰ We should read with Be and Ce: *anejaṃ te anuppattā*. SA: This is arahantship, the abandoning of craving, which is known as ‘the stirring’ (*ejā*). See 35:90, 91.

They are unsullied in the world—
The holy ones, without taints.

Having fully understood the five aggregates,
Ranging in the seven good qualities,¹⁰¹
Those praiseworthy superior men
Are the Buddha's bosom sons.

Endowed with the seven gems,
Trained in the threefold training,¹⁰²
Those great heroes wander about
With fear and trembling abandoned.

Endowed with the ten factors,
Those great nāgas, concentrated,
Are the best beings in the world:
No craving can be found in them.¹⁰³

The adepts' knowledge has arisen in them:
"This body is the last I bear."
In regard to the core of the holy life
They no longer depend on others. [84]

They do not waver in discrimination,¹⁰⁴
They are released from re-becoming.
Having reached the stage of the tamed,
They are the victors in the world.

Above, across, and below,
Delight is no more found in them.
They boldly sound their lion's roar:
"The enlightened are supreme in the world."

77 (5) Arahants (2)

(This sutta is identical with the preceding one except that the verses are omitted.)

78 (6) The Lion

Setting at Sāvathī. 'Bhikkhus, in the evening the lion, the king of beasts, comes out from his lair. Having come out, he stretches himself, surveys the four quarters all around, and roars his lion's roar three times. Then he sets out in search of game. [85]

'When the lion, the king of beasts, roars, whatever animals hear the sound are for the most part filled with fear, a sense of urgency, and terror. Those who live in holes enter their holes: those who live in the water enter the water: those who live in the woods enter the woods: and the birds fly up into the air. Even those royal bull-elephants, bound by strong thongs in the villages, towns, and capital cities, burst and break their bonds asunder: frightened, they urinate and defecate and flee here and there. So powerful, bhikkhus, is the lion, the king of beasts, so majestic and mighty.

'So too, bhikkhus,¹⁰⁵ when the Tathāgata arises in the world, an arahant, fully enlightened, accomplished in true knowledge and conduct, sublime, knower of the world, unsurpassed leader of persons to be tamed, teacher of devas and humans, the Enlightened One, the Blessed One, he teaches the Dhamma thus: "Such is form, such

¹⁰¹ *Sattasaddhammagocarā*. The seven good qualities: faith, moral shame, fear of wrongdoing, learning, energy, mindfulness, and wisdom. See MN I 356,1–21; DN III 252,10–12.

¹⁰² The seven gems (*sattaratana*) are the seven factors of enlightenment (*satta bojjhaṅgā*); see 46:42. The threefold training (*tisikkhā*) is the training in the higher virtue, the higher mind, and the higher wisdom (see AN I 235–36).

¹⁰³ The ten factors (*dasāṅga*): the eight perfected factors of the noble eightfold path, augmented by right knowledge and right liberation. They are known more specifically as the ten factors of the one beyond training (*asekha*); see MN I 446,29–447,6, II 29,2–12, etc. On *nāga*, see I,n.84.

¹⁰⁴ *Vidhāsu na vikampati*. SA: This refers to the three modes of conceit (superior, equal, inferior).

¹⁰⁵ SA elaborates point-by-point on the comparison between the lion's emerging from his lair and roaring, and the Buddha's arising in the world and teaching the Dhamma. The lion's sounding his roar is like the Buddha's 'setting in motion' the Wheel of the Dhamma in the Deer Park, and the terror of the smaller animals like the 'arising of the terror of knowledge' (*ñānasantāsassa uppatti*) in the long-lived deities when they hear the Buddha expound the four noble truths.

its origin, such its passing away: such is feeling ... such is perception ... such are volitional constructions ... such is consciousness, such its origin, such its passing away.”¹⁰⁶

‘Then, bhikkhus, when those devas who are long-lived, beautiful, abounding in happiness, dwelling for a long time in lofty palaces, hear the Tathāgata’s teaching of the Dhamma, they are for the most part filled with fear, a sense of urgency, and terror, saying: “It seems, sir, that we are impermanent, though we thought ourselves permanent: it seems, sir, that we are unstable, though we thought ourselves stable: it seems, sir, that we are non-eternal, though we thought ourselves eternal. It seems, sir, that we are impermanent, unstable, non-eternal, included within identity.”¹⁰⁷ So powerful, bhikkhus, is the Tathāgata over this world together with its devas, so majestic and mighty.’

This is what the Blessed One said. Having said this, the Sublime One, the Teacher, further said this: [86]

‘When the Buddha, through direct knowledge,
Sets in motion the Wheel of Dhamma,
The peerless Teacher in this world
With its devas (makes this known):

The cessation of identity
The origin of identity,
And the noble eightfold path
That leads to suffering’s appeasement.

Then those devas who enjoy long life,
Beautiful, ablaze with glory,
Are struck with fear, filled with terror,
Like beasts who hear the lion’s roar.

“We”ve not transcended identity:
It seems, sir, we’re impermanent,”
(So they say) having heard the utterance
Of the Arahant, the Stable One released.’

79 (7) Being Devoured

Setting at Sāvaththī. ‘Bhikkhus, those recluses and brahmins who recollect their manifold past abodes all recollect the five aggregates subject to clinging or a certain one among them.¹⁰⁸ What five?’

‘When recollecting thus, bhikkhus: “I had such form in the past,” it is just form that one recollects. When recollecting: “I had such a feeling in the past,” it is just feeling that one recollects. When recollecting: “I had such a perception in the past,” it is just perception that one recollects. When recollecting: “I had such volitional constructions in the past,” it is just volitional constructions that one recollects. When recollecting: “I had such consciousness in the past,” it is just consciousness that one recollects.

¹⁰⁶ Also at 12:21, etc. See II,n.58. SA refers to 22:56 <56 (4) Phases of Clinging> for an explanation of the origin and passing away of the five aggregates.

¹⁰⁷ SA: ‘For the most part’ (*yebhuyyena*) is said to make an exception of those devas who are noble disciples. For of these, no fear at all arises in the arahants, though the ‘urgency of knowledge’ (*ñāṇasaṃvega*) occurs in them because they have attained what one stirred by a sense of urgency should attain through proper striving. For the other devas, as they attend to impermanence, there arises both fear as mental fright (*cittutrāsa-bhaya*) and, at the time of strong insight, the fear of knowledge (*ñāṇabhaya*: probably the advanced stage of insight called *bhayat’upaṭṭhāna-ñāṇa*, ‘knowledge of appearance as fearful’; see *Vism* 645–47; *PP* 21:29–34). *Included within identity* (*sakkāya-pariyāpannā*): included in the five aggregates. Thus, when the Buddha teaches them the Dhamma stamped with the three characteristics, exposing the faults in the round of becoming, the fear of knowledge enters them.

¹⁰⁸ SA says that this does not refer to recollection by direct knowledge (i.e., by retrocognition of the past) but to the recollection of one’s past abodes by way of insight. SA seems to understand the purport of the Buddha’s statement to be that they *deliberately* recollect the past in terms of the aggregates. <When the translator’s mind is so overcome with perpetual scepticism, it is unavoidable that he reads things into the text that are not there. There is no conceivable reason to imagine that SA ‘seems to understand... that they *deliberately* recollect the past in terms of the aggregates. In perfectly plain and unambiguous language, SA explains merely that since this recollection is done by way of vipassanā, one cannot see concepts such as name, etc., which one can with the psychic power of recollecting past lives.> I take the point differently, i.e., that though these ascetics imagine they are recalling the past experience of a permanent self, they are only recollecting past configurations of the five aggregates. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the next paragraph, which reduces personalistic memories (*evamrūpo ahoṣim*) to experiences framed solely in terms of the aggregates (*rūpaṃ yeva*). <And how then is the Noble Disciple going to know this? By pure inference? Abandoning the Noble Truth of the Origin of Suffering by pure inference?> SA entitles this passage ‘the emptiness section’ (*suññatāpabba*).

‘And why, bhikkhus, do you say form?¹⁰⁹ “It is deformed,” bhikkhus, therefore it is called form. Deformed by what? Deformed by cold, deformed by heat, deformed by hunger, deformed by thirst, deformed by contact with flies, mosquitoes, wind, sun, and serpents. “It is deformed,” bhikkhus, therefore it is called form.¹¹⁰

‘And why, bhikkhus, do you say feeling? “It feels,” bhikkhus, therefore it is called feeling. And what does it feel? It feels pleasure, it feels pain, [87] it feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure. “It feels,” bhikkhus, therefore it is called feeling.¹¹¹

‘And why, bhikkhus, do you say perception? “It perceives,” bhikkhus, therefore it is called perception. And what does it perceive? It perceives blue, it perceives yellow, it perceives red, it perceives white. “It perceives,” bhikkhus, therefore it is called perception.

‘And why, bhikkhus, do you say volitional constructions? “They construct the constructed,” bhikkhus, therefore they are called volitional constructions.¹¹² And what is the constructed that they construct? They construct constructed form for its nature as form:¹¹³ they construct constructed feeling for its nature as feeling: they construct constructed perception for its nature as perception: they construct constructed volitional constructions for its nature as volitional constructions: they construct constructed consciousness for its nature as consciousness. “They construct the constructed,” bhikkhus, therefore they are called volitional constructions.

‘And why, bhikkhus, do you say consciousness? “It cognizes,” bhikkhus, therefore it is called consciousness. And what does it cognize? It cognizes sour, it cognizes bitter, it cognizes pungent, it cognizes sweet, it cognizes sharp, it cognizes mild, it cognizes salty, it cognizes unsalty. “It cognizes,” bhikkhus, therefore it is called consciousness.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁹ SA: Even though emptiness has been discussed, the discussion is not yet definitive because the characteristic of emptiness (*suññatā-lakkhaṇa*) has not been discussed. The present passage is introduced to show the characteristic of emptiness. SṬ: Since form, etc., are neither a self nor the belongings of a self, but are insubstantial and ownerless, they are empty of that (self). Their nature is emptiness, their characteristic is ‘being deformed,’ etc.

¹¹⁰ *Ruppātī ti kho bhikkhave tasmā rūpan ti vuccatī*. I have tried, though clumsily, to capture the subtle word play of the Pāli, which capitalizes on the apparent correspondence between the verb *ruppātī* and the noun *rūpa*. Etymologically, the two are not related. *Ruppātī* is a passive verb from the root *rup* (= Skt *rup*), meaning to break, injure, spoil. SED lists *rupyate* (s.v. *rup*), ‘to suffer violent or racking pain.’ See too PED, s.v. *ruppātī*. SA glosses: *Ruppātī ti kuppātī ghaṭṭiyati pīḷiyati, bhijjātī ti attho*; ‘deformed: disturbed, stricken, oppressed, meaning ‘is broken.’

At KS 2:73, n.1, Woodward has misunderstood the point of the commentary. It is not the case that Buddhaghosa misconstrues ‘these various contacts not as referring to this life, but as ‘informing’ creatures in other spheres.’ Rather, he merely cites the cold hells, hot hells, etc., as the realms where the different types of ‘deformation’ are most evident (*pākaṭa*). SA adds that being ‘deformed’ is the specific characteristic (*paccatta-lakkhaṇa*) of form, which distinguishes it from feeling and the other aggregates; but the general characteristics (*sāmañña-lakkhaṇa*) are what they have in common, namely, impermanence, suffering, and non-self.

¹¹¹ SA: It is feeling itself that feels, not another—a being or a person.

¹¹² *Saṅkhataṃ abhisankharontī ti bhikkhave tasmā saṅkhārā ti vuccanti*. This passage shows the active role of *cetanā*, volition, in constructing experienced reality. Not only does volition influence the objective content of the experience, but it also influences the psycho-physical organism to which it belongs and, via its role as kamma, shapes the future configurations of the five aggregates to be produced by kamma. In this connection see 35:145, on the six sense bases as ‘old kamma.’

¹¹³ All three printed eds. of SN read, *rūpaṃ rūpattāya saṅkhataṃ abhisankharontī*, and so for the other aggregates, except for *viññāna*, where Ee reads, *viññānatthāya*; however, since there is no note on v.ll., this is almost certainly an editorial oversight rather than a meaningful variant. SA (Ce) reads *rūpattāya* in its lemma, implying that the termination *-atthāya* should apply to every aggregate, and apparently old Sinhalese manuscripts of SN had this reading. SA (Be), however, has *rūpattāya*. The explanation in SA is equally intelligible on either reading of SN.

I follow here Be: ‘As one is said to cook congee for its nature as congee, to bake a cake for its nature as cake, so it [SṬ: the collection of states headed by volition] constructs, accumulates, builds up form itself—called ‘the constructed’ because it is made by a combination of conditions—for just such a nature, for its formness (*tathattāya rūpabhāvāya*). The meaning is that it produces it. This is the sense in brief: It constructs, produces the form generated along with itself and the associated feeling, etc. Here, too, the Blessed One shows just the specific characteristic of volitional constructions, whose characteristic is volition. [SṬ: This is said because volition is the chief of the states belonging to the aggregates of volitional constructions.]

¹¹⁴ The six flavours are: *ambila*, *tittaka*, *kaṭuka*, *madhuka*, *khārika*, *akhārika*, *loṇaka*, *aloṇaka*; see too 47:8. The explanation of *viññāna* seems very similar to that of *saññā*, the difference being only in the type of sense object they cognize. SA, however, explains that the difference in object highlights a difference in their functions: ‘Perception is analysed by way of the eye door because it is evident in grasping the appearance and shape of the object; consciousness is analysed by way of the tongue door because it can grasp particular distinctions in an object even when there is no appearance and shape.’ SA continues with a passage also found at Vism 437, which, however, I don’t find very convincing. *Saññā* is treated in more detail at DhsA 110–11 and *viññāna* (under the name *citta*) at DhsA 63–64. For an interesting discussion of the relationship between *saññā* and *viññāna*, with which I am not in full agreement, see Harvey, *The Selfless Mind*, pp.141–51.

‘Therein, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple reflects thus: “I am now being devoured by form.¹¹⁵ In the past too I was devoured by form in the very same way that I am now being devoured by present form. If I were to seek delight in future form, then in the future too I shall be devoured by form in the very same way that I am now being devoured by present form.”

‘Having reflected thus, he becomes indifferent towards past form, he does not seek delight in future form, and he is practising for disenchantment with present form, for its fading away and cessation.

‘(He reflects thus:) “I am now being devoured by feeling.” ... [88] ... “I am now being devoured by perception.” ... “I am now being devoured by volitional constructions.” ... “I am now being devoured by consciousness. In the past too I was devoured by consciousness in the very same way that I am now being devoured by present consciousness. If I were to seek delight in future consciousness, then in the future too I shall be devoured by consciousness in the very same way that I am now being devoured by present consciousness.”

‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form permanent or impermanent?... Is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... [89] consciousness permanent or impermanent?’¹¹⁶ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?’ – ‘Suffering, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self?”’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Therefore, bhikkhus, any kind of form whatsoever ... Any kind of feeling whatsoever ... Any kind of perception whatsoever ... Any kind of volitional constructions whatsoever ... Any kind of consciousness whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, all consciousness should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘This is called, bhikkhus, a noble disciple who dismantles and does not build up: who abandons and does not cling: who scatters and does not amass: who extinguishes and does not kindle.¹¹⁷

‘And what is it that he dismantles and does not build up? He dismantles form and does not build it up. He dismantles feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness and does not build it up.

‘And what is it that he abandons and does not cling to? He abandons form and does not cling to it. He abandons feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness and does not cling to it.

‘And what is it that he scatters and does not amass? He scatters form and does not amass it. He scatters feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness and does not amass it. [90]

‘And what is it that he extinguishes and does not kindle? He extinguishes form and does not kindle it. He extinguishes feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness and does not kindle it.

‘Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple becomes disenchanted with form, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with volitional constructions, disenchanted with consciousness. Being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion (his mind) is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: “It’s liberated.” He understands: “Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this world.”

‘This is called, bhikkhus, a noble disciple who neither builds up nor dismantles, but who abides having dismantled: who neither abandons nor clings, but who abides having abandoned: who neither scatters nor amasses, but who abides having scattered: who neither extinguishes nor kindles, but who abides having extinguished.¹¹⁸

‘And what is it, bhikkhus, that he neither builds up nor dismantles, but abides having dismantled? He neither builds up nor dismantles form, but abides having dismantled it. He neither builds up nor dismantles feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, but abides having dismantled it.

‘And what is it that he neither abandons nor clings to, but abides having abandoned? He neither abandons nor clings to form, but abides having abandoned it. He neither abandons nor clings to feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, but abides having abandoned it.

‘And what is it that he neither scatters nor amasses, but abides having scattered? He neither scatters nor amasses form, but abides having scattered it. He neither scatters nor amasses feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, but abides having scattered it.

¹¹⁵ SA: The first two sections—the emptiness section and the section on the characteristic of emptiness—have discussed the characteristic of non-self. Now he will discuss the characteristic of suffering. Therein, form does not devour one as a dog does a piece of meat, by tearing one apart, but rather in the way a soiled garment might cause discomfort, as when one says, ‘This shirt is devouring me.’

¹¹⁶ SA: This passage is stated to show the characteristic of impermanence, and to do so by bringing the three characteristics together.

¹¹⁷ I render this passage with the aid of SA, which glosses the last two pairs of terms thus: *Visineti na ussineti ti vikirati na sampiṇḍeti; vidhūpeti na sandhūpeti ti nibbāpeti na jālāpeti* (some texts read *viseneti, usseneti*). Cp. AN II 214–16. The present passage describes the *sekha*, who is still in the process of dismantling the round.

¹¹⁸ SA: This shows the arahant, who abides having dismantled the round.

‘And what is it that he neither extinguishes nor kindles, but abides having extinguished. He neither extinguishes nor kindles form, but abides having extinguished it. He neither extinguishes nor kindles feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, but abides having extinguished it.

‘When, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu is thus liberated in mind, the devas together with Indra, Brahmā, and Pajāpati pay homage to him from afar: [91]

“Homage to you, O thoroughbred man!
Homage to you, O highest among men!
We ourselves do not directly know
Dependent upon what you meditate.”¹¹⁹

80 (9) Alms-gatherer

On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling among the Sakyans at Kapilavatthu in Nigrodha’s Park.

Then the Blessed One, having dismissed the bhikkhus for a particular reason,¹²⁰ dressed in the morning and, taking bowl and robe, entered Kapilavatthu for alms. When he had walked for alms in Kapilavatthu and had returned from the alms round, after his meal he went to the Great Wood for the day’s abiding. Having plunged into the Great Wood, he sat down at the foot of a beluva sapling tree for the day’s abiding.

Then, while the Blessed One was alone in seclusion, a reflection arose in his mind thus:¹²¹ ‘The Sangha of bhikkhus has been dismissed by me. There are bhikkhus here who are newly ordained, not long gone forth, recently come to this Dhamma and Discipline. If they do not see me there may take place in them some alteration or change. Just as when a young calf does not see its mother there may take place in it some alteration or change, so too there are bhikkhus here who are newly ordained.... If they do not see me there may take place in them some alteration or change. Just as when young seedlings do not get water there may take place in them some alteration or change, so too there are bhikkhus here who are newly ordained.... If they do not see me there may take place in them some alteration or change. Let me assist the Sangha of bhikkhus now just as I have assisted it in the past.’

Then Brahmā Sahampati, having known with his own mind the reflection in the Blessed One’s mind, just as quickly as a strong man might extend his drawn-in arm or draw in his extended arm, disappeared from the Brahma-world and reappeared before the Blessed One. [92] He arranged his upper robe over one shoulder, saluted the Blessed One reverentially, and said to him: ‘So it is, Blessed One! So it is, Sublime One! The Sangha of bhikkhus has been dismissed by the Blessed One. There are bhikkhus here who are newly ordained ... (*as above, including the similes*) ... If they do not see the Blessed One there may take place in them some alteration or change. Venerable sir, let the Blessed One take delight in the Sangha of bhikkhus! Let the Blessed One welcome the Sangha of bhikkhus! Let the Blessed One assist the Sangha of bhikkhus now just as he has assisted it in the past.’

The Blessed One consented by silence. Then Brahmā Sahampati, having understood the Blessed One’s consent, paid homage to the Blessed One and, keeping him on his right, he disappeared right there.

Then in the evening the Blessed One emerged from seclusion and went to Nigrodha’s Park. He sat down in the appointed seat and performed such a feat of spiritual power that the bhikkhus would come to him, alone and in pairs, in an apprehensive manner.¹²² Then those bhikkhus approached the Blessed One, alone and in pairs, in an apprehensive manner. [93] Having approached, they paid homage to the Blessed One and sat down to one side. The Blessed One then said to them:

¹¹⁹ Pādas cd should be read: *yassa te nābhijānāma, yampi nissāya jhāyati*. See AN V 322–26 and MN I 140,3–6. SA states that at the end of this discourse five hundred bhikkhus were established in arahantship.

¹²⁰ SA: After spending the rains residence at Sāvathī, the Buddha had set out for Kapilavatthu together with a large company of bhikkhus. When they arrived, the Sakyans came to see him, bringing many gifts for the Sangha. A noisy quarrel broke out between the bhikkhus over the distribution of the gifts, and it was for this reason that the Teacher dismissed them. He wanted to teach them, ‘It isn’t for the sake of such things as robes, etc., that you have gone forth into homelessness, but for the sake of arahantship.’

¹²¹ A similar passage is at MN I 457–59, but there the Sakyans first request the Buddha to pardon the bhikkhus, followed by Brahmā Sahampati, who makes the same appeal. In the MN version the sequence of the two similes is inverted.

¹²² I follow Ce here, which reads: *Tathārūpaṃ iddhābhisāṅkhāraṃ abhisāṅkhāsi yathā te bhikkhū ekadvīhikāya sārājamānarūpā yena bhagavā ten’upasaṅkameyyuṃ*. Be and Ee read *yenāhaṃ* in place of *yena bhagavā*; it seems the whole phrase is missing in SS. SA glosses: *Ekadvīhikāyā ti ek’eko c’eva dve dve ca hutvā. Sārājamānarūpā ti ottappamānasa-bhāvā bhāyamānā*.

SA: Why did the Buddha perform such a feat? From a desire for their welfare. For if they had come to him in groups they would not have shown reverence towards the Buddha nor would they have been able to receive a Dhamma teaching. But when they come fearfully, ashamed, alone and in pairs, they show reverence and can receive a teaching.

‘Bhikkhus, this is the lowest form of livelihood, that is, gathering alms. In the world this is a term of abuse:¹²³ “You alms-gatherer: you roam about with a begging bowl in your hand!” And yet, bhikkhus, clansmen intent on the good take up that way of life for a valid reason. It is not because they have been driven to it by kings that they do so, nor because they have been driven to it by thieves, nor owing to debt, nor from fear, nor to earn a livelihood. But they do so with the thought: “I am immersed in birth, in aging, in death, in sorrow, in lamentation, in pain, in displeasure, in despair. I am immersed in suffering, oppressed by suffering. Perhaps an ending of this entire mass of suffering might be discerned!”

‘It is in such a way, bhikkhus, that this clansman has gone forth. Yet he is covetous, inflamed by lust for sensual pleasures, with a mind full of ill will, with intentions corrupted by hate, muddle-minded, lacking clear comprehension, unconcentrated, with a wandering mind, loose in their sense faculties. Just as a brand from a funeral pyre, burning at both ends and smeared with excrement in the middle, cannot be used as timber either in the village or in the forest, in just such a way do I speak about this person: he has missed out on the enjoyments of a householder, yet he does not fulfil the goal of recluseship.

‘There are, bhikkhus, these three kinds of unwholesome thoughts: sensual thought, thought of ill will, thought of harming.¹²⁴ And where, bhikkhus, do these three unwholesome thoughts cease without remainder? For one who dwells with a mind well established in the four foundations of mindfulness, or for one who develops the signless concentration.¹²⁵ This is reason enough, bhikkhus, to develop the signless concentration. When the signless concentration is developed and cultivated, bhikkhus, it is of great fruit and benefit.

‘There are, bhikkhus, these two views: the view of becoming and the view of disbecoming.¹²⁶ [94] Therein, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple reflects thus: “Is there anything in the world that I could cling to without being blameworthy?” He understands thus: “There is nothing in the world that I could cling to without being blameworthy. For if I should cling, it is only form that I would be clinging to, only feeling ... only perception ... only volitional constructions ... only consciousness that I would be clinging to. With that clinging of mine as condition, there would be becoming: with becoming as condition, birth: with birth as condition, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair would come to be. Such would be the origin of this whole mass of suffering.”

‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form permanent or impermanent?... Is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?’ – ‘Suffering, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self?”’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’¹²⁷

81 (9) Pārileyya

On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Kosambī in Ghosita’s Park.

Then, in the morning, the Blessed One dressed and, taking bowl and robe, entered Kosambī for alms. When he had walked for alms in Kosambī and had returned from the alms round, after his meal [95] he set his lodging in order himself, took his bowl and robe, and without informing his personal attendants, without taking leave of the Bhikkhu Sangha, he set out on tour alone, without a companion.¹²⁸

Then, not long after the Blessed One had departed, a certain bhikkhu approached the Venerable Ānanda and told him: ‘Friend Ānanda, the Blessed One has set his lodging in order himself, taken his bowl and robe, and

¹²³ *Abhisāpa*, glossed *akkosa* by SA, which explains: ‘For when people get angry they abuse their antagonist by saying, ‘You should put on a monk’s robe, get yourself a begging bowl, and roam about seeking alms!’” *Kapāla*, rendered here ‘begging bowl,’ is not the usual word for a monk’s almsbowl (= *patta*), but refers to the kind of bowl used by non-Buddhist ascetics (sometimes made from a skull); the use of the word seems perjorative.

¹²⁴ SA: This passage is introduced to show that this person has become like a brand from a funeral pyre because of his evil thoughts.

¹²⁵ SA: The ‘signless concentration’ (*animitta-samādhi*) is insight concentration (*vipassanā-samādhi*), called ‘signless’ because it removes the signs of permanence, etc.

¹²⁶ The view of becoming (*bhava-ditṭhi*) is eternalism (*sassata-ditṭhi*); the view of disbecoming (*vibhava-ditṭhi*), annihilationism (*uccheda-ditṭhi*). This passage is introduced to show that the signless concentration removes not only the three wrong thoughts but also eternalism and annihilationism.

¹²⁷ SA: At the end of the discourse five hundred bhikkhus attained arahantship together with the analytical knowledges (*pañisambhidā*).

¹²⁸ SA assigns this sutta to the time of the famous quarrel at Kosambī. After he had failed in three attempts to reconcile the factious parties, the Buddha decided to set out alone. For a full account, see Vin I 337–57 and Ñānamoli, *Life of the Buddha*, pp.109–19.

without informing his personal attendants, without taking leave of the Bhikkhu Sangha, he has set out on tour alone, without a companion.’

‘Friend, whenever the Blessed One does that he wishes to dwell alone. On such an occasion the Blessed One should not be followed by anyone.’

Then the Blessed One, wandering by stages, arrived at Pārileyyaka. There at Pārileyyaka the Blessed One dwelt at the foot of an auspicious *sāla* tree.¹²⁹

Then a number of bhikkhus approached the Venerable Ānanda and exchanged greetings with him.¹³⁰ When they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, they sat down to one side and said to the Venerable Ānanda: ‘Friend Ānanda, it has been a long time since we heard a Dhamma talk in the presence of the Blessed One. We should like to hear such a talk, friend Ānanda.’

Then the Venerable Ānanda together with those bhikkhus approached the Blessed One at Pārileyyaka, at the foot of the auspicious *sāla* tree. Having approached, they paid homage to the Blessed One and sat down to one side. The Blessed One then instructed, exhorted, inspired, and encouraged those bhikkhus with a Dhamma talk. [96] Now on that occasion a reflection arose in the mind of a certain bhikkhu thus: ‘How should one know, how should one see, for the immediate destruction of the taints to occur?’

The Blessed One, having known with his own mind the reflection in that bhikkhu’s mind, addressed the bhikkhus thus:

‘Bhikkhus, this Dhamma has been taught by me discriminately.¹³¹ The four foundations of mindfulness have been taught by me discriminately. The four right kinds of striving ... The four bases for spiritual power ... The five spiritual faculties ... The five powers ... The seven factors of enlightenment ... The noble eightfold path has been taught by me discriminately. Bhikkhus, in regard to the Dhamma that has been taught by me thus discriminately, a reflection arose in the mind of a certain bhikkhu thus: “How should one know, how should one see, for the immediate destruction of the taints to occur?”¹³²

‘And how, bhikkhus, should one know, how should one see, for the immediate destruction of the taints to occur? Here, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling, who does not get to see the noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who does not get to see superior persons and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, regards form as self. That regarding, bhikkhus, is a construction.¹³³ That construction—what is its source, what is its origin, from what is it born and produced? When the uninstructed worldling is contacted by a feeling born of ignorance-contact, craving arises: thence that construction is born.

‘Thus, bhikkhus, that construction is impermanent, constructed, dependently arisen: that craving is impermanent, constructed, dependently arisen: that feeling is impermanent, constructed, dependently arisen: that contact is impermanent, constructed, dependently arisen: that ignorance is impermanent, constructed, dependently arisen. [97] When one knows and sees thus, bhikkhus, the immediate destruction of the taints occurs.

¹²⁹ SA: The residents of Pārileyyaka built a leaf hall for the Blessed One in a protected grove near their town. An auspicious (*bhadda*) *sāla* tree grew there. While living in dependence on the town, the Blessed One dwelt at the foot of the tree near the leaf hut in the grove. SA relates here the story of the bull elephant who came to wait upon the Buddha; see Ud 41–42.

¹³⁰ SA: These were not the factious bhikkhus, but five hundred other monks who had come from various quarters after the rains.

¹³¹ *Vicayasō*. SA glosses with *vicayena* and explains: ‘Having delimited with knowledge that is capable of discriminating the real nature of the various phenomena.’ What follows are the thirty-seven ‘accessories of enlightenment’ (*bodhipakkhiyā dhammā*).

¹³² See 22:55 and n.78 above. SA explains this as referring to ‘the fruit of arahantship immediately following the path’ (*maggānantaram arahattaphalam*). However, as in the commentarial system the fruit inevitably occurs in immediate succession to the path, I think the monk is really asking how to attain arahantship swiftly and directly, without being detained at any lower stage of awakening[and how, pray, were one to have attained that ‘lower stage of awakening’ other than by the very same practice by which one attains the higher stage of awakening?].

¹³³ SA glosses ‘that regarding’ (*samanupassanā*) as a ‘view-construction’ (*ditṭhi-saṅkhāra*). I understand *saṅkhāra* here as bearing the meaning of ‘what is constructed’ rather than as the active power of construction, i.e., as the *saṅkhata-saṅkhāra* of the commentaries rather than as *abhisāṅkharāṇa-saṅkhāra*, a volitional construction. The point, it seems, is that by calling the act of regarding a ‘construction,’ the Buddha underlines its conditioned origination. This in turn highlights its impermanence, recognition of which knocks away the adherence to the very notion ‘I am,’ [it is recognition of the dependent origination of the five aggregates that ‘knocks away’ this adherence, not recognition of impermanence] thus culminating in arahantship [the usual homespun gibberish: when The Buddha speaks of source, origin, etc., He is clearly speaking in terms of dependent origination. And the formations of ‘Because of ignorance, formations (*avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā*)’, He analyses as bodily, verbal, and mental formations (*cittasaṅkhārā*), the latter which quite obviously is what He is referring to here, and which the commentary refers to. Once that has been recognized by the bhikkhu, he then contemplates its impermanence, etc., which is the standard procedure for vipassanā]. On ‘ignorance-contact’ (*avijjā-samphassa*), see n.63.

‘He may not regard form as self, but he regards self as possessing form. That regarding is a construction ... (*all as above*) ... When one knows and sees thus, bhikkhus, the immediate destruction of the taints occurs.

‘He may not regard form as self or self as possessing form, but he regards form as in self. That regarding is a construction....

‘He may not regard form as self or self as possessing form or form as in self, but he regards self as in form. That regarding is a construction.... [98]

‘He may not regard form as self ... or self as in form, but he regards feeling as self ... perception as self ... volitional constructions as self ... consciousness as self ... self as in consciousness. That regarding is a construction.... When one knows and sees thus, bhikkhus, the immediate destruction of the taints occurs.

‘He may not regard form as self ... [99] ... or self as in consciousness, but he holds such a view as this: “That which is the self is the world: having passed away, that I shall be—permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change.”¹³⁴ That eternalist view is a construction.... When one knows and sees thus, bhikkhus, the immediate destruction of the taints occurs.

‘He may not regard form as self ... or hold such an (eternalist) view, but he holds such a view as this: “I might not be, and it might not be for me: I will not be, (and) it will not be for me.”¹³⁵ That annihilationist view is a construction....

‘He may not regard form as self ... or hold such an (annihilationist) view, but he is perplexed, doubtful, indecisive in regard to the true Dhamma. That perplexity, doubtfulness, indecisiveness in regard to the true Dhamma is a construction. That construction—what is its source, what is its origin, from what is it born and produced? When the uninstructed worldling is contacted by a feeling born of ignorance-contact, craving arises: thence that construction is born.¹³⁶

‘So that construction, bhikkhus, is impermanent, constructed, dependently arisen: that craving is impermanent, constructed, dependently arisen: that feeling is impermanent, constructed, dependently arisen: that contact is impermanent, constructed, dependently arisen: that ignorance is impermanent, constructed, dependently arisen. When one knows and sees thus, bhikkhus, the immediate destruction of the taints occurs.’¹³⁷ [100]

82 (10) The Full-moon Night

On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Sāvattḥī in the Eastern Park, in the Mansion of Migāra’s Mother, together with a great Sangha of bhikkhus.¹³⁸ Now on that occasion—the Uposatha day of the fifteenth, a full-moon night—the Blessed One was sitting out in the open surrounded by the Sangha of bhikkhus.

Then a certain bhikkhu rose from his seat, arranged his upper robe over one shoulder, saluted the Blessed One reverentially, and said to him: ‘Venerable sir, I would ask the Blessed One about a certain point, if the Blessed One would grant me the favour of answering my question.’

‘Well then, bhikkhu, sit down in your own seat and ask whatever you wish.’

‘Yes, venerable sir,’ that bhikkhu replied. Then he sat down in his own seat and said to the Blessed One:

‘Aren’t these the five aggregates subject to clinging, venerable sir: that is, the form aggregate subject to clinging, the feeling aggregate subject to clinging, the perception aggregate subject to clinging, the volitional constructions aggregate subject to clinging, the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging?’

‘Those are the five aggregates subject to clinging, bhikkhu: that is, the form aggregate subject to clinging ... the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging.’

Saying, ‘Good, venerable sir,’ that bhikkhu delighted and rejoiced in the Blessed One’s statement. Then he asked the Blessed One a further question:

‘But, venerable sir, in what are these five aggregates subject to clinging rooted?’

‘These five aggregates subject to clinging, bhikkhu, are rooted in desire.’¹³⁹

¹³⁴ This view, which posits the identity of the self and the world (*so attā so loko*), seems to be derived from the Upaniśads. Strangely, SA passes over this view in silence, and MA (commenting on MN I 135,37) offers only an unilluminating word gloss. For a discussion, see Wijesekera, ‘An Aspect of Upaniśadic Ātman and Buddhist ‘Anattā,’ in his *Buddhist and Vedic Studies*, pp.261–63.

¹³⁵ Here I read with Ce and Ee: *no c’assam no ca me siyā, na bhavissāmi na me bhavissati*. Be reads the third negated verb as *nābhavissam*. SA: ‘If I were not, neither would there be my belongings; if I will not be in the future, neither will there be my belongings.’ For a fuller discussion, see n.75.

¹³⁶ SA: Even though doubt (*vicikicchā*) does not exist in the cittas associated with craving, the doubt-construction arises from it because craving has not been abandoned. For doubt arises in one who has not abandoned craving.

¹³⁷ In this sutta, in twenty-three cases, insight culminating in arahantship has been explained.

¹³⁸ This entire sutta is at MN No. 109.

¹³⁹ *Ime ... pañcupādānakkhandhā chandamūlakā*. SA: *Tañhāchandamūlakā*. On how the five aggregates originate from craving, see 22:5 and n.30.

‘Venerable sir, is that clinging the same as these five aggregates subject to clinging, or is the clinging something apart from the five aggregates subject to clinging?’

‘Bhikkhus, that clinging is neither the same as the five aggregates subject to clinging, [101] nor is the clinging something apart from the five aggregates subject to clinging. But rather, the desire and lust in regard to them, that is the clinging there.’¹⁴⁰

Saying, ‘Good, venerable sir,’ that bhikkhu ... asked the Blessed One a further question:

‘But, venerable sir, can there be diversity in the desire and lust in regard to the five aggregates subject to clinging?’

‘There can be, bhikkhu,’ the Blessed One said. ‘Here, bhikkhu, it occurs to someone: “May I have such form in the future! May I have such feeling in the future! May I have such perception in the future! May I have such volitional constructions in the future! May I have such consciousness in the future!” Thus, bhikkhu, there can be diversity in the desire and lust in regard to the five aggregates subject to clinging.’

Saying, ‘Good, venerable sir,’ that bhikkhu ... asked the Blessed One a further question:

‘In what way, venerable sir, does the designation “aggregates” apply to the aggregates?’

‘Whatever kind of form there is, bhikkhu, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near: this is called the form aggregate. Whatever kind of feeling there is ... this is called the feeling aggregate. Whatever kind of perception there is ... this is called the perception aggregate. Whatever kind of volitional constructions there are ... this is called the volitional constructions aggregate. Whatever kind of consciousness there is, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near: this is called the consciousness aggregate. It is in this way, bhikkhu, that the designation “aggregates” applies to the aggregates.’

Saying, ‘Good, venerable sir,’ that bhikkhu ... asked the Blessed One a further question:

‘What is the cause and condition, venerable sir, for the manifestation of the form aggregate?¹⁴¹ What is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the feeling aggregate?... the perception aggregate?... the volitional constructions aggregate?... the consciousness aggregate?’

‘The four great elements, bhikkhu, are the cause and condition for the manifestation of the form aggregate. Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the feeling aggregate. Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the perception aggregate. [102] Contact is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the volitional constructions aggregate. Name-and-form is the cause and condition for the manifestation of the consciousness aggregate.’

‘Venerable sir, how does identity view come to be?’

‘Here, bhikkhu, the uninstructed worldling, who does not get to see the noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who does not get to see superior persons and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. He regards feeling as self ... perception as self ... volitional constructions as self ... consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. That is how identity view comes to be.’

‘But, venerable sir, how does identity view not come to be?’

‘Here, bhikkhu, the instructed noble disciple, who gets to see the noble ones and is skilled and disciplined in their Dhamma, who gets to see superior persons and is skilled and disciplined in their Dhamma, does not regard form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. He does not regard feeling as self ... perception as self ... volitional constructions as self ... consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. That is how identity view does not come to be.’

‘What, venerable sir, is the gratification, what is the danger, and what is the escape in the case of form? What is the gratification, what is the danger, and what is the escape in the case of feeling?... in the case of perception?... in the case of volitional constructions?... in the case of consciousness?’

‘The pleasure and joy, bhikkhu, that arise in dependence on form: this is the gratification in form. That form is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this is the danger in form. The removal and abandonment of desire and lust for form: this is the escape from form. The pleasure and joy that arise in dependence on feeling ... [103] in dependence on perception ... in dependence on volitional constructions ... in dependence on conscious-

¹⁴⁰ This exchange is also at MN I 299,32–300,3. SA: ‘Clinging is neither the same as the five aggregates subject to clinging’ because the aggregates are not reducible simply to desire and lust; ‘nor is the clinging something apart from the five aggregates subject to clinging’ because there is no clinging apart from the aggregates either as concomitant factors or as object. For when a citta associated with craving occurs, the form originated by that citta belongs to the form aggregate, and the remaining mental states except craving belong to the other four aggregates: thus there is no clinging apart from the aggregates as concomitant factors. Then, too, there is no clinging apart from the aggregates as object, because when clinging arises it takes as object one of the aggregates such as form.

¹⁴¹ *Rūpakkhādhassa paññāpanāya*. This might have been rendered ‘for the description of the form aggregate.’ *Paññāpana* is literally ‘making known,’ and something is ‘made known’ either by becoming manifest or by being described.

ness: this is the gratification in consciousness. That consciousness is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this is the danger in consciousness. The removal and abandonment of desire and lust for consciousness: this is the escape from consciousness.’

Saying, ‘Good, venerable sir,’ that bhikkhu delighted and rejoiced in the Blessed One’s statement. Then he asked the Blessed One a further question:

‘Venerable sir, how should one know, how should one see so that, in regard to this body with consciousness and in regard to all external signs, I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit no longer occur within?’

‘Any kind of form whatsoever, bhikkhu, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near—one sees all form as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”’

‘Any kind of feeling whatsoever ... Any kind of perception whatsoever ... Any kind of volitional constructions whatsoever ... Any kind of consciousness whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near—one sees all consciousness as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”’

‘When one knows and sees thus, bhikkhu, then in regard to this body with consciousness and in regard to all external signs, I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit no longer occur within.’

Now on that occasion the following reflection arose in the mind of a certain bhikkhu: ‘So it seems that form is non-self, feeling is non-self, perception is non-self, volitional constructions are non-self, consciousness is non-self. How then will deeds done by what is non-self affect the self?’¹⁴²

Then the Blessed One, knowing with his own mind the reflection in the mind of that bhikkhu, addressed the bhikkhus thus: ‘It is possible, bhikkhus, that some senseless man here, obtuse and ignorant, with his mind dominated by craving, might think that he can outstrip the Teacher’s Teaching thus: “So it seems that form is non-self, feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness is non-self. [104] How then will deeds done by what is non-self affect the self?” Now, bhikkhus, you have been trained by me through interrogation here and there in regard to diverse teachings.’¹⁴³

‘What do you think, bhikkhu, is form permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ ... – ‘Is feeling permanent or impermanent?... Is perception permanent or impermanent?... Are volitional constructions permanent or impermanent?... Is consciousness permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?’ – ‘Suffering, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self?”’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Therefore ... Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’¹⁴⁴

These are the ten questions

That the bhikkhu came to ask:

Two about the aggregates,

Whether the same, can there be,

Designation and the cause,

Two about identity,

Gratification and with consciousness:

IX. The Elders

83 (1) Ānanda

[105] Setting at Sāvathī. There the Venerable Ānanda addressed the bhikkhus thus: ‘Friends, bhikkhus!’

‘Friend!’ those bhikkhus replied. The Venerable Ānanda said this:

‘Friends, the Venerable Puṇṇa Mantāniputta was very helpful to us when we were newly ordained.’¹⁴⁵ He exhorted us with the following exhortation:

¹⁴² I read *katham attānaṃ* with Be and Ce. Ee’s *katamattānaṃ* is not intelligible, unless this is amended to *katamam attānaṃ* or *kam attānaṃ* (as at MN III 19,13). SA is silent here, but MA explains that this monk had slipped into an eternalist view.

¹⁴³ *Paṭipucchā-vinītā kho me tumhe bhikkhave tatra tatra tesu tesu dhammesu*. The readings in Ee and MN (Ee) should be amended accordingly. Neither MA nor SA offers any explanation, but it is clear enough that the ‘training by interrogation’ is the catechistic method to be applied in the following paragraph.

¹⁴⁴ MN No. 109 concludes by stating that while this discourse was being spoken the minds of sixty bhikkhus were liberated from the taints. SA states that at the conclusion of each sutta in this *vagga* five hundred bhikkhus attained arahantship! The verse that follows is in Be and Ee, but not in Ce or MN. Pāda c should be read with Be: *sakkāyena duve vuttā*.

‘It is by clinging, Ānanda, that (the notion) “I am” occurs, not without clinging. And by clinging to what does “I am” occur, not without clinging?’¹⁴⁶ It is by clinging to form that “I am” occurs, not without clinging. It is by clinging to feeling ... to perception ... to volitional constructions ... to consciousness that “I am” occurs, not without clinging.

‘Suppose, friend Ānanda, a young woman—or a man—youthful and fond of ornaments, would examine her own facial image in a mirror or in a bowl filled with pure, clear, clean water: she would look at it with clinging, not without clinging. So too, it is by clinging to form that “I am” occurs, not without clinging. It is by clinging to feeling ... to perception ... to volitional constructions ... to consciousness that “I am” occurs, not without clinging.

‘What do you think, friend Ānanda, is form permanent or impermanent?’ ... (as in preceding sutta) ... ‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

‘Friends, the Venerable Puṇṇa Mantāniputta [106] was very helpful to us when we were newly ordained. He exhorted us with that exhortation. And when I heard his Dhamma teaching I made the breakthrough to the Dhamma.’¹⁴⁷

84 (2) Tissa

Setting at Sāvathī. Now on that occasion the Venerable Tissa, the Blessed One’s paternal cousin,¹⁴⁸ informed a number of bhikkhus: ‘Friends, my body seems as if it has been drugged, I have become disoriented, I cannot make sense out of anything.¹⁴⁹ Sloth and torpor persists obsessing my mind. I am leading the holy life dissatisfied, and I have doubt about the teachings.’

Then a number of bhikkhus approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and reported this matter to him. The Blessed One then addressed a certain bhikkhu thus: ‘Come, bhikkhu, tell the bhikkhu Tissa in my name that the Teacher calls him.’

‘Yes, venerable sir,’ that bhikkhu replied, and he went to the Venerable Tissa and told him: ‘The Teacher calls you, friend Tissa.’

‘Yes, friend,’ the Venerable Tissa replied, and he approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, and sat down to one side. The Blessed One then said to him: ‘Is it true, Tissa, [107] that you informed a number of bhikkhus thus: “Friends, my body seems as if it were drugged ... and I have doubt about the teachings?”’

‘Yes, venerable sir.’

‘What do you think, Tissa, if one is not devoid of lust for form, not devoid of desire, affection, thirst, passion, and craving for it, then with the change and alteration of that form, do sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair arise within?’

‘Yes, venerable sir.’

‘Good, good, Tissa! So it is, Tissa, with one who is not devoid of lust for form. If one is not devoid of lust for feeling ... for perception ... for volitional constructions ... for consciousness ... [108] ... then with the change and alteration of that consciousness, do sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair arise within?’

‘Yes, venerable sir.’

¹⁴⁵ Puṇṇa Mantāniputta was declared by the Buddha the foremost among the bhikkhu who were speakers on the Dhamma (AN I 23,26). See 14:15.

¹⁴⁶ *Upādāya* has a double meaning that is difficult to capture in translation. As absolute of *upādiyati* it means ‘having clung to,’ but it also has an idiomatic sense, ‘derived from, dependent on,’ as in the expression *catunnañ ca mahābhūtānaṃ upādāya rūpaṃ*, ‘the form derived from the four great elements.’ I have translated it here ‘by clinging to,’ on the supposition that the literal meaning is primary, but the gloss of SA emphasizes the idiomatic sense: *Upādāyā ti āgamma ārabha sandhāya paṭicca*; ‘*upādāya*: contingent on, referring to, on the basis of, in dependence on.’ The mirror simile can support either meaning, and both are probably intended: The youth looks at his or her image with concern for his or her personal appearance (‘with clinging’), and the image becomes manifest in dependence on the mirror. Similarly, a person conceives ‘I am’ by clinging to the five aggregates, and it is in dependence on the five aggregates, i.e., with the aggregates as objective reference, that the notion ‘I am’ arises. See 22:151, which again plays upon this double meaning of *upādāya*.

¹⁴⁷ *Dhammo me abhisameto*. SA: He penetrated the four truths with wisdom and became a stream-enterer. See the note on *abhisamaya*, II,n.13.

¹⁴⁸ See 21:9.

¹⁴⁹ This passage occurs elsewhere, e.g., in SN at 47:13 (V 162,15–16). SA does not explain the etymology of *madhurakajāto* but paraphrases: ‘it has become unwieldy, as if heavy.’ *Madhuraka* means ‘sweet, pleasant, charming,’ but I follow PED’s explanation, ‘full of sweet drink, intoxicated.’ See *madhupitā* in I,v.803 and I,n.590. SA takes *dhammā* literally as ‘the teachings’: ‘Even the doctrinal teachings are not clear to me; what I learned and studied does not appear.’ I doubt that this is what was intended.

‘Good, good, Tissa! So it is, Tissa, with one who is not devoid of lust for consciousness. If one is devoid of lust for form, devoid of desire, affection, thirst, passion, and craving for it, then with the change and alteration of that form, do sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair arise within?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Good, good, Tissa! So it is, Tissa, with one who is devoid of lust for form. If one is devoid of lust for feeling ... for perception ... for volitional constructions ... for consciousness ... then with the change and alteration of that consciousness, do sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair arise within?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Good, good, Tissa! So it is, Tissa, with one who is devoid of lust for consciousness. What do you think, Tissa, is form permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ ... – ‘Therefore ... Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

‘Suppose, Tissa, there were two men: one unskilled in the path, the other skilled in the path. The man unskilled in the path would ask the skilled man a question about the path, and the latter would say: “Come, good man, this is the path. Go along it a little way and you will see a fork in the road. Avoid the left-hand branch and take the right-hand branch. Go a little further and you will see a dense thicket. Go a little further and you will see a vast marshy swamp. Go a little further and you will see a steep precipice. Go a little further and you will see a delightful expanse of level ground.”’

‘I have made up this simile, Tissa, in order to convey a meaning. This here is the meaning: “The man unskilled in the path”: this is a designation for the worldling. “The man skilled in the path”: this is a designation for the Tathāgata, the Arahant, the Fully Enlightened One. “The forked road”: this is a designation for doubt. [109] “The left-hand branch”: this is a designation for the wrong eightfold path: that is, wrong view ... wrong concentration. “The right-hand branch”: this is a designation for the noble eightfold path: that is, right view ... right concentration. “The dense thicket”: this is a designation for ignorance. “The vast marshy swamp”: this is a designation for sensual pleasures. “The steep precipice”: this is a designation for despair due to anger. “The delightful expanse of level ground”: this is a designation for Nibbāna.

‘Rejoice, Tissa! Rejoice, Tissa! I am here to exhort, I am here to assist, I am here to instruct!’

This is what the Blessed One said. Being pleased, the Venerable Tissa delighted in the Blessed One’s statement.¹⁵⁰

85 (3) Yamaka

On one occasion the Venerable Sāriputta was dwelling at Sāvathī in Jeta’s Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park. Now on that occasion the following pernicious view had arisen in a bhikkhu named Yamaka: ‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death.’¹⁵¹

A number of bhikkhus heard that such a pernicious view had arisen in the bhikkhu Yamaka. Then they approached the Venerable Yamaka and exchanged greetings with him, after which they sat down to one side and said to him: ‘Is it true, friend Yamaka, that such a pernicious view as this has arisen in you: [110] “As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death”?’

‘Exactly so, friends. As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death.’

‘Friend Yamaka, do not speak thus. Do not misrepresent the Blessed One. It is not good to misrepresent the Blessed One. The Blessed One would not speak thus: “A bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death.”’

Yet, although he was admonished by the bhikkhus in this way, the Venerable Yamaka still obstinately grasped that pernicious view, adhered to it, and declared: ‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death.’

Since those bhikkhus were unable to detach the Venerable Yamaka from that pernicious view, they rose from their seats, approached the Venerable Sāriputta, and told him all that had occurred, adding: ‘It would be good if

¹⁵⁰ SA: He not only delighted in it, but having gained this consolation from the Teacher, struggling and striving, after some time he was established in arahantship.

¹⁵¹ His position is not quite the same as that of the common annihilationist, since he does not hold that all beings are annihilated at death. He seems to hold an eternalist view in regard to unenlightened beings (since they have a lasting self which transmigrates) and annihilationism in regard to the arahant (since he utterly perishes at death).

SA: If he had thought, ‘Constructions arise and cease; a simple process of constructions reaches non-occurrence,’ this would not be a view (*diṭṭhigata*) but knowledge in accordance with the Teaching. But since he thought, ‘A being is annihilated and destroyed,’ this becomes a view. What follows is paralleled by MN I 130–31 and I 256–57.

the Venerable Sāriputta would approach the bhikkhu Yamaka out of compassion for him.’ The Venerable Sāriputta consented by silence.

Then, in the evening, the Venerable Sāriputta emerged from seclusion. He approached the Venerable Yamaka and exchanged greetings with him, after which he sat down to one side and said to him: ‘Is it true, friend Yamaka, that such a pernicious view as this has arisen in you: “As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, [111] a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death”?’

‘It is exactly thus, friend, that I understand the Dhamma.’

‘What do you think, friend Yamaka, is form permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, friend.’ ... – ‘Therefore ... Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”¹⁵²

‘What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form as the Tathāgata?’ – ‘No, friend.’ – ‘Do you regard feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness as the Tathāgata?’ – ‘No, friend.’

‘What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathāgata as in form?’ – ‘No, friend.’ – ‘Do you regard the Tathāgata as apart from form?’ – ‘No, friend.’ – ‘Do you regard the Tathāgata as in feeling? As apart from feeling? As in perception? As apart from perception? As in volitional constructions? As apart from volitional constructions? As in consciousness? As apart from consciousness?’ – ‘No, friend.’

‘What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling, perception, volitional constructions, and consciousness (taken together) as the Tathāgata?’ – ‘No, friend.’ [112]

‘What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathāgata as one who is without form, without feeling, without perception, without volitional constructions, without consciousness?’ – ‘No, friend.’¹⁵³

‘But, friend, when the Tathāgata is not apprehended by you as real and actual here in this very life,¹⁵⁴ is it fitting for you to declare: “As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death”?’

‘Formerly, friend Sāriputta, when I was ignorant, I did hold that pernicious view, but now that I have heard this Dhamma teaching of the Venerable Sāriputta I have abandoned that pernicious view and have made the breakthrough to the Dhamma.’¹⁵⁵

‘If, friend Yamaka, they were to ask you: “Friend Yamaka, in the case of a bhikkhu who is an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed, with the breakup of the body, after death, what happens to him?”—being asked thus, what would you answer?’

‘If they were to ask me this, friend, I would answer thus: “Friends, form is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering has ceased, has passed away. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is impermanent. What is impermanent is suffering. What is suffering has ceased, has passed away.” Being asked thus, friend, I would answer in such a way.’¹⁵⁶

‘Good, good, friend Yamaka! Now, friend Yamaka, I will make up a simile for you in order to convey this same meaning even more clearly. Suppose, friend Yamaka, there was a householder or a householder’s son, a rich man, with much wealth and property, protected by a bodyguard. Then some man would appear who wanted to ruin him, to harm him, to endanger him, to take his life. [113] It would occur to that man: “This householder or householder’s son is a rich man, with much wealth and property, protected by a bodyguard. It won’t be easy to take his life by force. Let me get close to him and then take his life.”

‘Then he would approach that householder or householder’s son and say to him: “I would serve you, sir.” Then the householder or householder’s son would appoint him as a servant. The man would serve him, rising up be-

¹⁵² SA: At the end of this teaching on the three characteristics Yamaka became a stream-enterer. Sāriputta asks the following questions to examine him and to get him to show that he has given up his wrong view.

SA glosses *tathāgata* here as ‘a being’ (*satta*), which I think does not quite hit the mark. I take the subject of the discussion to be, not a being in general, but the arahant *conceived as a being*, as a substantial self. Thus the catechism will show that Yamaka has abandoned his identity view (*sakkāya-diṭṭhi*) in regard to the arahant. We find a similar transition from the arahant (*vimuttacitta bhikkhu*) to the Tathāgata at MN I 140,3–7 and I 486–88.

¹⁵³ The first three alternatives—conceiving the aggregates individually as the Tathāgata, the Tathāgata as within the aggregates, and the Tathāgata as apart from the aggregates—correspond to the first three modes of conceiving in the Mūlapariyāya Sutta (M I 1), which also appear in relation to the sense bases at 35:30, 31. The fourth position is conceiving the aggregates collectively as the Tathāgata (perhaps a view of supervenience); the fifth, conceiving the Tathāgata as entirely transcendent, without any relation to the aggregates. These modes of conceiving can also be correlated with the twenty types of identity view.

¹⁵⁴ *Diṭṭh’eva dhamme saccato thetato tathāgato anupalabbhiyamāno*. Cp. MN I 138,5–6: *Attani ca bhikkhave attaniye ca saccato thetato anupalabbhamāne*. MN I 140,6–7: *Diṭṭh’evāhaṃ bhikkhave dhamme tathāgataṃ ananuvejjo ti vadāmi*.

¹⁵⁵ See n.147.

¹⁵⁶ This passage can be read as a gloss on the Buddha’s famous dictum, ‘I make known just suffering and the cessation of suffering’ (see end of 22:86).

fore him, retiring after him, doing whatever he wants, agreeable in his conduct, endearing in his speech. The householder or householder's son would consider him a friend,¹⁵⁷ a bosom friend, and he would place trust in him. But when the man is aware that the householder or householder's son has placed trust in him, then, finding him alone, he would take his life with a sharp knife.

'What do you think, friend Yamaka, when that man had approached that householder or householder's son and said to him: "I would serve you, sir," wasn't he a murderer even then, though the other did not recognize him as "my murderer"? And when the man was serving him, rising up before him, retiring after him, doing whatever he wants, agreeable in his conduct, endearing in his speech, wasn't he a murderer then too, though the other did not recognize him as "my murderer"? And when the man came upon him while he was alone and took his life with a sharp knife, wasn't he a murderer then too, though the other did not recognize him as "my murderer"?'

'Yes, friend.'

'So too, friend Yamaka,¹⁵⁸ the uninstructed worldling, who does not get to see the noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who does not get to see superior persons and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form.

'He regards feeling as self ... perception as self ... volitional constructions as self ... consciousness as self, [114] or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness.

'He does not understand as it really is impermanent form as "impermanent form"¹⁵⁹ ... impermanent feeling as "impermanent feeling" ... impermanent perception as "impermanent perception" ... impermanent volitional constructions as "impermanent volitional constructions" ... impermanent consciousness as "impermanent consciousness."

'He does not understand as it really is painful form as "painful form" ... painful feeling as "painful feeling" ... painful perception as "painful perception" ... painful volitional constructions as "painful volitional constructions" ... painful consciousness as "painful consciousness."

'He does not understand as it really is selfless form as "selfless form" ... selfless feeling as "selfless feeling" ... selfless perception as "selfless perception" ... selfless volitional constructions as "selfless volitional constructions" ... selfless consciousness as "selfless consciousness."

'He does not understand as it really is constructed form as "constructed form" ... constructed feeling as "constructed feeling" ... constructed perception as "constructed perception" ... constructed volitional constructions as "constructed volitional constructions" ... constructed consciousness as "constructed consciousness."

'He does not understand as it really is murderous form as "murderous form" ... murderous feeling as "murderous feeling" ... murderous perception as "murderous perception" ... murderous volitional constructions as "murderous volitional constructions" ... murderous consciousness as "murderous consciousness."

'He becomes engaged with form, clings to it, and takes a stand upon it as "my self."¹⁶⁰ He becomes engaged with feeling ... with perception ... with volitional constructions ... with consciousness, clings to it, and takes a stand upon it as "my self." These same five aggregates of clinging, to which he becomes engaged and to which he clings, lead to his harm and suffering for a long time.

'But, friend, the instructed noble disciple, who gets to see the noble ones ... does not regard form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form.

'He does not regard feeling as self ... perception as self ... volitional constructions as self ... consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. [115]

'He understands as it really is impermanent form as "impermanent form" ... impermanent consciousness as "impermanent consciousness."

'He understands as it really is painful form as "painful form" ... painful consciousness as "painful consciousness."

'He understands as it really is selfless form as "selfless form" ... selfless consciousness as "selfless consciousness."

'He understands as it really is constructed form as "constructed form" ... constructed consciousness as "constructed consciousness."

¹⁵⁷ Ee's *daheyya* may be better than *saddaheyya*, in Be and Ce.

¹⁵⁸ SA: The uninstructed worldling attached to the round is like the gullible householder, the five fragile aggregates like the murderous enemy. When the enemy comes up to the householder and offers to serve him, that is like the time the aggregates are acquired at the moment of rebirth. When the householder takes the enemy to be his friend, that is like the time the worldling grasps the aggregates, thinking, 'They are mine.' The honour the householder bestows on the enemy, thinking, 'He is my friend,' is like the honour the worldling bestows on the aggregates by bathing them, feeding them, etc. The murder of the householder by the enemy is like the destruction of the worldling's life when the aggregates break up.

¹⁵⁹ The next four paragraphs are also at 22:55.

¹⁶⁰ As in 12:15; see II,n.31, n.32.

‘He understands as it really is murderous form as “murderous form” ... murderous consciousness as “murderous consciousness.”

‘He does not become engaged with form, cling to it, and take a stand upon it as “my self.” He does not become engaged with feeling ... with perception ... with volitional constructions ... with consciousness, cling to it, and take a stand upon it as “my self.” These same five aggregates of clinging, to which he does not become engaged and to which he does not cling, lead to his welfare and happiness for a long time.’

‘So it is, friend Sāriputta, for those venerable ones who have such companions in the holy life—compassionate, benevolent, exhorters, instructors. And now that I have heard this Dhamma teaching of the Venerable Sāriputta, my mind is liberated from the taints by non-clinging.’¹⁶¹ [116]

This is what the Venerable Sāriputta said. Being pleased, the Venerable Yamaka delighted in his statement.

86 (4) Anurādha

On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Vesālī in the Great Wood in the Hall with the Peaked Roof.¹⁶² Now on that occasion the Venerable Anurādha was dwelling in a forest hut not far from the Blessed One. Then a number of wanderers of other sects approached the Venerable Anurādha and exchanged greetings with him. When they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, they sat down to one side and said to him:

‘Friend Anurādha, when a Tathāgata is describing a Tathāgata—the highest type of man, the supreme man, the attainer of the supreme attainment¹⁶³—he describes him in terms of these four cases: “The Tathāgata exists after death,” or “The Tathāgata does not exist after death,” or “The Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death,” or “The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death.”’

When this was said, the Venerable Anurādha said to those wanderers: “Friends, when a Tathāgata is describing a Tathāgata—the the highest type of man, the supreme man, the attainer of the supreme attainment—he describes him apart from these four cases: “The Tathāgata exists after death,” or “The Tathāgata does not exist after death,” or “The Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death,” or “The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death.”’¹⁶⁴

When this was said, those wanderers said to the Venerable Anurādha: “This bhikkhu must be newly ordained, not long gone forth: or, if he is an elder, he must be an incompetent fool.”

Then those wanderers of other sects, having denigrated the Venerable Anurādha with the terms ‘newly ordained’ and ‘fool,’ rose from their seats and departed. [117]

Then, not long after those wanderers had left, it occurred to the Venerable Anurādha: ‘If those wanderers of other sects should question me further, how should I answer if I am to state what has been said by the Blessed One and not misrepresent him with what is contrary to fact? And how should I explain in accordance with the Dhamma, so that no reasonable consequence of my assertion would give ground for criticism?’

Then the Venerable Anurādha approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and reported to the Blessed One everything that had happened, [118] asking: ‘If those wanderers of other sects should question me further, how should I answer ... so that no reasonable consequence of my assertion would give ground for criticism?’

‘What do you think, Anurādha, is form permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ ... – ‘Therefore ... Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

‘What do you think, Anurādha, do you regard form as the Tathāgata?’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’ – ‘Do you regard feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness as the Tathāgata?’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’

‘What do you think, Anurādha, do you regard the Tathāgata as in form?’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’ – ‘Do you regard the Tathāgata as apart from form?’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’ – ‘Do you regard the Tathāgata as in feeling? As apart from feeling? As in perception? As apart from perception? As in volitional constructions? As apart from volitional constructions? As in consciousness? As apart from consciousness?’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’

‘What do you think, Anurādha, do you regard form, feeling, perception, volitional constructions, and consciousness (taken together) as the Tathāgata?’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’

¹⁶¹ This last sentence is not in Be.

¹⁶² This sutta also occurs at 44:2, with the questionnaire given in full (though abridged in this translation).

¹⁶³ *Tathāgato uttamapuriso paramapuriso paramapattipatto*. This should establish that ‘the Tathāgata’ here is not just ‘a being,’ but a Buddha or an arahant; the expression recurs at 44:9. The four theses are all rooted in a conception of the Tathāgata as a self. The commentaries explain the first as eternalism, the second as annihilationism, the third as a syncretic view (partial eternalism), the fourth as evasive scepticism. Two whole chapters in SN deal with these issues, the Vacchagotta-samyutta (ch.33) and the Abyākata-samyutta (ch.44). See too 16:12.

¹⁶⁴ SA: It is said that he thought, ‘These are hostile enemies of the Teaching. The Teacher would not describe (the Tathāgata) as they say. He must have described him in some other way.’

‘What do you think, Anurādha, do you regard the Tathāgata as one who is without form, without feeling, without perception, without volitional constructions, without consciousness?’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’

‘But, Anurādha, when the Tathāgata is not apprehended by you as real and actual here in this very life, is it fitting for you to declare: “Friends, when a Tathāgata is describing a Tathāgata—the highest type of man, the supreme man, the attainer of the supreme attainment—he describes him apart from these four cases: [119] “The Tathāgata exists after death,” or ... “The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death”?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Good, good, Anurādha! Formerly, Anurādha, and also now, I make known just suffering and the cessation of suffering.’¹⁶⁵

87 (5) Vakkali

Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Rājagaha in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrel Sanctuary. Now on that occasion the Venerable Vakkali was dwelling in a potter’s shed, sick, afflicted, gravely ill.¹⁶⁶ Then the Venerable Vakkali addressed his attendants:

‘Come, friends, approach the Blessed One, pay homage to him in my name with your head at his feet, and say: “Venerable sir, the bhikkhu Vakkali is sick, afflicted, gravely ill: he pays homage to the Blessed One with his head at his feet.” Then say: “It would be good, venerable sir, if the Blessed One would approach the bhikkhu Vakkali out of compassion.”’

‘Yes, friend,’ those bhikkhus replied, and they approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and delivered their message. The Blessed One consented by silence.

Then the Blessed One dressed and, taking bowl and robe, approached the Venerable Vakkali. [120] The Venerable Vakkali saw the Blessed One coming in the distance and stirred on his bed.¹⁶⁷ The Blessed One said to him: ‘Enough, Vakkali, do not stir on your bed. There are these seats ready, I will sit down there.’

The Blessed One then sat down on the appointed seat and said to the Venerable Vakkali: ‘I hope you are bearing up, Vakkali, I hope you are getting better. I hope that your painful feelings are subsiding and not increasing, and that their subsiding, not their increase, is to be discerned.’

‘Venerable sir, I am not bearing up, I am not getting better. Strong painful feelings are increasing in me, not subsiding, and their increase, not their subsiding, is to be discerned.’

‘I hope then, Vakkali, that you are not troubled by worry or remorse.’

‘Indeed, venerable sir, I have quite a lot of worry, quite a lot of remorse.’

‘I hope, Vakkali, that you have nothing for which to reproach yourself in regard to virtue.’

‘I have nothing, venerable sir, for which to reproach myself in regard to virtue.’

‘Then, Vakkali, if you have nothing for which to reproach yourself in regard to virtue, why are you troubled by worry and remorse?’

‘For a long time, venerable sir, I have wanted to come to see the Blessed One, but I haven’t been fit enough to do so.’

‘Enough, Vakkali! Why do you want to see this foul body? One who sees the Dhamma sees me: one who sees me sees the Dhamma.¹⁶⁸ For in seeing the Dhamma, Vakkali, one sees me: and in seeing me, one sees the Dhamma.

¹⁶⁵ This oft-quoted dictum can be interpreted at two levels. At the more superficial level the Buddha can be read as saying that he does not make any declaration about such metaphysical questions but teaches only a practical path for reaching the end of suffering. This interpretation, however, does not connect the dictum with the Buddha’s previous statement that the Tathāgata is not apprehended in this very life. To make this connection we have to bring in the second interpretation, according to which the ‘Tathāgata’ is a mere term of conventional usage referring to a compound of impermanent constructions. It is just these that stand while the Tathāgata lives, and just these that cease with his passing away. The context in which the dictum occurs at MN I 140,14–15 also supports this interpretation.

¹⁶⁶ Vakkali was declared by the Buddha the foremost bhikkhu of those resolved through faith (*etadaggaṃ ... saddhādhimuttānaṃ*; AN I 24,15).

SA: After completing the rains residence, the elder was on his way to see the Blessed One when he fell ill in the middle of the city. He could not walk, so they put him on a stretcher and carried him to a potter’s shed.

¹⁶⁷ *Samadhosi*. SA: He showed his respect by making a movement; for, it is said, even a patient is obliged to show respect to a superior by making a gesture of rising.

¹⁶⁸ *Yo kho Vakkali dhammaṃ passati, so maṃ passati. Yo maṃ passati, so dhammaṃ passati*. SA: Here the Blessed One shows (himself as) the Dhamma-body, as stated in the passage, ‘The Tathāgata, great king, is the Dhamma-body.’ For the ninefold supramundane Dhamma is called the Tathāgata’s body.

I cannot track down a statement that corresponds exactly to the one cited by SA. SA may be misquoting DN III 84,23–24, which actually reads: ‘For this is a designation of the Tathāgata, that is, the Dhamma-body....’ On the ninefold supramundane Dhamma, see n.51.

‘What do you think, Vakkali, is form permanent or impermanent?’ – [121] ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’... – ‘Therefore ... Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

Then the Blessed One, having given this exhortation to the Venerable Vakkali, rose from his seat and departed for Mount Vulture Peak.

Then, not long after the Blessed One had left, the Venerable Vakkali addressed his attendants thus: ‘Come, friends, lift me up on this bed and carry me to the Black Rock on the Isigili Slope.¹⁶⁹ How can one like me think of dying among the houses?’

‘Yes, friend,’ those bhikkhus replied and, having lifted up the Venerable Vakkali on the bed, they carried him to the Black Rock on the Isigili Slope.

The Blessed One spent the rest of that day and night on Mount Vulture Peak. Then, when the night was well advanced, two devatās of stunning beauty approached the Blessed One, illuminating the whole of Mount Vulture Peak.... Standing to one side, one devatā said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, the bhikkhu Vakkali is intent on deliverance.’¹⁷⁰ The other devatā said: ‘Surely, venerable sir, he will be liberated as one well liberated.’¹⁷¹ This is what those devatās said. Having said this, they paid homage to the Blessed One and, keeping him on their right, they disappeared right there.

Then, when the night had passed, the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus thus: ‘Come, bhikkhus, approach the bhikkhu Vakkali and say to him: “Friend Vakkali, listen to the word of the Blessed One [122] and two devatās. Last night, friend, when the night was well advanced, two devatās of stunning beauty approached the Blessed One.... The other devatā said: “Surely, venerable sir, he will be liberated as one well liberated.” And the Blessed One says to you, friend Vakkali: “Do not be afraid, Vakkali, do not be afraid! Your death will not be a bad one. Your demise will not be a bad one.”’

‘Yes, venerable sir,’ those bhikkhus replied, and they approached the Venerable Vakkali and said to him: ‘Friend Vakkali, listen to the word of the Blessed One and two deities.’

Then the Venerable Vakkali addressed his attendants: ‘Come, friends, lower me from the bed. How can one like me think of listening to the Blessed One’s teaching while seated on a high seat.’

‘Yes, friend,’ those bhikkhus replied, and they lowered the Venerable Vakkali from the bed.

‘Last night, friend, two deities of stunning beauty approached the Blessed One.... And the Blessed One says to you, friend Vakkali: “Do not be afraid, Vakkali, do not be afraid! Your death will not be a bad one. Your demise will not be a bad one.”’

‘Well then, friends, pay homage to the Blessed One in my name with your head at his feet and say: “Venerable sir, the bhikkhu Vakkali is sick, afflicted, gravely ill: he pays homage to the Blessed One with his head at his feet.” Then say: “Form is impermanent: I have no perplexity about this, venerable sir, I do not doubt that whatever is impermanent is suffering. I do not doubt that in regard to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, I have no more desire or lust or affection. [123] Feeling is impermanent ... Perception is impermanent ... Volitional constructions are impermanent ... Consciousness is impermanent: I have no perplexity about this, venerable sir, I do not doubt that whatever is impermanent is suffering. I do not doubt that in regard to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, I have no more desire or lust or affection.”’

‘Yes, friend,’ those bhikkhus replied, and then they departed. Then, not long after those bhikkhus had left, the Venerable Vakkali used the knife.¹⁷²

Then those bhikkhus approached the Blessed One ... and delivered their message. The Blessed One then addressed the bhikkhus thus: ‘Come, bhikkhus, let us go to the Black Rock on the Isigili Slope, where the clansman Vakkali has used the knife.’¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ It was here too that the Venerable Godhika expired by his own hand; see 4:23.

¹⁷⁰ *Vimokkhāya ceteti*. SA: For the sake of the deliverance of the path (*magga-vimokkhatthāya*). Although *vimokkha* and *vimutti* are derived from the same prefixed root (*vi + muc*), they usually appear in different contexts. To avoid confusion I have rendered the former as ‘deliverance,’ the latter as ‘liberation.’ Here they are synonymous.

¹⁷¹ *Suvimutto vimuccissati*. SA: He will be liberated as one liberated by the liberation of the fruit of arahantship. Those devas spoke thus because they knew, ‘By whatever method he arouses insight, he will attain arahantship immediately.’

¹⁷² Vakkali’s message implies that he already considered himself an arahant. SA, however, explains: ‘The elder, it is said, overestimated himself. As he had suppressed the defilements by concentration and insight, he did not see himself assailed by them and thus thought he was an arahant. Disgusted with his miserable life, he cut his jugular vein with a sharp knife. Just then, painful feelings arose in him. Realizing he was still a worldling, he took up his main meditation subject, explored it with knowledge, and attained arahantship just as he died.’ For another account of a monk who took his life while thinking he was an arahant, see 35:88. Godhika (in 4:23) did not have this conviction, but took his life from despair due to his illness. He too, however, also attained arahantship just at the time of death. The sequel is as at 4:23; see I,n.313, n.314.

¹⁷³ I read with Be: *gelaññe passambhetvā passambhetvā kāyasaṅkhāre viharāmi, so’haṃ samādhiṃ nappaṭilabhāmi*. The ‘bodily constructions’ are in-breathing and out-breathing (*assāsa-passāsa*); see MN I 56,20–22 and MN I 301,20–21 (= 41:6; IV 293,16).

‘Yes, venerable sir,’ those bhikkhus replied. Then the Blessed One, together with a number of bhikkhus, went to the Black Rock on the Isigili Slope. The Blessed One saw in the distance the Venerable Vakkali lying on the bed with his shoulder turned. [124]

Now on that occasion a cloud of smoke, a swirl of darkness, was moving to the east, then to the west, to the north, to the south, upwards, downwards, and to the intermediate quarters. The Blessed One then addressed the bhikkhus thus: ‘Do you see, bhikkhus, that cloud of smoke, that swirl of darkness, moving to the east ... and to the intermediate quarters?’

‘Yes, venerable sir.’

‘That, bhikkhus, is Māra the Evil One searching for the consciousness of the clansman Vakkali, wondering: “Where now has the consciousness of the clansman Vakkali been established?” However, bhikkhus, with consciousness unestablished, the clansman Vakkali has attained final Nibbāna.’

88 (6) Assaji

On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Rājagaha in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrel Sanctuary. Now on that occasion the Venerable Assaji was dwelling at Kassapaka’s Park, sick, afflicted, gravely ill.

(As in preceding sutta, down to:) [125]

‘Then if you have nothing for which to reproach yourself in regard to virtue, Assaji, why are you troubled by worry and remorse?’

‘Formerly, venerable sir, when I was will I kept on tranquillizing the bodily constructions, but (now) I do not obtain concentration.¹⁷⁴ As I do not obtain concentration, it occurs to me: “Let me not fall away!”’

‘Those recluses and brahmins, Assaji, who regard concentration as the essence, who identify concentration with recluship, failing to obtain concentration might think, “Let us not fall away!”¹⁷⁵

‘What do you think, Assaji, is form permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ ... [126] – ‘Therefore ... Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

‘If he feels a pleasant feeling,¹⁷⁶ he understands: “It is impermanent”: he understands: “It is not held to”: he understands: “It is not delighted in.” If he feels a painful feeling, he understands: “It is impermanent”: he understands: “It is not held to”: he understands: “It is not delighted in.” If he feels a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he understands: “It is impermanent”: he understands: “It is not held to”: he understands: “It is not delighted in.”’

‘If he feels a pleasant feeling, he feels it detached: if he feels a painful feeling, he feels it detached: if he feels a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he feels it detached.’

‘When he feels a feeling terminating with the body, he understands: “I feel a feeling terminating with the body.” When he feels a feeling terminating with life, he understands: “I feel a feeling terminating with life.” He understands: “With the breakup of the body, following the exhaustion of life, all that is felt, not being delighted in, will become cool right here.”’

‘Just as, Assaji, an oil lamp burns in dependence on the oil and the wick, and with the exhaustion of the oil and the wick it is extinguished through lack of fuel, so too, Assaji, when a bhikkhu feels a feeling terminating with the body ... terminating with life ... He understands: “With the breakup of the body, following the exhaustion of life, all that is felt, not being delighted in, will become cool right here.”’

89 (7) Khemaka

On one occasion a number of elder bhikkhus were dwelling at Kosambī in Ghosita’s Park. Now on that occasion the Venerable Khemaka was living at Jujube Tree Park, sick, afflicted, gravely ill. [127]

Then, in the evening, those elder bhikkhus emerged from seclusion and addressed the Venerable Dāsaka thus: ‘Come, friend Dāsaka, approach the bhikkhu Khemaka and say to him: “The elders say to you, friend Khemaka: We hope that you are bearing up, friend, we hope that you are getting better. We hope that your painful feelings are subsiding and not increasing, and that their subsiding, not their increase, is to be discerned.”’

‘Yes, friends,’ the Venerable Dāsaka replied, and he approached the Venerable Khemaka and delivered his message.

SA: He kept tranquillizing in-and-out breathing when he dwelt in the fourth jhāna, where breathing ceases (36:11; IV 217,8–9). Because he had fallen away from all the meditative absorptions that he had previously attained, he thought, ‘Let me not fall away from the Teaching.’

¹⁷⁴ SA: *Samādhisarākā samādhisāmaññā ti samādhim yeva sārāṇ ca sāmāññaṇ ca maññanti.* ‘In my Teaching that is not the essence; the essence is insight, path, and fruit.’

¹⁷⁵ SA: At the end of the teaching on the three characteristics he attained arahantship.

¹⁷⁶ SA: The Buddha introduces this passage to show the arahant’s constant abiding. See too 12:51, where we find the same text with a different simile. The present version is also at 36:7, 36:8, and 54:8.

(The Venerable Khemaka answered:) ‘I am not bearing up, friend, I am not getting better. Strong painful feelings are increasing in me, not subsiding, and their increase, not their subsiding, is to be discerned.’

Then the Venerable Dāsaka approached the elder bhikkhus and reported what the Venerable Khemaka had said. They told him: ‘Come, friend Dāsaka, approach the bhikkhu Khemaka and say to him: “The elders say to you, friend Khemaka: These five aggregates subject to clinging, friend, have been spoken of by the Blessed One: that is, the form aggregate subject to clinging, the feeling aggregate subject to clinging, the perception aggregate subject to clinging, the volitional constructions aggregate subject to clinging, the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. Does the Venerable Khemaka regard anything as self or as belonging to self among these five aggregates subject to clinging?”’

‘Yes, friends,’ the Venerable Dāsaka replied, and he approached the Venerable Khemaka and delivered his message.

(The Venerable Khemaka replied:) [128] ‘These five aggregates subject to clinging have been spoken of by the Blessed One: that is, the form aggregate subject to clinging ... the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. I do not regard anything as self or as belonging to self among these five aggregates subject to clinging.’

Then the Venerable Dāsaka approached the elder bhikkhus and reported what the Venerable Khemaka had said. They replied: ‘Come, friend Dāsaka, approach the bhikkhu Khemaka and say to him: “The elders say to you, friend Khemaka: These five aggregates subject to clinging, friend, have been spoken of by the Blessed One: that is, the form aggregate subject to clinging ... the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. If the Venerable Khemaka does not regard anything as self or as belonging to self among these five aggregates subject to clinging, then he is an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed.”’

‘Yes, friends,’ the Venerable Dāsaka replied, and he approached the Venerable Khemaka and delivered his message.

(The Venerable Khemaka replied:) ‘These five aggregates subject to clinging have been spoken of by the Blessed One: that is, the form aggregate subject to clinging ... the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. I do not regard anything as self or as belonging to self among these five aggregates subject to clinging, yet I am not an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed. Friends, (the notion) “I am” has not yet vanished in me in relation to these five aggregates subject to clinging, but I do not regard (anything among them) as “This I am.”’¹⁷⁷ [129]

Then the Venerable Dāsaka approached the elder bhikkhus and reported what the Venerable Khemaka had said. They replied: ‘Come, friend Dāsaka, approach the bhikkhu Khemaka and say to him: “The elders say to you, friend Khemaka: Friend Khemaka, when you speak of this ‘I am’—what is it that you speak of as ‘I am’? Do you speak of form as ‘I am,’ or do you speak of ‘I am’ apart from form? Do you speak of feeling ... of perception ... of volitional constructions ... of consciousness as ‘I am,’ or do you speak of ‘I am’ apart from consciousness? When you speak of this ‘I am,’ friend Khemaka, what is it that you speak of as ‘I am’?”’

‘Yes, friends,’ the Venerable Dāsaka replied, and he approached the Venerable Khemaka and delivered his message.

‘Enough, friend Dāsaka! Why keep running back and forth? Bring me my staff, friend. I’ll go to the elder bhikkhus myself.’

Then the Venerable Khemaka, leaning on his staff, approached the elder bhikkhus, exchanged greetings with them, and sat down to one side. [130] The elder bhikkhus then said to him: ‘Friend Khemaka, when you speak of this ‘I am’ ... what is it that you speak of as “I am”?’

‘Friends, I do not speak of form as “I am,” nor do I speak of “I am” apart from form. I do not speak of feeling as “I am” ... nor of perception as “I am” ... nor of volitional constructions as “I am” ... nor of consciousness as “I am,” nor do I speak of “I am” apart from consciousness. Friends, although (the notion) “I am” has not yet vanished in me in relation to these five aggregates subject to clinging, still I do not regard (anything among them) as “This I am.”’

‘Suppose, friends, there is the scent of a blue, red, or white lotus. Would one be speaking rightly if one would say, “The scent belongs to the petals,” or “The scent belongs to the colour,” or “The scent belongs to the pistils?”’

¹⁷⁷ Although all three eds. of SN and both eds. of SA read *asmī ti adhigatam*, I am convinced this is an ancient corruption and would read *asmī ti avigatam*. See my justification for this change at n.61 above. SA: Craving and conceit are found occurring in the mode ‘I am.’

This passage clarifies the essential difference between the *sekha* and the arahant. While the *sekha* has eliminated identity view and thus no longer identifies any of the five aggregates as a self, he has not yet eradicated craving and conceit, which can engender the shadowy notion ‘I am’ in relation to the five aggregates. The arahant, in contrast, has eradicated ignorance, the most basic defilement of the mind, and thus no longer entertains any ideas of ‘I’ and ‘mine.’ The other elders apparently had not yet attained any stage of awakening and thus did not understand this difference, but the Venerable Khemaka must have been at least a stream-enterer (SṬ: some hold he was a non-returner, others a once-returner) and thus knew that the elimination of identity view is not tantamount to the complete elimination of the sense of personal identity. Even for the non-returner, an ‘odour of subjectivity’ based on the five aggregates still lingers over his experience.

‘No, friend.’

‘And how, friends, should one answer if one is to answer rightly?’

‘Answering rightly, friend, one should answer: “The scent belongs to the flower.”’

‘So too, friends, I do not speak of form as “I am,” nor do I speak of “I am” apart from form. I do not speak of feeling as “I am” ... nor of perception as “I am” ... nor of volitional constructions as “I am” ... nor of consciousness as “I am,” nor do I speak of “I am” apart from consciousness. Friends, although (the notion) “I am” has not yet vanished in me in relation to these five aggregates subject to clinging, still I do not regard (anything among them) as “This I am.”’

‘Friends, even though a noble disciple has abandoned the five lower fetters, still, in relation to the five aggregates subject to clinging, there lingers in him a residual conceit “I am,” a desire “I am,” an underlying tendency “I am” that has not yet been uprooted.¹⁷⁸ Sometime later he dwells contemplating rise and fall in the five aggregates subject to clinging: “Such is form, such its origin, [131] such its passing away: such is feeling ... such is perception ... such are volitional constructions ... such is consciousness, such its origin, such its passing away.” As he dwells thus contemplating rise and fall in the five aggregates subject to clinging, the residual conceit “I am,” the desire “I am,” the underlying tendency “I am” that had not yet been uprooted—this comes to be uprooted.

‘Suppose, friends, a cloth has become soiled and stained, and its owners give it to a laundryman. The laundryman would scour it evenly with cleaning salt, lye, or cowdung, and rinse it in clean water. Even though that cloth would become pure and clean, it would still retain a residual smell of cleaning salt, lye, or cow dung that had not yet vanished. The laundryman would then give it back to the owners. The owners would put it in a sweet-scented casket, and the residual smell of cleaning salt, lye, or cowdung that had not yet vanished would vanish.¹⁷⁹

‘So too, friends, even though a noble disciple has abandoned the five lower fetters, still, in relation to the five aggregates subject to clinging, there lingers in him a residual conceit “I am,” a desire “I am,” an underlying tendency “I am” that has not yet been uprooted.... As he dwells thus contemplating rise and fall in the five aggregates subject to clinging, the residual conceit “I am,” the desire “I am,” the underlying tendency “I am” that had not yet been uprooted—this comes to be uprooted.’

When this was said, the elder bhikkhus said to the Venerable Khemaka: ‘We did not ask our questions in order to trouble the Venerable Khemaka, [132] but we thought that the Venerable Khemaka would be capable of explaining, teaching, proclaiming, establishing, disclosing, analysing, and elucidating the Blessed One’s teaching in detail. And the Venerable Khemaka has explained, taught, proclaimed, established, disclosed, analysed, and elucidated the Blessed One’s teaching in detail.’

This is what the Venerable Khemaka said. Being pleased, the elder bhikkhus delighted in the Venerable Khemaka’s statement. And while this exposition was being spoken, the minds of sixty elder bhikkhus and of the Venerable Khemaka were liberated from the taints by non-clinging.

90 (8) Channa

On one occasion a number of bhikkhus were dwelling at Bārāṇasī in the Deer Park at Isipatana. Then, in the evening, the Venerable Channa emerged from seclusion and, taking a key, went from dwelling to dwelling saying to the elder bhikkhus: ‘Let the elder venerable ones exhort me, let them instruct me, let them give me a Dhamma talk in such a way that I might see the Dhamma.’¹⁸⁰

When this was said, the elder bhikkhus said to the Venerable Channa: ‘Form, friend Channa, is impermanent, feeling is impermanent, perception is impermanent, volitional constructions are impermanent, consciousness is impermanent. Form is non-self, [133] feeling is non-self, perception is non-self, volitional constructions are non-self, consciousness is non-self. All constructions are impermanent: all phenomena are non-self.’¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ *Anusahagato asmī ti māno, asmī ti chando, asmī ti anusayo asamūhato.*

¹⁷⁹ SA: The worldling’s mental process is like the soiled cloth. The three contemplations (of impermanence, suffering, and non-self) are like the three cleansers. The mental process of the non-returner is like the cloth that has been washed with the three cleansers. The defilements to be eradicated by the path of arahantship are like the residual smell of the cleansers. The knowledge of the path of arahantship is like the sweetly scented casket, and the destruction of all defilements by that path is like the vanishing of the residual smell of the cleansers from the cloth after it has been placed in the casket.

¹⁸⁰ SA identifies this Channa with the Bodhisatta’s charioteer who led him out of the palace on the night of his great renunciation. He had received ordination as a monk but, because of his former close relationship with the Buddha, he became proud and domineering and spoke harshly to the other bhikkhus. Shortly before his parinibbāna the Buddha had instructed the Sangha to impose on him the *brahmadaṇḍa*, ‘the silence treatment’ (DN II 154,18–23). When Channa realized he was being treated as a pariah by the Sangha, he was shaken by a sense of urgency (*samvega*). It is at this point that the sutta opens.

¹⁸¹ SA: All constructions of the three planes (*sabbe tebhūmaka-saṅkhārā*) are impermanent; all phenomena of the four planes (*sabbe catubhūmakā-dhammā*) are non-self. Why didn’t those bhikkhus mention the characteristic of suffering? Because they thought, ‘This bhikkhus is argumentative. If we mention suffering he will quarrel with us, saying, ‘If form, etc., are

Then it occurred to the Venerable Channa: ‘I too think in this way: “Form is impermanent ... consciousness is impermanent. Form is non-self ... consciousness is non-self. All constructions are impermanent: all phenomena are non-self.” When, however, it comes to the stilling of all constructions, the relinquishing of all acquisitions, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, Nibbāna, my mind does not launch out upon it, acquire confidence, settle down there, and resolve on it. Instead, agitation and clinging arise and the mind turns back, thinking: “But who is my self?”’¹⁸² But such does not happen to one who sees the Dhamma. So who can teach me the Dhamma in such a way that I might see the Dhamma?’

Then it occurred to the Venerable Channa: ‘This Venerable Ānanda is dwelling at Kosambī in Ghosita’s Park, and he has been praised by the Teacher and is esteemed by his wise companions in the holy life. The Venerable Ānanda is capable of teaching me the Dhamma in such a way that I might see the Dhamma. Since I have so much trust in the Venerable Ānanda, let me approach him.’

Then the Venerable Channa set his lodging in order, took his bowl and robe, and went to Ghosita’s Park in Kosambī, where he approached the Venerable Ānanda and exchanged greetings with him. When they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, he sat down to one side and told the Venerable Ānanda everything that had happened, adding: [134] ‘Let the Venerable Ānanda exhort me, let him instruct me, let him give me a Dhamma talk in such a way that I might see the Dhamma.’

‘Even by this much am I pleased with the Venerable Channa. Perhaps the Venerable Channa has opened himself up and broken down his mental barrenness.’¹⁸³ Lend your ear, friend Channa, you are capable of understanding the Dhamma.’

Then at once a lofty rapture and gladness arose in the Venerable Channa as he thought: ‘It seems that I am capable of understanding the Dhamma.’

(The Venerable Ānanda then said:) ‘In the presence of the Blessed One I have heard this, friend Channa, in his presence I have received the exhortation he spoke to the bhikkhu Kaccānagotta.’¹⁸⁴

‘This world, Kaccāna, for the most part relies upon a duality ... [135] (*the entire sutta 12:15 is cited here*) ... Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.’

‘So it is, friend Ānanda, for those venerable ones who have such companions in the holy life—compassionate, benevolent, exhorters, instructors. And now that I have heard this Dhamma teaching of the Venerable Ānanda, I have made the breakthrough to the Dhamma.’

91 (9) Rāhula (1)

Setting at Sāvattihī.¹⁸⁵ Then the Venerable Rāhula approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, [136] and said to him:

‘Venerable sir, how should one know, how should one see so that, in regard to this body with consciousness and in regard to all external signs, I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit no longer occur within?’

‘Any kind of form whatsoever, Rāhula, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near—one sees all form as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘Any kind of feeling whatsoever ... Any kind of perception whatsoever ... Any kind of volitional constructions whatsoever ... Any kind of consciousness whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross

suffering, the path and fruit too are suffering, so you monks have attained nothing but suffering.’ Thus they answered in a way that could not be faulted.

See too MN I 228–30, where only impermanence and non-self are mentioned in the explicit context of debate. The commentary to this passage gives a similar explanation of the omission.

¹⁸² *Atha ko carahi me attā*. SA: It is said that this elder had started to practise insight meditation without having done discernment of conditions. His weak insight could not eliminate the grip of self (*atta-gāha*), and thus when constructions appeared to him as empty, agitation arose in him along with the annihilationist view, ‘I will be annihilated, I will be destroyed.’ He saw himself falling into an abyss.

Discernment of conditions (*paccaya-pariggaha*) is a stage in the development of insight in which the meditator explores the conditions for the five aggregates (see Vism, ch.19). In the proper sequence of development this stage should *precede* investigation of the aggregates as impermanent, suffering, and non-self.

¹⁸³ *Khilam pabhindi*. MN I 101,9–27 mentions five types of mental barrenness (*cetokhila*). Channa’s problem seems to have been the fifth, being angry and contemptuous towards one’s fellow monks.

¹⁸⁴ Ānanda’s choice of the Kaccānagotta Sutta is especially pertinent, as this sutta teaches how insight into dependent origination removes the two extreme views of eternalism and annihilationism and replaces the view of self with the realization that it is only *dukkha* that arises and ceases.

¹⁸⁵ This sutta and the next are identical with 18:21–22, respectively.

or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near—one sees all consciousness as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘When one knows and sees thus, Rāhula, then in regard to this body with consciousness and in regard to all external signs, I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit no longer occur within.’

92 (10) Rāhula (2)

Setting at Sāvattthī. Then the Venerable Rāhula ... said to the Blessed One:

‘Venerable sir, how should one know, how should one see so that, in regard to this body with consciousness and in regard to all external signs, the mind is rid of I-making, mine-making, and conceit, has transcended discrimination, and is peaceful and well liberated?’

‘Any kind of form whatsoever, Rāhula, whether past, future, or present ... far or near—having seen all form as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self,” one is liberated by non-clinging.

‘Any kind of feeling whatsoever ... Any kind of perception whatsoever ... Any kind of volitional constructions whatsoever ... Any kind of consciousness whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near—[137] having seen all consciousness as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self,” one is liberated by non-clinging.

‘When one knows and sees thus, Rāhula, then in regard to this body with consciousness and in regard to all external signs, the mind is rid of I-making, mine-making, and conceit, has transcended discrimination, and is peaceful and well liberated.’

X. Flowers

93 (1) The River

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, suppose there was a mountain river sweeping downwards, flowing into the distance with a swift current. If on either bank of the river *kāsa* grass or *kusa* grass were to grow, it would overhang it: if rushes, reeds, or trees were to grow, they would overhang it. If a man being carried along by the current should grasp the *kāsa* grass, it would break off, and he would thereby meet with calamity and disaster: if he should grasp the *kusa* grass, it would break off, and he would thereby meet with calamity and disaster: if he should grasp the rushes ... the reeds ... the trees, [138] they would break off, and he would thereby meet with calamity and disaster.

‘So too, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling ... regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. That form of his disintegrates, and he thereby meets with calamity and disaster. He regards feeling as self ... perception as self ... volitional constructions as self ... consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. That consciousness of his disintegrates, and he thereby meets with calamity and disaster.

‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’... – ‘Therefore ... Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

94 (2) Flowers

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, I do not dispute with the world: rather, it is the world that disputes with me. A proponent of the Dhamma does not dispute with anyone in the world. Of that which the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, I too say that it does not exist. And of that which the wise in the world agree upon as existing, I too say that it exists.

‘And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist? [139] Form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist.

‘That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist.

‘And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling that is impermanent ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists.

‘That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists.

‘There is, bhikkhus, a world-phenomenon¹⁸⁶ in the world to which the Tathāgata has awakened and broken through. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it.

‘And what is that world-phenomenon in the world to which the Tathāgata has awakened and broken through? Form, bhikkhus, is a world-phenomenon in the world to which the Tathāgata has awakened and broken through. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it. When it is being thus explained ... [140] ... elucidated by the Tathāgata, if anyone does not know and see, how can I do anything with that foolish worldling, blind and sightless, who does not know and does not see?’

‘Feeling is a world-phenomenon in the world ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is a world-phenomenon in the world to which the Tathāgata has awakened and broken through. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it. When it is being thus explained ... and elucidated by the Tathāgata, if anyone does not know and see, how can I do anything with that foolish worldling, blind and sightless, who does not know and does not see?’

‘Bhikkhus, just as a blue, red, or white lotus is born in the water and grows up in the water, but having risen up above the water, it stands unsullied by the water, so too the Tathāgata was born in the world and grew up in the world, but having overcome the world, he dwells unsullied by the world.’¹⁸⁷

95 (3) A Lump of Foam

On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Ayojjhā on the bank of the river Ganges. There the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus thus:¹⁸⁸

‘Bhikkhus, suppose that this river Ganges was carrying along a great lump of foam. A man with good sight would inspect it, ponder it, and properly investigate it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in a lump of foam? So too, bhikkhus, whatever kind of form there is, whether past, future, or present ... far or near: [141] a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and properly investigates it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in form?’¹⁸⁹

‘Suppose, bhikkhus, that in the autumn, when it is raining and big rain drops are falling, a water bubble arises and bursts on the surface of the water. A man with good sight would inspect it, ponder it, and properly investigate it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in a water bubble? So too, bhikkhus, whatever kind of feeling there is, whether past, future, or present ... far or near: a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and properly investigates it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in feeling?’¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁶ *Lokadhamma*. SA: The five aggregates are called thus because it is their nature to disintegrate (*lujjanasabhāvattā*). *Loka* is derived from *lujjati* at 35:82. The etymology is doubtful but serves an edifying purpose.

¹⁸⁷ SA: In this sutta three types of world are spoken of. When it is said, ‘I do not dispute with the world,’ it is the world of beings (*satta-loka*). ‘A world-phenomenon in the world’: here, the world of constructions (*saṅkhāra-loka*). ‘The Tathāgata was born in the world’: here, the geographic world (*okāsa-loka*). Ee has omitted *loke jāto*, no doubt by oversight. The simile is also at AN IV 38,30–39,3.

¹⁸⁸ SA: One evening, while dwelling in that abode, the Blessed One came out from his fragrant cottage and sat down by the bank of the Ganges. He saw a great lump of foam coming downstream and thought, ‘I will give a Dhamma talk relating to the five aggregates.’ Then he addressed the bhikkhus sitting around him.

The sutta is one of the most radical discourses on the empty nature of conditioned phenomena; its imagery (especially the similes of the mirage and the magical illusion) has been taken up by later Buddhist thinkers, most persistently by the Mādhyamikas. Some of the images are found elsewhere in the Pāli Canon, e.g., at Dhp 46, 170. In the context of early Buddhist thought these similes have to be handled with care. They are not intended to suggest an illusionist view of the world but to show that our conceptions of the world, and of our own existence, are largely distorted by the process of cognition. Just as the mirage and magical illusion are based on real existents—the sand of the desert, the magician’s appurtenances—so these false conceptions arise from a base that objectively exists, namely, the five aggregates; but when seen through a mind subject to conceptual distortion, the aggregates appear in a way that deviates from their actual nature. Instead of being seen as transient and selfless, they appear as substantial and as a self.

¹⁸⁹ SA explains how form (i.e., the body) is like a lump of foam (*phenapiṇḍa*): as a lump of foam lacks any substance (*sāra*), so form lacks any substance that is permanent, stable, a self; as the lump of foam is full of holes and fissures and the abode of many creatures, so too form; as the lump of foam, after expanding, breaks up, so does form, which is pulverized in the mouth of death.

¹⁹⁰ SA: A bubble (*bubbula*) is feeble and cannot be grasped, for it breaks up as soon as it is seized; so too feeling is feeble and cannot be grasped as permanent and stable. As a bubble arises and ceases in a drop of water and does not last long, so too with feeling: 100,000 koṭis of feelings arise and cease in the time of a fingersnap. As a bubble arises in dependence on conditions, so feeling arises in dependence on a sense base, an object, the defilements, and contact.

‘Suppose, bhikkhus, that in the last month of the hot season, at high noon, a shimmering mirage appears. A man with good sight would inspect it, ponder it, and properly investigate it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in a mirage? So too, bhikkhus, whatever kind of perception there is, whether past, future, or present ... far or near: a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and properly investigates it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in perception?’¹⁹¹

‘Suppose, bhikkhus, that a man needing heartwood, seeking heartwood, wandering in search of heartwood, would take a sharp axe and enter a forest. There he would see the trunk of a large plantain tree, straight, fresh, without a fruit-bud core.¹⁹² He would cut it down at the root, cut off the crown, and unroll the coil. As he unrolls the coil, he would not find even softwood, let alone heartwood. A man with good sight would inspect it, ponder it, and properly investigate it, [142] and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in the trunk of a plantain tree? So too, bhikkhus, whatever kind of volitional constructions there are, whether past, future, or present ... far or near: a bhikkhu inspects them, ponders them, and properly investigates them. As he investigates them, they appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in volitional constructions?’¹⁹³

‘Suppose, bhikkhus, that a magician or a magician’s apprentice would display a magical illusion at a cross-roads. A man with good sight would inspect it, ponder it, and properly investigate it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in a magical illusion? So too, bhikkhus, whatever kind of consciousness there is, whether past, future, or present ... far or near: a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and properly investigates it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in consciousness?’¹⁹⁴

‘Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple becomes disenchanted with form, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with volitional constructions, disenchanted with consciousness. Being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion (his mind) is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: “It’s liberated.” He understands: “Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this world.”’

This is what the Blessed One said. Having said this, the Sublime One, the Teacher, further said this:

‘Form is like a lump of foam,
Feeling like a water bubble:
Perception are like a mirage,
Constructions like a plantain trunk,
And consciousness like an illusion:
So explained the Kinsman of the Sun.

However one may ponder it,
Or properly investigate,
It appears but hollow and void
When one sees it properly. [143]

With reference to this body
The One of Broad Wisdom has taught
That with the abandoning of three things
One sees this form discarded.

When vitality, heat, and consciousness
Depart from this physical body,
Then it lies there cast away:

¹⁹¹ SA: Perception too is like a mirage (*marīcikā*) in the sense that it is insubstantial, for one cannot grasp a mirage to drink or bathe or fill a pitcher. As a mirage deceives the multitude, so does perception, which entices people with the idea that the colourful object is beautiful, pleasurable, and permanent.

¹⁹² *Akukkukajātam*. SA: There is no pith growing inside (*anto asañjāta-ghanadaṇḍakam*).

¹⁹³ The simile is used for a different purpose at MN I 233,15–23. SA: As a plantain trunk (*kadalikkhandha*) is an assemblage of many sheaths, each with its own characteristic, so the aggregate of volitional constructions is an assemblage of many phenomena, each with its own characteristic.

¹⁹⁴ SA: Consciousness is like a magical illusion (*māyā*) in the sense that it is insubstantial and cannot be grasped. Consciousness is even more transient and fleeting than a magical illusion. For it gives the impression that a person comes and goes, stands and sits, with the same mind, but the mind is different in each of these activities. Consciousness deceives the multitude like a magical illusion.

For a modern parable illustrating the deceptive nature of consciousness, see Ñāṇananda, *The Magic of the Mind*, pp.5–7.

Food for others, without volition.¹⁹⁵

Such is this continuum,
This illusion, beguiler of fools.
It is taught to be a murderer,
Here no substance can be found.¹⁹⁶

A bhikkhu with energy aroused
Should look upon the aggregates thus,
Whether by day or by night,
Comprehending, ever mindful.

He should discard all the fetters
And make a refuge for himself:
Let him fare as if with head ablaze,
Yearning for the imperishable state.’

96 (4) The Ball of Cowdung

Setting at Sāvathī. Then a certain bhikkhu ... Sitting to one side, that bhikkhu said to the Blessed One:

‘Venerable sir, is there any form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself? Is there, venerable sir, any feeling ... any perception ... any volitional constructions ... any consciousness [144] that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself?’

‘Bhikkhu, there is no form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself. There is no feeling ... no perception ... no volitional constructions ... no consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself.’

Then the Blessed One took up a little piece of cowdung in his hand and said to that bhikkhu: ‘Bhikkhu, there is not even this much individual existence¹⁹⁷ that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself. If there was this much individual existence that was permanent ... not subject to change, this living of the holy life for the complete destruction of suffering could not be discerned.¹⁹⁸ But because there is not this much individual existence that is permanent ... not subject to change, this living of the holy life for the complete destruction of suffering is discerned.

‘In the past, bhikkhu, I was a head-anointed khattiya king.¹⁹⁹ I had 84,000 cities, the chief of which was the capital Kusāvati. I had 84,000 palaces, the chief of which was the palace (named) Dhamma. I had 84,000 halls with peaked roofs, the chief of which was the hall (named) the Great Array. I had 84,000 couches made of ivory, of heartwood, of gold and silver,²⁰⁰ decked with long-haired coverlets, embroidered with flowers, with choice spreads made of antelope hides, [145] with red awnings overhead and red cushions at both ends.

‘I had 84,000 bull elephants with golden ornaments and golden banners, covered with nets of golden thread, the chief of which was the royal bull elephant (named) Uposatha.²⁰¹ I had 84,000 steeds with golden ornaments and golden banners, covered with nets of golden thread, the chief of which was the royal steed (named) Valāhaka. I

¹⁹⁵ See MN I 296,9–11, spoken by the Venerable Sāriputta. I cannot trace a parallel spoken by the Buddha himself, but see Dh 41.

¹⁹⁶ SA explains that *māyāyaṃ bālalāpinī*, in pāda b, refers specifically to the aggregates of consciousness. The aggregate-mass is a murderer in two ways: (i) because the aggregates slay each other; and (ii) because murder appears in dependence on the aggregates. As to (i), when the earth element breaks up it takes along the other elements, and when the form aggregate breaks up it takes along the mental aggregates. As to (ii), when the aggregates exist such things as murder, bondage, injury, etc., come into being.

¹⁹⁷ *Attabhāvapaṭilābha*. See II,n.340.

¹⁹⁸ SA: The holy life of the path arises stilling the constructions of the three planes. If even this much individual existence were permanent, though the path might arise it would not be able to still the round of constructions. Thus the holy life would not be discerned.

¹⁹⁹ SA: This is said to show: ‘If any constructions were permanent, then the success I enjoyed as King Mahāsudassana would have been permanent.’ On King Mahāsudassana, a past incarnation of the Buddha, see the eponymic sutta, DN No. 17.

²⁰⁰ *Rūpiyamayāni* is missing in Be.

²⁰¹ The elephant, the steed, the jewel, the beautiful queen, and the counsellor are five of the seven treasures of the world monarch (*rājā cakkavati*). The other two, which Mahāsudassana also possessed, are the wheel-treasure and the steward-treasure. See DN II 172–77.

had 84,000 chariots with golden ornaments and golden banners, covered with nets of golden thread, the chief of which was the chariot (named) Vejayanta.

‘I had 84,000 jewels, the chief of which was the jewel-treasure. I had 84,000 women, the chief of whom was Queen Subhaddā. I had 84,000 vassals of the khattiya caste, the chief of whom was the counsellor-treasure. I had 84,000 cows with tethers of fine jute and milk pails of bronze. I had 84,000 *koṭis* of garments made of fine linen, of fine silk, of fine wool, of fine cotton. I had 84,000 plates on which my meals were served both in the morning and in the evening.

‘Of those 84,000 cities, bhikkhu, there was only one city in which I resided at that time: the capital Kusāvātī. Of those 84,000 palaces, [146] there was only one palace in which I resided at that time: the palace (named) Dhamma. Of those 84,000 halls with peaked roof, there was only one hall with peaked roof in which I resided at that time: the hall (named) the Great Array. Of those 84,000 couches, there was only one couch that I used at that time, one made either of ivory or of heartwood or of gold or of silver.

‘Of those 84,000 elephants, there was only one elephant that I rode at that time, the royal bull elephant (named) Uposatha. Of those 84,000 steeds, there was only one steed that I rode at that time, the royal steed (named) Valāhaka. Of those 84,000 chariots, there was only one chariot that I rode in at that time, the chariot (named) Vejayanta.

‘Of those 84,000 women, there was only one woman who waited on me at that time, either Khattiyāni or Velamikā. Of those 84,000 *koṭis* of garments, there was only one pair of garments that I wore at that time, one made either of fine linen or of fine silk or of fine wool or of fine cotton. Of those 84,000 plates, there was only one plate from which I ate at most a measure of rice with a suitable curry.

‘Thus, bhikkhu, all those constructions have passed, ceased, changed. So impermanent are constructions, bhikkhu, so unstable, so unreliable. [147] It is enough, bhikkhu, to become disenchanting with all constructions, enough to become dispassionate towards them, enough to be liberated from them.’²⁰²

97 (5) The Fingernail

Setting at Sāvattthī. Sitting to one side, that bhikkhu said to the Blessed One: ‘Is there, venerable sir, any form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself? Is there any feeling ... any perception ... any volitional constructions ... any consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself?’

‘Bhikkhu, there is no form ... no feeling ... no perception ... no volitional constructions ... no consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself.’

Then the Blessed One took up a little bit of soil in his fingernail and said to that bhikkhu: ‘Bhikkhu, there is not even this much form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself. If there was this much form that was permanent ... not subject to change, this living of the holy life for the complete destruction of suffering could not be discerned. But because there is not even this much form that is permanent ... not subject to change, this living of the holy life for the complete destruction of suffering is discerned. [148]

‘There is not even this much feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself. If there was this much consciousness ... But because there is not even this much consciousness that is permanent ... not subject to change, this living of the holy life for the complete destruction of suffering is discerned.

‘What do you think, bhikkhu, is form permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’... [149] – ‘Therefore ... Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

98 (6) Simple Version

Setting at Sāvattthī. Sitting to one side, that bhikkhus said to the Blessed One: ‘Is there, venerable sir, any form, any feeling, any perception, any volitional constructions, any consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself?’

‘Bhikkhu, there is no form, no feeling, no perception, no volitional constructions, no consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will remain the same just like eternity itself.’

²⁰² As at 15:20 (II 193,3–6). SA: Having shown his success at the time when he was King Mahāsudassana, he now shows its impermanence. Just as a man might place a ladder against a campaka tree, climb up, take a campaka flower, and then descend, so the Blessed One has climbed up the story of King Mahāsudassana’s success, taken the characteristic of impermanence at the top, and descended.

99 (7) The Leash (1)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, this saṃsāra is without discoverable beginning. A first point is not discerned of beings roaming and wandering on hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving.’²⁰³

‘There comes a time, bhikkhus, when the great ocean dries up and evaporates and no longer exists,²⁰⁴ but still, I say, there is no making an end of suffering for those beings roaming and wandering on hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving.

‘There comes a time, bhikkhus, when Sineru, the king of mountains, burns up and perishes and no longer exists, but still, I say, [150] there is no making an end of suffering for those beings roaming and wandering on hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving.

‘There comes a time, bhikkhus, when the great earth burns up and perishes and no longer exists, but still, I say, there is no making an end of suffering for those beings roaming and wandering on hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving.

‘Suppose, bhikkhus, a dog tied up on a leash was bound to a strong post or pillar: it would just keep on running and revolving around that same post or pillar. So too, the uninstructed worldling ... regards form as self ... feeling as self ... perception as self ... volitional constructions as self ... consciousness as self.... He just keeps running and revolving around that same form, that same feeling, that same perception, those same volitional constructions, that same consciousness.²⁰⁵ As he keeps on running and revolving around them, he is not freed from form, not freed from feeling, not freed from perception, not freed from volitional constructions, not freed from consciousness. He is not freed from birth, from aging-and-death, from sorrow, from lamentation, from pain, from displeasure, from despair: he is not freed from suffering, I say.

‘But the instructed noble disciple ... does not regard form as self ... nor feeling as self ... nor perception as self ... nor volitional constructions as self ... nor consciousness as self.... He no longer keeps running and revolving around that same form ... that same consciousness. As he no longer keeps running and revolving around them, he is freed from form, freed from feeling, freed from perception, freed from volitional constructions, freed from consciousness. He is freed from birth, from aging-and-death, from sorrow, from lamentation, from pain, from displeasure, from despair: he is freed from suffering, I say.’ [151]

100 (8) The Leash (2)

‘Bhikkhus, this saṃsāra is without discoverable beginning. A first point is not discerned of beings roaming and wandering on hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving....

‘Suppose, bhikkhus, a dog tied up on a leash was bound to a strong post or pillar. If it walks, it walks close to that post or pillar. If it stands, it stands close to that post or pillar. If it sits down, it sits down close to that post or pillar. If it lies down, it lies down close to that post or pillar.

‘So too, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling regards form thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self.” He regards feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self.” If he walks, he walks close to those five aggregates subject to clinging. If he stands, he stands close to those five aggregates subject to clinging. If he sits down, he sits down close to those five aggregates subject to clinging. If he lies down, he lies down close to those five aggregates subject to clinging.

‘Therefore, bhikkhus, one should often reflect upon one’s own mind thus: “For a long time this mind has been defiled by lust, by hatred, by delusion.” Through the defilements of the mind beings are defiled: with the cleansing of the mind beings are purified.

‘Bhikkhus, have you seen the picture called “Conduct”?’²⁰⁶

‘Yes, venerable sir.’

‘Even that picture called “Conduct” has been designed in its diversity by the mind, yet the mind is even more diverse than that picture called “Conduct”.’²⁰⁷

²⁰³ As at 15:1, etc. See II,n.250.

²⁰⁴ On the destruction of the world by fire, see Vism 414–17 (PP 13:32–41).

²⁰⁵ SA: The foolish worldling is like the dog, his view is like the leash, his personal identity (*sakkāya*) is like the post. Like the dog’s running around the post is the worldling’s running around his personal identity bound to it by craving and views.

²⁰⁶ *Caraṇaṃ nāma cittaṃ*. *Citta* here is the equivalent of Skt *citra*, picture. The exact meaning of the picture’s title is obscure. SA glosses *vicaraṇa-citta*, ‘the wandering picture’ [ST: because they take it and wander about with it], but I’m not sure that *caraṇa* here doesn’t mean conduct, as in other contexts.

SA: The Saṅkha were a sect of heretical brahmins. Having taken a canvas, they had various pictures painted on it of the good and bad destinations to illustrate success and failure, and then they took it around on their wanderings. They would show it to the people, explaining, ‘If one does this deed, one gets this result; if one does that, one gets that.’

²⁰⁷ *Tam pi ... caraṇaṃ nāma cittaṃ citten’eva cittaṃ, tena pi ... caraṇena cittaṃ cittaññeva cittaṃ*. There are several puns here that cannot be successfully conveyed in translation (nor even in Skt for that matter). *Citta* is both mind (as in Skt)

‘Therefore, bhikkhus, one should often reflect upon one’s own mind thus: “For a long time this mind has been defiled by lust, by hatred, by delusion.” Through the defilements of the mind beings are defiled: with the cleansing of the mind beings are purified. [152]

‘Bhikkhus, I do not see any other order of living beings so diversified as those in the animal realm. Even those beings in the animal realm have been diversified by the mind,²⁰⁸ yet the mind is even more diverse than those beings in the animal realm.

‘Therefore, bhikkhus, one should often reflect upon one’s own mind thus: “For a long time this mind has been defiled by lust, by hatred, by delusion.” Through the defilements of the mind beings are defiled: with the cleansing of the mind beings are purified.

‘Suppose, bhikkhus, an artist or a painter, using dye or lac or turmeric or indigo or crimson, would create the figure of a man or a woman complete in all its features on a well-polished plank or wall or roll of cloth.²⁰⁹ So too, when the uninstructed worldling generates anything, it is only form that he generates: it is only feeling ... only perception ... only volitional constructions ... only consciousness that he generates.

‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ ... – ‘Therefore ... Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

101 (9) The Adze Handle (or The Ship)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, I say that the destruction of the taints is for one who knows and sees, not for one who does not know and does not see. For one who knows what, who sees what, does the destruction of the taints come about? “Such is form, such its origin, such its passing away: such is feeling ... such is perception ... such are volitional constructions ... such is consciousness, such its origin, [153] such its passing away”: it is for one who knows thus, for one who sees thus, that the destruction of the taints comes about.²¹⁰

‘Bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu does not dwell devoted to development, even though such a wish as this might arise in him: “Oh, that my mind might be liberated from the taints by non-clinging!”, yet his mind is not liberated from the taints by non-clinging. For what reason? It should be said: because of non-development. Because of non-development of what? Because of non-development of the four foundations of mindfulness ... of the four right kinds of striving ... of the four bases of spiritual power ... of the five spiritual faculties ... of the five powers ... of the seven factors of enlightenment ... of the noble eightfold path.²¹¹

‘Suppose, bhikkhus there was a hen with eight, ten, or twelve eggs which she had not covered, incubated, and nurtured properly. Even though such a wish as this might arise in her: “Oh, that my chicks might pierce their shells with the points of their claws and beaks and hatch safely!”, yet the chicks are incapable of piercing their shells with the points of their claws and beaks and hatching safely. For what reason? Because that hen with eight, ten, or twelve eggs had not covered, incubated, and nurtured them properly.

‘So too, bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu does not dwell devoted to development, even though such a wish as this might arise in him: “Oh, that my mind might be liberated from the taints by non-clinging!”, yet his mind is not liberated from the taints by non-clinging. For what reason? It should be said: because of non-development ... of the noble eightfold path.

‘Bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu dwells devoted to development, [154] even though no such wish as this might arise in him: “Oh, that my mind might be liberated from the taints by non-clinging!”, yet his mind is liberated from the taints by non-clinging. For what reason? It should be said: because of development. Because of development of what? Because of development of the four foundations of mindfulness ... of the four right kinds of striving ... of

and picture (= Skt *citra*). *Cittita* (Ee: *cintita*) is ‘thought out’ (related to *citta*, mind) and ‘diversified’ (related to *citra*, picture). I have used ‘designed in its diversity’ to capture both nuances. DhsA 64–65 quotes this passage in its discussion of how mind designs the world.

²⁰⁸ *Te pi ... tiracchānagatā pāṇā citten’eva cittitā, tehi pi ... tiracchānagatehi pāṇehi cittaññeva cittataram*. Another series of puns. The point is that the diversity of the creatures in the animal realm reflects the diversity of the past kamma that engenders birth as an animal, and this diversity of kamma in turn stems from the diversity of volition (*cetana*), a function of the mind. DhsA 64–65 discusses this passage at length.

SA: Quails and partridges, etc., do not accumulate diverse kamma, thinking, ‘We will become diversified in such and such a way,’ but the kamma arrives at the appropriate species (*yonī*), and the diversity is rooted in the species. For beings that arise in a particular species become diversified in the way appropriate to that species. Thus the diversity is achieved through the species, and the species reflect kamma.

²⁰⁹ The simile is also at 12:64. See II,n.173.

²¹⁰ Also at 12:23.

²¹¹ Again, these are the thirty-seven accessories of enlightenment. The theme of this sutta might be compared with MN No. 126, which deals with the question whether, in living the holy life, it is necessary to make a wish (*āsaṅ ce pi karitvā*) in order to achieve the fruit (*phalassa adhiḡamāya*). Here the word rendered ‘wish’ is *icchā*.

the four bases of spiritual power ... of the five spiritual faculties ... of the five powers ... of the seven factors of enlightenment ... of the noble eightfold path.

‘Suppose, bhikkhus there was a hen with eight, ten, or twelve eggs which she had covered, incubated, and nurtured properly. Even though no such wish as this might arise in her: “Oh, that my chicks might pierce their shells with the points of their claws and beaks and hatch safely!” yet the chicks are capable of piercing their shells with the points of their claws and beaks and of hatching safely. For what reason? Because that hen with eight, ten, or twelve eggs had covered, incubated, and nurtured them properly.

‘So too, bhikkhus,²¹² when a bhikkhu dwells devoted to development, even though no such wish as this might arise in him: “Oh, that my mind might be liberated from the taints by non-clinging!” yet his mind is liberated from the taints by non-clinging. For what reason? It should be said: because of development ... of the noble eightfold path.

‘When, bhikkhus, a carpenter²¹³ or a carpenter’s apprentice looks at the handle of his adze, he sees the impressions of his fingers and his thumb, but he does not know: “So much of the adze handle has been worn away today, so much yesterday, so much earlier.”

‘So too, bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu dwells devoted to development, [155] even though no such knowledge occurs to him: “So much of my taints has been destroyed today, so much yesterday, so much earlier,” yet when they are destroyed, the knowledge occurs to him that they have been destroyed.

‘Suppose, bhikkhus, there was a seafaring ship bound with rigging that had been worn out in the water for six months.²¹⁴ It would be hauled up on dry land during the cold season and its rigging would be further attacked by wind and sun. Inundated by rain from a rain cloud, the rigging would easily collapse and rot away. So too, bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu dwells devoted to development, his fetters easily collapse and rot away.’

102 (10) Perception of Impermanence

Setting at Sāvattḥī. ‘Bhikkhus, when the perception of impermanence is developed and cultivated, it eliminates all sensual lust, it eliminates all lust for becoming, it eliminates all ignorance, it uproots all conceit “I am.”²¹⁵

‘Just as, bhikkhus, in the autumn a ploughman ploughing with a great ploughshare cuts through all the rootlets as he ploughs, so too, when the perception of impermanence is developed and cultivated, it eliminates all sensual lust ... it uproots all conceit “I am.”

‘Just as, bhikkhus, a rush-cutter would cut down a rush, grab it by the top, and shake it down and shake it out and thump it about, so too, when the perception of impermanence is developed and cultivated, it eliminates all sensual lust ... it uproots all conceit “I am.”

‘Just as, bhikkhus, when the stalk of a bunch of mangoes has been cut, [156] all the mangoes attached to the stalk follow along with it, so too, when the perception of impermanence is developed ... it uproots all conceit “I am.”

‘Just as, bhikkhus, all the rafters of a house with a peaked roof lead to the roof peak, slope towards the roof peak, and converge upon the roof peak, and the roof peak is declared to be their chief, so too, when the perception of impermanence is developed ... it uproots all conceit “I am.”²¹⁶

‘Just as, bhikkhus, among fragrant roots, black orris is declared to be their chief, so too, when the perception of impermanence is developed ... it uproots all conceit “I am.”

‘Just as, bhikkhus, among fragrant heartwoods, red sandalwood is declared to be their chief, so too, when the perception of impermanence is developed ... it uproots all conceit “I am.”

‘Just as, bhikkhus, among fragrant flowers, jasmine is declared to be their chief, so too, when the perception of impermanence is developed ... it uproots all conceit “I am.”

²¹² The simile of the chicks is applied differently at MN I 104,3–13 and MN I 357–58. See too Vin III 3–5. SA elaborates on the comparison of the bhikkhu’s enlightenment to the hatching of chicks. The hen’s preparatory work is like the bhikkhu’s devotion to development. The non-rotting of the eggs is like the bhikkhu’s not falling away from insight knowledge; the drying up of the moisture in the eggs is like the drying up of attachment to the three realms of existence; the thinning of the egg shells is like the thinning of ignorance; the maturation of the chicks is like the maturation of insight knowledge. The time when the chicks break the shells and emerge safely is like the time when the bhikkhu breaks the shell of ignorance and attains arahantship. And as the chicks go about adorning the village field, so the great arahant enters into fruition attainment which takes Nibbāna as its object, and thus adorns his monastery.

²¹³ Reading *palagaṇḍassa* with Be and Ce. SA glosses *vaḍḍhakissa*.

²¹⁴ The simile is also at 45:158. I read it as in Ce and Ee. SA develops this simile even more minutely than the simile of the chicks.

²¹⁵ Sensual lust is eliminated by the path of non-returning; lust for becoming, ignorance, and the conceit ‘I am’ by the path of arahantship.

²¹⁶ This simile, and the six to follow, are applied differently at 45:141–47. The simile of the ascending sun is also at 2:29.

‘Just as, bhikkhus, all petty princes are the vassals of a wheel-turning monarch, and the wheel-turning monarch is declared to be their chief, so too, when the perception of impermanence is developed ... it uproots all conceit “I am.”

‘Just as, bhikkhus, the radiance of all the stars does not amount to a sixteenth part of the radiance of the moon, and the radiance of the moon is declared to be their chief, so too, when the perception of impermanence is developed ... it uproots all conceit “I am.”

‘Just as, bhikkhus, in the autumn, when the sky is clear and cloudless, the sun, ascending in the sky, dispels all darkness from space as it shines and beams and radiates, so too, when the perception of impermanence is developed and cultivated, it eliminates all sensual lust, it eliminates all lust for becoming, it eliminates all ignorance, it uproots all conceit “I am.”

‘And how, bhikkhus, is the perception of impermanence developed [157] and cultivated so that it eliminates all sensual lust ... and uproots all conceit “I am”? “Such is form, such its origin, such its passing away: such is feeling ... such is perception ... such are volitional constructions ... such is consciousness, such its origin, such its passing away”: that is how the perception of impermanence is developed and cultivated so that it eliminates all sensual lust, eliminates all lust for becoming, eliminates all ignorance, uproots all conceit “I am.”’

XI. Portions

103 (1) Portions

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these four portions.²¹⁷ What four? [158] The portion of identity, the portion of the origin of identity, the portion of the cessation of identity, the portion of the way leading to the cessation of identity.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the portion of identity? It should be said: the five aggregates subject to clinging. What five? The form aggregate subject to clinging, the feeling aggregate subject to clinging, the perception aggregate subject to clinging, the constructional-activities aggregate subject to clinging, the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. This is called the portion of identity.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the portion of the origin of identity? It is this craving which leads to re-becoming, accompanied by delight and lust, seeking delight here and there: that is, craving for sensual pleasures, craving for becoming, craving for disbecoming. This is called the portion of the origin of identity.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the portion of the cessation of identity? It is the remainderless fading away and cessation of that same craving, the giving up and relinquishing of it, freedom from it, non-reliance on it. This is called the portion of the cessation of identity.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the portion of the way leading to the cessation of identity? It is this noble eightfold path: that is, right view ... right concentration. This is called the portion of the way leading to the cessation of identity.

‘These, bhikkhus, are the four portions.’

104 (2) Suffering

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, I will teach you suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the way leading to the cessation of suffering.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is suffering? It should be said: the five aggregates subject to clinging. What five?... (*as above*) ... This is called suffering.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the origin of suffering? It is this craving which leads to re-becoming.... This is called the origin of suffering.

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the cessation of suffering? It is the remainderless fading away and cessation of that same craving.... This is called the cessation of suffering. [159]

‘And what, bhikkhus, is the way leading to the cessation of suffering? It is this noble eightfold path: that is, right view ... right concentration. This is called the way leading to the cessation of suffering.’

105 (3) Identity

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, I will teach you identity, the origin of identity, the cessation of identity, and the way leading to the cessation of identity.’

(The remainder of this sutta is identical with the preceding one, with appropriate substitutions.)

²¹⁷ SA glosses *antā*, lit. ends, with *koṭṭhāsā*, and explains that this sutta interprets the five aggregates by way of the four truths.

106 (4) To Be Fully Understood

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, I will teach you things that should be fully understood, full understanding, and the person who has fully understood.’²¹⁸ Listen to that....

‘And what, bhikkhus, are the things that should be fully understood? Form, bhikkhus, is something that should be fully understood. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is something that should be fully understood. These are called the things that should be fully understood. [160]

‘And what, bhikkhus, is full understanding? The destruction of lust, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion: this is called full understanding.’²¹⁹

‘And who, bhikkhus, is the person that has fully understood? It should be said: the arahant, the venerable one of such a name and such a clan. This is called the person that has fully understood.’

107 (5) Recluses (1)

Setting at Sāvathī.²²⁰ ‘Bhikkhus, there are these five aggregates subject to clinging. What five? The form aggregate subject to clinging ... the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging.

‘Bhikkhus, those recluses and brahmins who do not understand as they really are the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of these five aggregates subject to clinging: these I do not consider to be recluses among recluses or brahmins among brahmins, and these venerable ones do not, by realizing it for themselves with direct knowledge, in this very life enter and dwell in the goal of recluseship or the goal of brahminhood.

‘But, bhikkhus, those recluses and brahmins who understand these things as they really are: these I consider to be recluses among recluses and brahmins among brahmins, and these venerable ones, by realizing it for themselves with direct knowledge, in this very life enter and dwell in the goal of recluseship and the goal of brahminhood.’

108 (6) Recluses (2)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these five aggregates subject to clinging. What five? The form aggregate subject to clinging ... the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging.

‘Bhikkhus, those recluses and brahmins who do not understand as they really are the origin and the passing away, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of these five aggregates subject to clinging: these I do not consider to be recluses among recluses or brahmins among brahmins....

‘But, bhikkhus, those recluses and brahmins who understand these things as they really are ... in this very life enter and dwell in the goal of recluseship and the goal of brahminhood.’

109 (7) Stream-enterer

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these five aggregates subject to clinging. What five? The form aggregate subject to clinging ... the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging.

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple understands as they really are the origin and the passing away, [161] the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of these five aggregates subject to clinging, then he is called a noble disciple who is a stream-enterer, no longer bound to the nether world, fixed in destiny, with enlightenment as his destination.’

110 (8) Arahant

... ‘When, bhikkhus, having understood as they really are the origin and the passing away, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of these five aggregates subject to clinging, a noble disciple is liberated by non-clinging,²²¹ then he is called a bhikkhu who is an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed, who has lived the holy life, done what had to be done, laid down the burden, reached his own goal, utterly destroyed the fetters of becoming, one completely liberated through final knowledge.’

²¹⁸ SA glosses *pariññeyya* with *samatikkamitabba* and *pariññā* with *samatikkama*; see n.41. The ‘person who has fully understood’ (*pariññātāvī*) is a conventional expression; see n.37.

²¹⁹ SA: By this, Nibbāna is shown.

²²⁰ This sutta and the next are formed from a template; see Introduction, p.???. Woodward, at KS 2:136, says that the next sutta is the same as this, but that is not the case; the second adds *samudayañ ca atthaṅgamañ ca*.

²²¹ The stream-enterer (in the preceding sutta) and the arahant share the same understanding of the five aggregates. They differ in that the arahant has used this understanding to extricate all defilements, while the stream-enterer (and higher trainees) have yet to complete this task.

111 (9) Abandoning Desire (1)

Setting at Sāvaththī. ‘Bhikkhus, whatever desire there is for form, whatever lust, delight, craving—abandon it. Thus that form will be abandoned, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that it is no more subject to future arising. So too in the case of feeling, perception, volitional constructions, and consciousness.’

112 (10) Abandoning Desire (2)

Setting at Sāvaththī. ‘Bhikkhus, whatever desire there is for form, whatever lust, delight, craving, whatever engagement and clinging, mental standpoints, adherences, and underlying tendencies—[162] abandon them. Thus that form will be abandoned, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that it is no more subject to future arising. So too in the case of feeling, perception, volitional constructions, and consciousness.’

XII. A Speaker on the Dhamma**113 (1) Ignorance**

Setting at Sāvaththī. Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:

‘Venerable sir, it is said, “ignorance, ignorance.” What now, venerable sir, is ignorance, and in what way is one immersed in ignorance?’

‘Here, bhikkhu, the uninstructed worldling does not understand form, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation. He does not understand feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation. [163] This is called ignorance, and in this way one is immersed in ignorance.’

114 (2) True Knowledge

Setting at Sāvaththī.... Sitting to one side, that bhikkhu said to the Blessed One:

‘Venerable sir, it is said, “true knowledge, true knowledge.” What now, venerable sir, is true knowledge, and in what way has one arrived at true knowledge?’

‘Here, bhikkhu, the instructed noble disciple understands form, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation. He understands feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation. This is called true knowledge, and in this way one has arrived at true knowledge.’

115 (3) A Speaker on the Dhamma (1)

Setting at Sāvaththī.... Sitting to one side, that bhikkhu said to the Blessed One:

‘Venerable, sir, it is said, “a speaker on the Dhamma, a speaker on the Dhamma.” In what way, venerable sir, is one a speaker on the Dhamma?’²²²

‘Bhikkhu, if one teaches the Dhamma for the purpose of disenchantment with form, for its fading away and cessation, one can be called a bhikkhu who is a speaker on the Dhamma. If one is practising for the purpose of disenchantment with form, for its fading away and cessation, one can be called a bhikkhu who is practising in accordance with the Dhamma. If, through disenchantment with form, through its fading away and cessation, one is liberated by non-clinging, one can be called a bhikkhu who has attained Nibbāna in this very life.

‘Bhikkhu, if one teaches the Dhamma for the purpose of disenchantment with feeling ... consciousness, for its fading away and cessation, one can be called a bhikkhu who is a speaker on the Dhamma. If one is practising for the purpose of disenchantment with consciousness, for its fading away and cessation, one can be called a bhikkhu who is practising in accordance with the Dhamma. If, through disenchantment with consciousness, [164] through its fading away and cessation, one is liberated by non-clinging, one can be called a bhikkhu who has attained Nibbāna in this very life.’

116 (4) A Speaker on the Dhamma (2)

Setting at Sāvaththī.... Sitting to one side, that bhikkhu said to the Blessed One:

‘Venerable, sir, it is said, “a speaker on the Dhamma, a speaker on the Dhamma.” In what way, venerable sir, is one a speaker on the Dhamma? In what way is one practising in accordance with the Dhamma? In what way has one attained Nibbāna in this very life?’

(The rest of this sutta is identical with the preceding one.)

²²² As at 12:16. See II,n.34, n.35.

117 (5) Bondage

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Here, bhikkhus, the uninstructed worldling ... regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. This is called, bhikkhus, an uninstructed worldling who is bound by bondage to form, who is bound by inner and outer bondage, who does not see the near shore and the far shore, who grows out in bondage,²²³ who dies in bondage, who in bondage goes from this world to the other world. [165]

‘He regards feeling as self ... perception as self ... volitional constructions as self ... consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. This is called, bhikkhus, an uninstructed worldling who is bound by bondage to consciousness ... who in bondage goes from this world to the other world.

‘But, bhikkhus the instructed noble disciple ... does not regard form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. This is called, bhikkhus, an instructed noble disciple who is not bound by bondage to form, who is not bound by inner and outer bondage, who sees the near shore or the far shore. He is freed from suffering, I say.

‘He does not regard feeling as self ... perception as self ... volitional constructions as self ... consciousness as self ... or self as in consciousness. This is called, bhikkhus, an instructed noble disciple who is not bound by bondage to consciousness.... He is freed from suffering, I say.’

118 (6) Interrogation (1) ²²⁴

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, what do you think, do you regard form thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self”?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Good, bhikkhus! Form should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘Do you regard feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... [166] consciousness thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self”?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Good, bhikkhus! Consciousness should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

119 (7) Interrogation (2)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, what do you think, do you regard form thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self”?’

‘Yes, venerable sir.’

‘Good, bhikkhus! Form should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘Do you regard feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self”?’

‘Yes, venerable sir.’

‘Good, bhikkhus! Consciousness should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

120 (8) Things That Fetter

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, I will teach you the things that fetter and the fetter. Listen to that....

‘And what, bhikkhus, are the things that fetter, and what is the fetter? Form, bhikkhus, is a thing that fetters: the desire and lust for it is the fetter there. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... [167] Consciousness is a thing that fetters: the desire and lust for it is the fetter there. These are called the things that fetter, and this the fetter.’

121 (9) Things That Can Be Clung To

‘Bhikkhus, I will teach you the things that can be clung to and the clinging. Listen to that....

²²³ I follow Be, which reads *baddho jīyati*, as against Ce and Ee, which have *baddho jāyati*, ‘who is born in bondage.’

²²⁴ Ee’s title, *Parimucchita*, should be amended to *Paripucchita*.

‘And what, bhikkhus, are the things that can be clung to, and what is the clinging? Form, bhikkhus, is a thing that can be clung to: the desire and lust for it is the clinging there. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is a thing that can be clung to: the desire and lust for it is the clinging there. These are called the things that can be clung to, and this the clinging.’

122 (10) Virtuous

On one occasion the Venerable Sāriputta and the Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita were dwelling at Bārāṇasī in the Deer Park at Isipatana. Then, in the evening, the Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita emerged from seclusion, approached the Venerable Sāriputta, ... and said to him: ‘Friend Sāriputta, what are the things that a virtuous bhikkhu should properly attend to?’

‘Friend Koṭṭhita, a virtuous bhikkhu should properly attend to the five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumour, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty, as non-self.²²⁵ What five? The form aggregate subject to clinging, the feeling aggregate subject to clinging, the perception aggregate subject to clinging, the constructional-activities aggregate subject to clinging, the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. A virtuous bhikkhu should properly attend to these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent ... as non-self. [168] When, friend, a virtuous bhikkhu properly attends to these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent ... as non-self, it is possible that he may realize the fruit of stream-entry.’

‘But, friend Sāriputta, what are the things that a bhikkhu who is a stream-enterer should properly attend to?’

‘Friend Koṭṭhita, a bhikkhu who is a stream-enterer should properly attend to these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent ... as non-self. When, friend, a bhikkhu who is a stream-enterer properly attends to these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent ... as non-self, it is possible that he may realize the fruit of once-returning.’

‘But, friend Sāriputta, what are the things that a bhikkhu who is a once-returner should properly attend to?’

‘Friend Koṭṭhita, a bhikkhu who is a once-returner should properly attend to these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent ... as non-self. When, friend, a bhikkhu who is a once-returner properly attends to these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent ... as non-self, it is possible that he may realize the fruit of non-returning.’

‘But, friend Sāriputta, what are the things that a bhikkhu who is a non-returner should properly attend to?’

‘Friend Koṭṭhita, a bhikkhu who is a non-returner should properly attend to these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent ... as non-self. When, friend, a bhikkhu who is a non-returner properly attends to these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent ... as non-self, it is possible that he may realize the fruit of arahantship.’

‘But, friend Sāriputta, what are the things that a bhikkhu who is an arahant should properly attend to?’

‘Friend Koṭṭhita, a bhikkhu who is an arahant should properly attend to these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent ... as non-self. For the arahant, friend, there is nothing further that has to be done and no repetition of what he has already done.²²⁶ [169] However, when these things are developed and cultivated, they lead to a pleasant dwelling in this very life and to mindfulness and clear comprehension.’

123 (11) Instructed

(This sutta is identical with the preceding one except that the opening question and reply are phrased in terms of ‘an instructed bhikkhu.’)

124 (12) Kappa (1)

Setting at Sāvathī. Then the Venerable Kappa approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:

²²⁵ This list is found elsewhere in the Nikāyas (e.g., at MN I 435,33–35, MN I 500,3–5, AN IV 422,24–423,1). The eleven terms are expanded to forty at Paṭi II 238, and commented on at Vism 611–13 (PP 20:19–20). SA reduces them to the three contemplations: ‘impermanence’ and ‘disintegration’ represent contemplation of impermanence; ‘empty’ and ‘non-self,’ contemplation of non-self; and the others, contemplation of suffering. Vism 613 and MA III 146,??, however, assign ‘as alien’ to the contemplation of non-self, which seems more plausible.

²²⁶ *Natthi ... arahato uttarikaraṇīyaṃ katassa vā paṭicayo.* SA does not comment on this, but AA IV 165,?? (commenting on AN IV 355,24–25) explains: ‘There is nothing further to be done, because he has done the four tasks imposed by the four truths (see 56:11). And no repetition of what he has already done, for the developed path need not be developed again and the abandoned defilements need not be abandoned again.’

‘Venerable sir, how should one know, how should one see so that, in regard to this body with consciousness and in regard to all external signs, I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit no longer occur within?’

(Remainder identical with §71, but addressed to Kappa.) [170]

125 (13) Kappa (2)

Setting at Sāvathī. Then the Venerable Kappa approached the Blessed One ... and said to him:

‘Venerable sir, how should one know, how should one see, so that, in regard to this body with consciousness and in regard to all external signs, the mind is rid of I-making, mine-making, and conceit, has transcended discrimination, and is peaceful and well liberated?’

(Remainder identical with §72, but addressed to Kappa.)

XIII. Ignorance

126 (1) Subject to Arising (1)

Setting at Sāvathī. [171] Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One ... and said to him: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “ignorance, ignorance.” What now, venerable sir, is ignorance, and in what way is one immersed in ignorance?’

‘Here, bhikkhu, the uninstructed worldling does not understand form subject to arising as it really is thus: “Form is subject to arising.” He does not understand form subject to vanishing as it really is thus: “Form is subject to vanishing.” He does not understand form subject to arising and vanishing as it really is thus: “Form is subject to arising and vanishing.” He does not understand feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness subject to arising ... subject to vanishing ... subject to arising and vanishing as it really is thus: “Consciousness is subject to arising and vanishing.”

‘This is called ignorance, bhikkhu, and in this way one is immersed in ignorance.’

When this was said, that bhikkhu said to the Blessed One:

‘Venerable sir, it is said, “true knowledge, true knowledge.” What now, venerable sir, is true knowledge, and in what way has one arrived at true knowledge?’

‘Here, bhikkhu, the instructed noble disciple understands form subject to arising as it really is thus: “Form is subject to arising.” He understands form subject to vanishing as it really is thus: “Form is subject to vanishing.” He understands form subject to arising and vanishing as it really is thus: “Form is subject to arising and vanishing.” He understands feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness subject to arising ... subject to vanishing ... subject to arising and vanishing as it really is thus: “Consciousness is subject to arising and vanishing.”

‘This is called true knowledge, bhikkhu, and in this way one has arrived at true knowledge.’

127 (2) Subject to Arising (2)

On one occasion the Venerable Sāriputta and the Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita were dwelling at Bārāṇasī in the Deer Park at Isipatana. Then, in the evening, the Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita emerged from seclusion, approached the Venerable Sāriputta, ... and said to him: ‘Friend Sāriputta, it is said, “ignorance, ignorance.” What now, friend, is ignorance, and in what way is one immersed in ignorance?’

(The rest of this sutta is identical with the exchange on ignorance in the preceding sutta.) [173]

128 (3) Subject to Arising (3)

At Bārāṇasī in the Deer Park at Isipatana. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita said to the Venerable Sāriputta: ‘Friend Sāriputta, it is said, “true knowledge, true knowledge.” What now, friend, is true knowledge, and in what way has one arrived at true knowledge?’

(The rest of this sutta is identical with the exchange on true knowledge in §126.)

129 (4) Gratification (1)

At Bārāṇasī in the Deer Park at Isipatana. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita said to the Venerable Sāriputta: ‘Friend Sāriputta, it is said, “ignorance, ignorance.” What now, friend, is ignorance, and in what way is one immersed in ignorance?’

‘Here, friend, the uninstructed worldling does not understand as it really is the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of form. He does not understand all this in the case of feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness. This, friend, is called ignorance, and in this way one is immersed in ignorance.’

130 (5) Gratification (2)

At Bārāṇasī in the Deer Park at Isipatana.... [174] ‘Friend Sāriputta, it is said, “true knowledge, true knowledge.” What now, friend, is true knowledge, and in what way has one arrived at true knowledge?’

‘Here, friend, the instructed noble disciple understands as it really is the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of form. He understands all this in the case of feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness. This, friend, is called true knowledge, and in this way one has arrived at true knowledge.’

131 (6) Origin (1)

At Bārāṇasī in the Deer Park at Isipatana.... ‘Friend Sāriputta, it is said, “ignorance, ignorance.” What now, friend, is ignorance, and in what way is one immersed in ignorance?’

‘Here, friend, the uninstructed worldling does not understand as it really is the origin and the passing away, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of form. He does not understand all this in the case of feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness. This, friend, is called ignorance, and in this way one is immersed in ignorance.’

132 (7) Origin (2)

At Bārāṇasī in the Deer Park at Isipatana.... ‘Friend Sāriputta, it is said, “true knowledge, true knowledge.” What now, friend, is true knowledge, and in what way has one arrived at true knowledge?’

‘Here, friend, the instructed noble disciple understands as it really is the origin and the passing away, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of form. He understands all this in the case of feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness. This, friend, is called true knowledge, and in this way one has arrived at true knowledge.’ [175]

133 (8) Koṭṭhita (1)

(Identical with §129 and §130 combined, except here Sāriputta asks the questions and Mahākoṭṭhita replies.)

134 (9) Koṭṭhita (2)

(Identical with §131 and §132 combined, except here Sāriputta asks the questions and Mahākoṭṭhita replies.) [176]

135 (10) Koṭṭhita (3)

The same setting. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Sāriputta said to the Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita: ‘Friend Koṭṭhita, it is said, “ignorance, ignorance.” What now, friend, is ignorance, and in what way is one immersed in ignorance?’

‘Here, friend, the uninstructed worldling does not understand form, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation. He does not understand feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation. This, friend, is called ignorance, and in this way one is immersed in ignorance.’

When this was said, the Venerable Sāriputta said to the Venerable Mahākoṭṭhita: ‘Friend Koṭṭhita, it is said, “true knowledge, true knowledge.” What now, friend, is true knowledge, and in what way has one arrived at true knowledge?’

‘Here, friend, the instructed noble disciple understands form, [177] its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation. He understands feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation. This, friend, is called true knowledge, and in this way one has arrived at true knowledge.’

XIV. Hot Embers**136 (1) Hot Embers**

Setting at Sāvattḥī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is hot embers,²²⁷ feeling is hot embers, perception is hot embers, volitional constructions are hot embers, consciousness is hot embers. Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple becomes disenchanted with form ... disenchanted with consciousness. Being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate.... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

²²⁷ *Kukkuḷa*. See I,v.787. SA: A great conflagration, hot and blazing. In this sutta the characteristic of suffering is discussed.

137 (2) Impermanent (1)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, you should abandon desire for whatever is impermanent. And what is impermanent? [178] Form is impermanent: you should abandon desire for it. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is impermanent: you should abandon desire for it. Bhikkhus, you should abandon desire for whatever is impermanent.’

138 (3) Impermanent (2)

... ‘Bhikkhus, you should abandon lust for whatever is impermanent.’...
(Complete as in the preceding sutta, with ‘lust’ instead of ‘desire.’)

139 (4) Impermanent (3)

... ‘Bhikkhus, you should abandon desire and lust for whatever is impermanent.’...

140 (5) Suffering (1)

... ‘Bhikkhus, you should abandon desire for whatever is suffering.’...

141 (6) Suffering (2)

... ‘Bhikkhus, you should abandon lust for whatever is suffering.’...

142 (7) Suffering (3)

... ‘Bhikkhus, you should abandon desire and lust for whatever is suffering.’...

143 (8) Non-self (1)

... ‘Bhikkhus, you should abandon desire for whatever is non-self.’... [179]

144 (9) Non-self (2)

... ‘Bhikkhus, you should abandon lust for whatever is non-self.’...

145 (10) Non-self (3)

... ‘Bhikkhus, you should abandon desire and lust for whatever is non-self.’...

146 (11) Engrossed in Disenchantment

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, for a clansman who has gone forth out of faith, this is what accords with the Dhamma: he should dwell engrossed in disenchantment with form,²²⁸ engrossed in disenchantment with feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness. One who dwells engrossed in disenchantment with form ... engrossed in disenchantment with consciousness, fully understands form ... fully understands consciousness. One who fully understands form ... consciousness is freed from form, freed from feeling, freed from perception, freed from volitional constructions, freed from consciousness. He is freed from birth, from aging-and-death, from sorrow, from lamentation, from pain, from displeasure, from despair. He is freed from suffering, I say.’

147 (12) Contemplating Impermanence

Setting at Sāvathī.²²⁹ ‘Bhikkhus, for a clansman who has gone forth out of faith, this is what accords with the Dhamma: he should dwell contemplating impermanence in form ... (as above) ... [180] He is freed from suffering, I say.’

148 (13) Contemplating Suffering

... ‘he should dwell contemplating suffering in form ... He is freed from suffering, I say.’

149 (14) Contemplating Non-self

... ‘he should dwell contemplating non-self in form ... He is freed from suffering, I say.’

²²⁸ See 22:39 and n.52.

²²⁹ The next three suttas correspond to 22:40–42. Ee has omitted the text of 22:148, apparently by oversight as the title is correct while the text is that of 22:149. Accordingly, for this chapter all the following sutta numbers in Ee are short by one.

XV. Views

150 (1) Internally

Setting at Sāvaththī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, do pleasure and pain arise internally?’²³⁰ [181]

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, pleasure and pain arise internally. When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, pleasure and pain arise internally.’

‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form permanent or impermanent?’

‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’

‘Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?’

‘Suffering, venerable sir.’

‘But without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could pleasure and pain arise internally?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness permanent or impermanent?... But without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could pleasure and pain arise internally?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

151 (2) This Is Mine

Setting at Sāvaththī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what,²³¹ does one regard things thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self”?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, [182] one regards things thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self.” When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, one regards things thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self.”’

‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form ... consciousness permanent or impermanent?’

‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ ...

‘But without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could one regard anything thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self”?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

152 (3) The Self

Setting at Sāvaththī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “That which is the self is the world: having passed away, that I shall be—permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change”?’²³²

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, such a view as this arises: “That which is the self is the world: having passed away, that I shall be—permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change.” When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, such a view as this [183] arises: “That which is the self is the world ... not subject to change.”’

²³⁰ SA glosses *kiṃ upādāya* with *kiṃ paṭicca*, but a word play is probably involved; see n.146. The double sense would then be that pleasure and pain arise because one clings to the five aggregates with desire and lust, and they arise in dependence on the five aggregates as their support and object.

²³¹ *Kiṃ abhinivissa*. SA: *Kiṃ abhinivisitvā; paccayaṃ katvā ti attho*. SA, it seems, does not see *abhinivissa* as contributing anything more to the meaning than a synonym for *upādāya*, but the question then arises of why it should be added in the case of views but not in the case of ‘pleasure and pain.’ *Abhinivissa* is an absolutive related to the noun *abhinivesa*, ‘adherence,’ which implies an element of interpretation, namely, interpretation of experience through the lens of a wrong view. When this is acknowledged, we can then see that *abhinivissa* suggests the imposition of a cognitive interpretation on the aggregates, which goes beyond the bare conative clinging implied by *upādāya*.

²³² This is the full eternalist view; see 22:81 and n.134.

‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form ... consciousness permanent or impermanent?’

‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ ...

‘But without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could such a view as that arise?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

153 (4) It Would Not Be For Me

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “I might not be, and it might not be for me: I will not be, (and) it will not be for me”?’²³³

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, such a view as this arises: “I might not be, and it might not be for me: I will not be, (and) it will not be for me.” When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... [184] consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, such a view as this arises: “I might not be ... and it will not be for me.”

‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form ... consciousness permanent or impermanent?’

‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ ...

‘But without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could such a view as that arise?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

154 (5) Wrong View

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does wrong view arise?’²³⁴

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, wrong view arises. When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, wrong view arises.

‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form ... consciousness permanent or impermanent?’ [185]

‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ ...

‘But without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could wrong view arise.’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

155 (6) Identity View

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does identity view arise?’²³⁵

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, identity view arises. When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, identity view arises.’ ...

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

156 (7) View of Self

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does view of self arise?’²³⁶

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, view of self arises. [186] When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, view of self arises.’ ...

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

²³³ The annihilationist view; see 22:81, n.75, and n.135.

²³⁴ *Micchādiṭṭhi*. In the Nikāyas usually explained as the nihilist view, e.g., at MN I 287,12–18. For text, see 24:51.

²³⁵ *Sakkāya-diṭṭhi*. See n.5.

²³⁶ *Attānudiṭṭhi*. At Paṭi I 143 defined by the formula for the twenty kinds of identity view.

157 (8) Adherence (1)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, do the fetters, adherences, and shackles arise?’²³⁷

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, the fetters, adherences, and shackles arise. When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, the fetters, adherences, and shackles arise.’...

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’ [187]

158 (9) Adherence (2)

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, do the fetters, adherences, shackles, and holding arise?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’ (*Complete as above.*)

159 (10) Ānanda

Setting at Sāvathī. Then the Venerable Ānanda approached the Blessed One ... and said to him: ‘Venerable sir, it would be good if the Blessed One would teach me the Dhamma in brief, so that having heard the Dhamma from the Blessed One, I might dwell alone, withdrawn, diligent, ardent, and resolute.’²³⁸

‘What do you think, Ānanda, is form permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?’ – ‘Suffering, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self”?’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Is feeling permanent or impermanent?... Is perception permanent or impermanent?... Are volitional constructions permanent or impermanent?... Is consciousness permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?’ – ‘Suffering, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self”?’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Therefore, Ānanda, any kind of form whatsoever, whether past, future, or present.... [188]

‘Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

²³⁷ SṬ explains *adherences* (*abhinivesa*) as craving, conceit, and views, and *shackles* (*vinibandha*) as the mental shackles of not being devoid of lust for form, etc. (see MN I 101,28–102,16). *Holding* (*ajjhosaṇa*), in the next sutta, is defined by SṬ as craving and views.

²³⁸ SA: The Venerable Ānanda had seen other bhikkhus receive from the Buddha a meditation subject based on the five aggregates, attain arahantship, and declare final knowledge in the Teacher’s presence. He thus approached thinking to do the same. The Buddha saw that he would not attain the three higher paths during his own lifetime, but he gave him instructions to satisfy him. Ānanda would attend to it for one or two turns before going to serve the Teacher, and it became one of the factors that matured in his liberation.

Book II
Chapter 23
Connected Discourses with Rādhā
(Rādhā-saṃyutta)

I. The First Māra Chapter

1 (1) Māra

Setting at Sāvattihī. Then the Venerable Rādhā approached the Blessed One,²³⁹ [189] paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “Māra, Māra.” In what way, venerable sir, might Māra be?’²⁴⁰

‘When there is form, Rādhā, there might be Māra, or the killer, or the one who is killed.²⁴¹ Therefore, Rādhā, see form as Māra, see it as the killer, see it as the one who is killed. See it as a disease, as a tumour, as a dart, as misery, as real misery. Those who see it thus see rightly.

‘When there is feeling ... When there is perception ... When there are volitional constructions ... When there is consciousness, Rādhā, there might be Māra, or the killer, or the one who is killed. Therefore, Rādhā, see consciousness as Māra, see it as the killer, see it as the one who is killed. See it as a disease ... as real misery. Those who see it thus see rightly.’

‘What, venerable sir, is the purpose of seeing rightly?’

‘The purpose of seeing rightly, Rādhā, is disenchantment.’

‘And what, venerable sir, is the purpose of disenchantment?’

‘The purpose of disenchantment is dispassion.’

‘And what, venerable sir, is the purpose of dispassion?’

‘The purpose of dispassion is liberation.’

‘And what, venerable sir, is the purpose of liberation?’

‘The purpose of liberation is Nibbāna.’²⁴²

‘And what, venerable sir, is the purpose of Nibbāna?’

‘You have gone beyond the range of questioning, Rādhā.²⁴³ You were not able to grasp the limit to questioning. For, Rādhā, the holy life is lived for the plunge into Nibbāna, with Nibbāna as its destination, Nibbāna as its final goal.’

2 (2) A Being

Setting at Sāvattihī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādhā said to the Blessed One: [190] ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “a being, a being.” In what way, venerable sir, is one called a being?’

‘One is stuck, Rādhā, tightly stuck, in desire, lust, delight, and craving for form: therefore one is called a being.²⁴⁴ One is stuck, tightly stuck, in desire, lust, delight, and craving for feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness: therefore one is called a being.

‘Suppose, Rādhā, some little boys or girls are playing with sand castles. So long as they are not devoid of lust, desire, affection, thirst, passion, and craving for those sand castles, they cherish them, play with them, treasure them,²⁴⁵ and treat them possessively. But when those little boys or girls lose their lust, desire, affection, thirst,

²³⁹ DPPN 2:730 explains that he was a brahmin of Rājagaha who had become a monk in his old age. The Buddha declared him the foremost of those who could inspire ingenuity in others (*etadaggaṃ paṭibhāṇakeyyānam*; AN I 25,15). He has two verses at Th 133–34 (= Dh 13–14). SA: Whenever the Tathāgata saw this elder, a subtle topic occurred to him. Thus the Blessed One taught him the Dhamma in various ways. In this saṃyutta, two chapters have come down by way of questions, a third by way of request, and a fourth by way of intimate discourse (*upanisinnakakathā*, lit. ‘sitting nearby talk’).

²⁴⁰ Here ‘Māra’ is a metaphor for death and the aggregates (*maṛaṇa-māra, khandha-māra*).

²⁴¹ *Māro vā assa māretā vā yo vā pana miyati*. SA glosses *māretā* with *māretabbo*, but the word is clearly an agent noun with an active sense.

²⁴² *Vimutti kho Rādhā nibbānatthā*. SA: This ‘liberation of the fruit’ is for the purpose of Nibbāna without clinging (*phala-vimutti nāṃ’esā anupādānibbānatthā*).

²⁴³ Also at 48:42 (V 218,19–21) and MN I 304,20–22. Be consistently reads the verb as *accayāsi* (aorist of *atiyāti*), Ce as *accasarā* (aorist of *atisarati*). Ee’s *assa* here and *ajjhaparam* below must stem from faulty manuscripts.

²⁴⁴ This reply hinges on a pun between *satta* as the Pāli equivalent of Skt *sattva*, ‘a being,’ and as the past participle of *sajjati* (= Skt *sakta*), ‘attached.’

²⁴⁵ I read *dhanāyanti* with Be and Ce, glossed *dhanam viya maññanti* by SA.

passion, and craving for those sand castles, then they scatter those sand castles with their hands and feet, demolish them, shatter them, and put them out of play.

‘So too, Rādhā, scatter form, demolish it, shatter it, put it out of play: practise for the destruction of craving. Scatter feeling ... Scatter perception ... Scatter volitional constructions ... Scatter consciousness, demolish it, shatter it, put it out of play: practise for the destruction of craving. For the destruction of craving, Rādhā, is Nibbāna.’

3 (3) The Conduit to Becoming

Setting at Sāvaththī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādhā said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “the conduit to becoming, the conduit to becoming.”²⁴⁶ What, venerable sir, is the conduit to becoming, and what is the cessation of the conduit to becoming?’ [191]

‘Rādhā, the desire, lust, delight, craving, engagement and clinging, mental standpoints, adherences, and underlying tendencies regarding form.²⁴⁷ this is called the conduit to becoming. Their cessation is the cessation of the conduit to becoming.

‘The desire, lust, delight, craving, engagement and clinging, mental standpoints, adherences, and underlying tendencies regarding feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness: this is called the conduit to becoming. Their cessation is the cessation of the conduit to becoming.’

4 (4)–10 (10)

(These seven suttas are identical with 22:106–12, but addressed to Rādhā.) [192–94]

II. The Second Māra Chapter

11 (1) Māra

[195] Setting at Sāvaththī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādhā said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “Māra, Māra.” What now, venerable sir, is Māra?’

‘Form, Rādhā, is Māra. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is Māra. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

12 (2) Subject to Māra

Setting at Sāvaththī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādhā said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “subject to Māra, subject to Māra.”²⁴⁸ What now, venerable sir, is subject to Māra?’

‘Form, Rādhā, is subject to Māra. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is subject to Māra. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

13 (3) Impermanent

Setting at Sāvaththī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādhā said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “impermanent, impermanent.” What now, venerable sir, is impermanent?’

‘Form, Rādhā, is impermanent. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is impermanent. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

14 (4) Subject to Impermanence

Setting at Sāvaththī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādhā said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “subject to impermanence, subject to impermanence.” What now, venerable sir, is subject to impermanence?’

‘Form, Rādhā, is subject to impermanence. Feeling ... [196] Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is subject to impermanence. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

15 (5) Suffering

Setting at Sāvaththī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādhā said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “suffering, suffering.” What now, venerable sir, is suffering?’

²⁴⁶ I follow Ce. Be reads *bhavanetti-nirodho* twice, Ee *bhavanetti bhavanetti-nirodho*. *Bhavanetti*, lit. ‘what leads to becoming,’ is glossed *bhavarajju*, ‘rope of becoming,’ by SA. The expression is a synonym of *bhava-taṅhā*, craving for becoming, and often occurs in verse.

²⁴⁷ A partly similar series of terms is met at 12:15. See II,n.31, n.32.

²⁴⁸ *Māradhamma*. SA glosses with *marañadhamma*, ‘subject to death.’

‘Form, Rādhā, is suffering, feeling is suffering, perception is suffering, volitional constructions are suffering, consciousness is suffering. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

16 (6) Subject to Suffering

Setting at Sāvathī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādhā said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “subject to suffering, subject to suffering.” What now, venerable sir, is subject to suffering?’

‘Form, Rādhā, is subject to suffering. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is subject to suffering. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

17 (7) Non-self

Setting at Sāvathī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādhā said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “non-self, non-self.” What now, venerable sir, is non-self?’

‘Form, Rādhā, is non-self, feeling is non-self, perception is non-self, volitional constructions are non-self, consciousness is non-self. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

18 (8) Subject to Selflessness

Setting at Sāvathī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādhā said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “subject to selflessness, subject to selflessness.” What now, venerable sir, is subject to selflessness?’

‘Form, Rādhā, is subject to selflessness. Feeling ... [197] Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is subject to selflessness. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

19 (9) Subject to Destruction

Setting at Sāvathī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādhā said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “subject to destruction, subject to destruction.” What now, venerable sir, is subject to destruction?’

‘Form, Rādhā, is subject to destruction. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is subject to destruction. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

20 (10) Subject to Vanishing

Setting at Sāvathī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādhā said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “subject to vanishing, subject to vanishing.” What now, venerable sir, is subject to vanishing?’

‘Form, Rādhā, is subject to vanishing. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is subject to vanishing. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

21 (11) Subject to Arising

Setting at Sāvathī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādhā said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “subject to arising, subject to arising.” What now, venerable sir, is subject to arising?’

‘Form, Rādhā, is subject to arising. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is subject to arising. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

22 (12) Subject to Cessation

Setting at Sāvathī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādhā said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, it is said, “subject to cessation, [198] subject to cessation.” What now, venerable sir, is subject to cessation?’

‘Form, Rādhā, is subject to cessation. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is subject to cessation. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

III. Request

23 (1) Māra

Setting at Sāvathī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādhā said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, it would be good if the Blessed One would teach me the Dhamma in brief, so that, having heard the Dhamma from the Blessed One, I might dwell alone, withdrawn, diligent, ardent, and resolute.’

‘Rādhā, you should abandon desire, you should abandon lust, you should abandon desire and lust, for whatever is Māra. And what, Rādhā is Māra? Form is Māra. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is Māra. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

24 (2)–34 (12) Subject to Māra, Etc.

... ‘Rādha, you should abandon desire, you should abandon lust, you should abandon desire and lust, for whatever is subject to Māra ... [199] ... for whatever is impermanent ... for whatever is subject to impermanence ... for whatever is suffering ... for whatever is subject to suffering ... for whatever is non-self ... for whatever is subject to selflessness ... for whatever is subject to destruction ... for whatever is subject to perishing ... for whatever is subject to arising ... for whatever is subject to cessation. And what, Rādha is subject to cessation? Form is subject to cessation. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is subject to cessation. Seeing thus ... He understands: “... there is no more for this world.”’

IV. Sitting Nearby**35 (1) Māra**

[200] Setting at Sāvathī. The Blessed One said to the Venerable Rādha as he was sitting to one side: ‘Rādha, you should abandon desire, you should abandon lust, you should abandon desire and lust, for whatever is Māra. And what, Rādha, is Māra?’ ... (*Complete as in §23.*)

36 (2)–46 (12) Subject to Māra, Etc.

(*Identical with §§24–34, but opening as in the preceding sutta.*) [201]

Book III
Chapter 24
Connected Discourses on Views
(Diṭṭhi-samyutta)

I. Stream-entry

1 (1) Winds

[202] Setting at Sāvattḥī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “The winds do not blow, the rivers do not flow, pregnant women do not give birth, the moon and sun do not rise and set but stand as steady as a pillar”?’²⁴⁹

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, such a view as this arises: “The winds do not blow ... but stand as steady as a pillar.” When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, such a view as this arises: “The winds do not blow ... but stand as steady as a pillar.”’

‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form permanent or impermanent?... [203] ... Is consciousness permanent or impermanent?’

‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’...

‘But without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could such a view as that arise?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘That which is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, sought after, and ranged over by the mind:²⁵⁰ is that permanent or impermanent?’

‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’

‘Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?’

‘Suffering, venerable sir.’

‘But without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could such a view as that arise?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple has abandoned perplexity in these six cases,²⁵¹ and when, further, he has abandoned perplexity about suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the way leading to the cessation of suffering, he is then called a noble disciple who is a stream-enterer, no longer bound to the nether world, fixed in destiny, with enlightenment as his destination.’

2 (2) This Is Mine

Setting at Sāvattḥī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self”?’

²⁴⁹ This strange view seems to be a poetic statement of the illusory nature of change. It is a exactly the same as what in Western philosophy is called Platonism. The compound *esikaṭṭhāyitṭhita*, ‘stands as steady as a pillar,’ occurs in the statement of the eternalist views at DN I 14–16 and in the doctrine of the seven bodies just below (24:8; III 211,8). A doctrine holding time and change to be illusory (*avicalita-nityatva*) emerged later in the history of the Ājīvika school and may have been brought into the system from the school of Pakudha Kaccāyana, the propounder of the ‘doctrine of the seven bodies.’ See Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, p.236.

SA: This, it is said, was their view: ‘Although winds blow breaking the branches of trees, etc., these are not (really) winds; they are facsimiles of wind (vātalesā; SṬ: *vātalesā ti vātasadisā*). The wind stands as steady as a pillar and a mountain peak. [SṬ: The phrase ‘as a pillar’ shows its immobility (*niccalabhāva*); ‘a mountain peak,’ its eternality (*sassatisama*).] Similarly with water. Though it is said that pregnant women give birth, the fetuses do not (really) emerge; those are facsimiles of fetuses. Though the sun and moon rise and set, they do not (really) do so; those are facsimiles of the sun and moon, which stand as steady as a pillar and a mountain peak.

²⁵⁰ This is a fourfold classification of all objects. According to SA, *the seen* (*diṭṭha*) is the visible-form base; *the heard* (*suta*), the sound base; *the sensed* (*muta*), the objects of smell, taste, and touch; and *the cognized* (*viññāta*), the other seven bases (i.e., the six internal sense bases and the mental-phenomena base). The words ‘attained, sought after, and ranged over by the mind’ are just an elaboration of the fourth. In the following suttas of this *vagga*, this portion has been elided in the abridgement, but it should be understood in all.

²⁵¹ I read *imesu chasu ṭhānesu*, with Ce and Ee, as against Be’s *imesu ca ṭhānesu*. SA is silent, but it seems the six cases are the impermanence, etc., of the five aggregates and of the tetrad of sense objects taken collectively as one. Cp. MN I 135,34–36, where the tetrad of sense objects actually replaces *viññāṇa* as a basis for wrong views (*diṭṭhiṭṭhāna*).

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’ [204]

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, such a view as this arises: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self.” When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, such a view as this arises: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self.” ...

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple has abandoned perplexity in these six cases ... he is then called a noble disciple who is a stream-enterer ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

3 (3) The Self

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “That which is the self is the world: having passed away, that I shall be—permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change”?’²⁵² [205]

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, such a view as this arises: “That which is the self is the world: having passed away, that I shall be—permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change” When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, such a view as this arises: “That which is the self is the world ... not subject to change.” ...

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple has abandoned perplexity in these six cases ... he is then called a noble disciple who is a stream-enterer ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

4 (4) It Might Not Be For Me

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “I might not be, and it might not be for me: I will not be, (and) it will not be for me”?’²⁵³

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, [206] such a view as this arises: “I might not be, and it might not be for me: I will not be, (and) it will not be for me” When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, such a view as this arises: “I might not be ... it will not be for me.” ...

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple has abandoned perplexity in these six cases ... he is then called a noble disciple who is a stream-enterer ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

5 (5) There Is Not

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise?’²⁵⁴ “There is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing presented in charity: no fruit or result of good and bad actions: no this world, no other world: no mother, no father: no beings who are reborn spontaneously: no good and virtuous recluses and brahmins in the world who, having realized this world and the other world for themselves by direct knowledge, make them known to others. This person consists of the four great elements. [207] When one dies, earth returns to and merges with the body of earth: water returns to and merges with the body of water: fire returns to and merges with the body of fire: air returns to and merges with the body of air: the faculties are transferred to space. (Four) men with the bier as fifth carry away the corpse. The funeral orations last as far as the charnel ground: the bones whiten: burnt offerings end with ashes. Giving is a doctrine of fools. When anyone asserts the doctrine that there is (giving and the like), it is empty, false prattle. Fools and the wise are alike cut off and perish with the breakup of the body: after death they do not exist”?

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, when there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, such a view as this arises: “There is nothing given ... [208] ... after death they do not exist.” ...

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple has abandoned perplexity in these six cases ... he is then called a noble disciple who is a stream-enterer ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

²⁵² As at 22:81; see n.134.

²⁵³ As at 22:81; see n.135.

²⁵⁴ This is the full nihilist doctrine (*natthika-vāda*) [it is a blunder to equate annihilationism with nihilism: look in a standard encyclopaedia/dictionary]. At DN I 55,15–31, it is called annihilationism (*ucchedavāda*) and ascribed to Ajita Kesakambalī. For the commentarial explanation, see Bodhi, *Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship*, pp.77–83.

6 (6) Acting

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise:²⁵⁵ “When one acts or makes others act, when one mutilates or makes others mutilate, when one tortures or makes others inflict torture, when one inflicts sorrow or makes others inflict sorrow, when one oppresses or makes others inflict oppression, when one intimidates or makes others inflict intimidation, when one destroys life, takes what is not given, breaks into houses, plunders wealth, commits burglary, ambushes highways, seduces another’s wife, utters falsehood—no evil is done by the doer. If, with a razor-rimmed wheel, one were to make the living beings of this earth into one mass of flesh, into one heap of flesh, because of this there would be no evil and no outcome of evil. If one were to go along the south bank of the Ganges [209] killing and slaughtering, mutilating and making others mutilate, torturing and making others inflict torture, because of this there would be no evil and no outcome of evil. If one were to go along the north bank of the Ganges giving gifts and making others give gifts, making offerings and making others make offerings, because of this there would be no merit and no outcome of merit. By giving, by taming oneself, by restraint, by speaking truth, there is no merit and no outcome of merit”?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, when there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, such a view as this arises: “When one acts or makes others act ... there is no merit and no outcome of merit.”’ ...

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple has abandoned perplexity in these six cases ... he is then called a noble disciple who is a stream-enterer ... with enlightenment as his destination.’ [210]

7 (7) Cause

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise:²⁵⁶ “There is no cause or condition for the defilement of beings: beings are defiled without cause or condition. There is no cause or condition for the purification of beings: beings are purified without cause or condition. There is no power, no energy, no manly strength, no manly endurance. All beings, all living beings, all creatures, all souls are without mastery, power, and energy: moulded by destiny, circumstance, and nature, they experience pleasure and pain in the six classes”?’²⁵⁷

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, when there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, such a view as this arises: “There is no cause or condition for the defilement of beings ... they experience pleasure and pain in the six classes.”’ ...

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple has abandoned perplexity in these six cases ... [211] ... he is then called a noble disciple who is a stream-enterer ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

8 (8) The Great View

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise:²⁵⁸ “There are these seven bodies that are unmade, not brought forth, uncreated, without a creator, barren, steady as mountain peaks, steady as pillars. They do not move or change or obstruct each other. None is able (to arouse) pleasure or pain or pleasure-and-pain in the others. What are the seven? They are: the earth-body, the water-body, the fire-body, the air-body, pleasure, pain, and the soul as the seventh. These seven bodies are unmade.... [Herein, there is no killer, no slaughterer, no hearer, no speaker, no knower, no intimator.]²⁵⁹ Even one who cuts off another’s head with a sharp sword does not deprive anyone of life: the sword merely passes through

²⁵⁵ The doctrine of the inefficacy of action (*akiriya-vāda*), at DN I 52,21–53,4 ascribed to Pūraṇa Kassapa. See *Fruits of Reclusheship*, pp.69–70.

²⁵⁶ The doctrine of non-causality (*ahetuka-vāda*), at DN I 53,24–28 ascribed to Makkhali Gosāla, but at 22:60 a portion of it is attributed to Pūraṇa Kassapa; see above n.92. For the commentary, see *Fruits of Reclusheship*, pp.70–72. Strict determinism (*niyatīvāda*) is known to have been the main plank of Makkhali’s Ājīvika philosophy, discussed in detail by Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, pp.224–39.

²⁵⁷ The six classes (*chaḷabhijātiyo*)—the black, the blue, the red, the yellow, the white, and the ultimate white—represent stages along the Ājīvika road to perfection; see *Fruits of Reclusheship*, pp.73–75. At AN III 383–84, this scheme is ascribed to Pūraṇa Kassapa, which again shows the connection between the two systems (a point noted by Basham, pp.23–24).

²⁵⁸ At DN I 56,21–34 this doctrine of the seven bodies (*sattakāya-vāda*) is ascribed to Pakudha Kaccāyana.

²⁵⁹ I have imported the sentence in brackets from the DN and MN versions of this view; it seems to have been lost in the SN transmission.

the space between the seven bodies. There are fourteen hundred thousand principal modes of generation,²⁶⁰ and six thousand, and six hundred: there are five hundred kinds of kamma, and five kinds of kamma, and three kinds of kamma, and full kamma, and half-kamma: there are sixty-two pathways, sixty-two sub-aeons, six classes, eight stages in the life of man, forty-nine hundred kinds of Ājīvakas,²⁶¹ forty-nine hundred kinds of wanderers, forty-nine hundred abodes of nāgas, twenty hundred faculties, thirty hundred hells, thirty-six realms of dust, seven spheres of percipient beings, seven spheres of non-percipient beings, seven spheres of knotless ones, seven [212] kinds of devas, seven kinds of human beings, seven kinds of demons, seven great lakes, seven kinds of knots, seven hundred (other) kinds of knots, seven precipices, seven hundred (other) precipices, seven kinds of dreams, seven hundred (other) kinds of dreams, eighty-four hundred thousand great aeons through which the foolish and the wise roam and wander, after which they will alike make an end to suffering. There is none of this: ‘By this virtue or vow or austerity or holy life I will make unripened kamma ripen or eradicated ripened kamma by repeatedly experiencing it’—not so! Pleasure and pain are meted out: saṃsāra’s limits are fixed: there is no shortening it or extending it, no advancing forward or falling back. Just as, when a ball of string is thrown, it runs away unwinding, so too, the foolish and the wise, by unwinding, run away from pleasure and pain?’²⁶²

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, when there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, such a view as this arises: “There are these seven bodies that are unmade ... the foolish and the wise fly forth unwinding to the end of pleasure and pain.”... [213] ...

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple has abandoned perplexity in these six cases ... he is then called a noble disciple who is a stream-enterer ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

9 (9) The World Is Eternal

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “The world is eternal”?’²⁶³

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, when there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, such a view as this arises: “The world is eternal.”... [214] ...

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple has abandoned perplexity in these six cases ... he is then called a noble disciple who is a stream-enterer ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

²⁶⁰ In the DN version, this fantastic cosmology is connected to the doctrine of non-causality and subsumed under the teaching of Makkhali Gosāla, where the whole system is called the doctrine of purity by wandering on (*saṃsārasuddhi*). At MN I 517–18, however, as here, the cosmology is attached to the doctrine of the seven bodies. This dual ascription suggests that the cosmological scheme may have been shared by both systems, and in fact the schools of Makkhali and Pakudha later coalesced to form the southern branch of the Ājīvika school. Basham discusses the different ascriptions at pp.18–23, but treats the cosmology as an integral feature of Makkhali’s system at pp.240–54.

The passage contains a number of anomalous grammatical forms, such as nominatives both singular and plural terminating in *-e*, which are probably vestiges of ancient Māgadhi. Variant readings are common. I have generally translated the passage with the aid of SA, but we must bear in mind that the commentaries are explaining the obscure terms at double remove: first, from the outside perspective of the Buddhist community (which may already have been acquainted with a distorted version of the doctrine), and then from the additional distance of the centuries that separated the commentators from the period when the views were current. Often the commentary is obviously engaging in conjecture, and sometimes is clearly wrong. For a translation of the full commentary, see *Fruits of Recluseship*, pp.72–77, and for a critical assessment, see Basham’s discussion of the passage at pp.240–54.

²⁶¹ Here I part with SA, which glosses *ājīvaka* with *ājīvavutti*, ‘means of livelihood.’

²⁶² *Bāle ca paṇḍite ca nibbeṭṭhiyamānā sukhadukkhaṃ paleti*. SA: Starting from a mountain top or a tree top, a ball of thread goes along unwinding for the length of the thread; then, when the thread is finished, it stops right there and goes no further. Just so, fools and the wise run away from pleasure and pain ‘unwinding’ by way of time. They do not exceed the aforesaid time.

The versions at DN I 54,20–21 and MN I 518,14–15 read: *bāle ca paṇḍite ca sandhāvitvā saṃsaritvā dukkhass’antaṃ karissanti*; ‘the foolish and the wise, having roamed and wandered on, will make an end of suffering.’ Note in both versions the nominative plurals terminating in *-e*.

²⁶³ The next ten suttas are each devoted to one of the ten ‘undeclared points,’ also dealt with from still different angles in SN 33 and 44.

10 (10) The World Is Not Eternal

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “The world is not eternal”?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

11 (11) Finite

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “The world is finite”?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple ... with enlightenment as his destination.’ [215]

12 (12) The World Is Infinite

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “The world is infinite”?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

13 (13) Soul and Body Are the Same

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “The soul and the body are the same”?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

14 (14) Soul and Body Are Different

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “The soul is one thing, the body another”?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

15 (15) The Tathāgata Exists

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “The Tathāgata exists after death”?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

16 (16) The Tathāgata Does Not Exist

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “The Tathāgata does not exist after death”?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

17 (17) The Tathāgata Both Exists and Does Not Exist

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, [216] by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “The Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death”?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

18 (18) The Tathāgata Neither Exists Nor Does Not Exist

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death”?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, such a view as this arises: “The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death.” When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, such a view as this arises: “The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death.”

‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form ... consciousness permanent or impermanent?’

‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’...

‘But without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could such a view as that arise?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘That which is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, sought after, and ranged over by the mind: is that permanent or impermanent?’

‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’

‘Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?’

‘Suffering, venerable sir.’

‘But without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could such a view as that arise?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘When, bhikkhus, a noble disciple has abandoned perplexity in these six cases, and when, further, he has abandoned perplexity about suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the way leading to the cessation of suffering, he is then called a noble disciple who is a stream-enterer, no longer bound to the nether world, fixed in destiny, with enlightenment as his destination.’ [217]

II. The Second Round²⁶⁴

19 (1) Winds

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “The winds do not blow, the rivers do not flow, pregnant women do not give birth, the moon and sun do not rise and set but stand as steady as a pillar”?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, such a view as this arises: “The winds do not blow ... (everything) stands as steady as a pillar.” When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, such a view as this arises: “The winds do not blow ... but stand as steady as a pillar.”

‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form ... [218] ... consciousness permanent or impermanent?’

‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’...

‘But without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could such a view as that arise?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Thus, bhikkhus, when there is suffering, it is by clinging to suffering, by adhering to suffering,²⁶⁵ that such a view as this arises: “The winds do not blow ... but stand as steady as a pillar.”’

20 (2)–36 (18)

(These suttas repeat the views of 24:2–18, but modelled on the preceding sutta.)

37 (19) A Self Made of Form

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what is present ... [219] ... does such a view as this arise: “The self is made of form and is unimpaired after death”?’...²⁶⁶

38 (20) A Formless Self

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what is present ... does such a view as this arise: “The self is formless and is unimpaired after death”?’...

²⁶⁴ I translate from the titles of the next three chapters as in Be: *dutiya-gamana-vagga*, *tatiya-gamana-vagga*, *catutthaga-mana-vagga*. In Ce, the third and fourth chapters are similarly named, but the second is called *gamana-vagga*. In Ee, the title *purimagamana* is applied to the first eighteen suttas of this chapter, and *dutiya-gamana* to the second eighteen; the third and fourth chapters are named as in the other eds.

²⁶⁵ This is said because the five aggregates are *dukkha*.

²⁶⁶ The next eight views are various types of eternalism with regard to the after-death condition of the self. SA: The view of a *self made of form* arises from taking the object alone [SṬ: the *kaṣiṇa*] as self; a *formless self*, from taking the *jhāna* as self; the syncretic view, from taking both object and *jhāna* as self; the double negation, from mere reasoning (*takkamattena*). The view of the self as *exclusively happy* arises in the meditator, the rationalist, and those who remember past births. The same for those who view the self as *exclusively miserable*, etc.

39 (21) A Self Both Made of Form and Formless

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what is present ... does such a view as this arise: “The self is both made of form and formless and is unimpaired after death”?’ ...

40 (22) A Self Neither Made of Form nor Formless

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what is present ... does such a view as this arise: “The self is neither made of form nor formless and is unimpaired after death”?’ ...

41 (23) Exclusively Happy

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what is present ... does such a view as this arise: “The self is exclusively happy, unimpaired after death”?’ ... [220]

42 (24) Exclusively Miserable

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what is present ... does such a view as this arise: “The self is exclusively miserable, unimpaired after death”?’ ...

43 (25) Both Happy and Miserable

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what is present ... does such a view as this arise: “The self is both happy and miserable, unimpaired after death”?’ ...

44 (26) Neither Happy nor Miserable

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what is present ... does such a view as this arise: “The self is neither happy nor miserable, unimpaired after death”?’ ...

III. The Third Round**45 (1) Winds**

[221] Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “The winds do not blow, the rivers do not flow, pregnant women do not give birth, the moon and sun do not rise and set but stand as steady as a pillar”?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, such a view as this arises: “The winds do not blow ... (everything) stands as steady as a pillar.” When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, such a view as this arises: “The winds do not blow ... but stand as steady as a pillar.”

‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form ... consciousness permanent or impermanent?’

‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ ...

‘But without clinging to what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change, could such a view as that arise?’

‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Thus, bhikkhus, whatever is impermanent is suffering. When that is present, it is by clinging to that, that such a view as this arises:²⁶⁷ “The winds do not blow ... but stand as steady as a pillar.”’

46 (2)–70 (26) This Is Mine, Etc.

(These suttas repeat the views expressed in the preceding section, modelled on the above paradigm.) [222]

IV. The Fourth Round**71 (1) Winds**

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, when what exists, by clinging to what, by adhering to what, does such a view as this arise: “The winds do not blow, the rivers do not [223] flow, pregnant women do not give birth, the moon and sun do not rise and set but stand as steady as a pillar”?’

‘Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One....’

²⁶⁷ This paragraph distinguishes the suttas of this round from those of the preceding rounds. Similarly, the fourth round is distinguished simply by the concluding argument.

‘When there is form, bhikkhus, by clinging to form, by adhering to form, such a view as this arises: “The winds do not blow ... (everything) stands as steady as a pillar.” When there is feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, by clinging to consciousness, by adhering to consciousness, such a view as this arises: “The winds do not blow ... but stand as steady as a pillar.”

‘What do you think, bhikkhus, is form ... feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness permanent or impermanent?’ – ‘Impermanent, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness?’ – ‘Suffering, venerable sir.’ – ‘Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: “This is mine, this I am, this is my self”?’ – ‘No, venerable sir.’

‘Therefore, bhikkhus, any kind of form whatsoever ... Any kind of feeling whatsoever ... Any kind of perception whatsoever ... Any kind of volitional constructions whatsoever ... Any kind of consciousness whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near—all consciousness should be seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.”

‘Seeing thus, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple becomes disenchanted with form, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with volitional constructions, disenchanted with consciousness. Being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion (his mind) is liberated. When it is liberated there comes the knowledge: “It’s liberated.” He understands: “Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this world.”’

72 (2)–96 (26) This Is Mine, Etc.

(These suttas repeat the views expressed in The Second Round, modelled on the above paradigm.) [224]

Book IV
Chapter 25
Connected Discourses on Entering
(Okkanti-samyutta)

1 The Eye

[225] Setting at Sāvattihī. ‘Bhikkhus, the eye is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. The ear ... The nose ... The tongue ... The body ... The mind is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. One who places faith in these teachings and resolves on them thus is called a faith-follower, one who has entered the fixed course of rightness, entered the plane of superior persons, transcended the plane of the worldlings. He is incapable of doing any deed by reason of which he might be reborn in hell, in the animal realm, or in the sphere of ghosts: he is incapable of passing away without having realized the fruit of stream-entry.’²⁶⁸

‘One for whom these teachings are accepted thus after being pondered to a sufficient degree with wisdom is called a Dhamma-follower,²⁶⁹ one who has entered the fixed course of rightness, entered the plane of superior persons, transcended the plane of the worldlings. He is incapable of doing any deed by reason of which he might be reborn in hell, in the animal realm, or in the sphere of ghosts: he is incapable of passing away without having realized the fruit of stream-entry.

‘One who knows and sees these teachings thus is called a stream-enterer, no longer bound to the nether world, fixed in destiny, with enlightenment as his destination.’²⁷⁰

2 Forms

Setting at Sāvattihī. ‘Bhikkhus, forms are impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Sounds ... Odours ... Tastes ... Tactile objects ... Mental phenomena are impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. [226] One who places faith in these teachings and resolves on them thus is called a faith-follower, one who has entered the fixed course of rightness...: he is incapable of passing away without having realized the fruit of stream-entry.

‘One for whom these teachings are accepted thus after being pondered to a sufficient degree with wisdom is called a Dhamma-follower, one who has entered the fixed course of rightness...: he is incapable of passing away without having realized the fruit of stream-entry.

²⁶⁸ The faith-follower (*saddhānusārī*) and the Dhamma-follower (*dhammānusārī*), described just below, are the two classes of disciples who are practising for realization of the fruit of stream-entry. The two are the lowest ranking members of a comprehensive sevenfold typology of noble disciples found, with formal definitions, at MN I 477–79. The seven types are also defined, somewhat differently, at Pug 14–15 (§§30–36) and at Vism 659–60 (PP 21:74–78). The faith-follower and the Dhamma-follower are also distinguished at 55:24 (V 377,8–23), though the terms themselves are not used there. At 48:12-17 they come at the end of the more usual list of noble persons, in place of the one practising for the realization of the fruit of stream-entry, and here the faith-follower is placed below the Dhamma-follower for the reason that his faculties are weaker.

Briefly, the faith-follower and the Dhamma-follower differ with regard to their dominant faculty: the former relies on faith as the vehicle of progress, the latter on wisdom. When they attain the fruit of stream-entry, the former becomes ‘one liberated by faith’ (*saddhāvimutta*; see MN I 478,29–34), the latter ‘one attained by view’ (*ditṭhippatta*; see MN I 478,18–23).

According to the Abhidhamma system, with its conception of the supramundane path as lasting for but a single mind-moment, both the faith-follower and the Dhamma-follower should be such for only the one mind-moment of the path. This interpretation, however, though advocated by the commentaries, is difficult to reconcile with the Nikāyas. For an interesting discussion of the two models, see Gethin, *The Buddhist Path of Awakening*, pp.129–33.

SA explains ‘the fixed course of rightness’ (*sammatta-niyāma*) as the noble path (*ariyamagga*). On the clause, ‘he is incapable of passing away without having realized the fruit of stream-entry,’ SA says that once the path has arisen there can be no obstruction to the fruit. It quotes Pug 13 (§20): ‘Should this person be one practising for the realization of the fruit of stream-entry, and should it be the time when the aeon is to burn up, the aeon will not burn up until that person realizes the fruit of stream-entry.’

²⁶⁹ On the Dhamma-follower, see the preceding note. The commentaries do not clarify the syntax of the expression *ime dhammā evaṃ paññāya mattaso nijjhānaṃ khamanti*, but I understand *nijjhānaṃ* as an accusative functioning in an ablative sense.

SA: *Mattaso nijjhānaṃ khamantī ti pamānato olokanam khamanti*; ‘Accepted after being pondered to a sufficient degree’: accepted in measure (through) examination. ST: *Olokanan ti saccābhisamayasaṅkhātāṃ dassanam; khamanti sahanti, ñayanī ti attho*; ‘Examination’: vision consisting in the breakthrough to the truths. ‘Accepted’: consented to, meaning ‘are known.’

²⁷⁰ This statement makes it clear how the stream-enterer differs from those on the way to stream-entry. The faith-follower accepts the teachings on trust (with a limited degree of understanding), the Dhamma-follower through investigation, but the stream-enterer has *known and seen* the teachings directly. I read with Ce: *evaṃ jānāti evaṃ passati*.

‘One who knows and sees these teachings thus is called a stream-enterer, no longer bound to the nether world, fixed in destiny, with enlightenment as his destination.’

3 Consciousness

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, eye-consciousness is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Ear-consciousness ... Nose-consciousness ... Tongue-consciousness ... Body-consciousness ... Mind-consciousness is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. One who ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

4 Contact

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, eye-contact is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Ear-contact ... Nose-contact ... Tongue-contact ... Body-contact ... Mind-contact is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. One who ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

5 Feeling

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, feeling born of eye-contact is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Feeling born of ear-contact ... Feeling born of nose-contact ... Feeling born of tongue-contact ... Feeling born of body-contact ... Feeling born of mind-contact is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. One who ... with enlightenment as his destination.’ [227]

6 Perception

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, perception of forms is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Perception of sounds ... Perception of odours ... Perception of tastes ... Perception of tactile objects ... Perception of mental phenomena is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. One who ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

7 Volition

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, volition regarding forms is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Volition regarding sounds ... Volition regarding odours ... Volition regarding tastes ... Volition regarding tactile objects ... Volition regarding mental phenomena is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. One who ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

8 Craving

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, craving for forms is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Craving for sounds ... Craving for odours ... Craving for tastes ... Craving for tactile objects ... Craving for mental phenomena is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. One who ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

9 Elements

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, the earth element is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. The water element ... The heat element ... The air element ... The space element ... The consciousness element is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise.’²⁷¹ One who ... with enlightenment as his destination.’

10 Aggregates

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, form is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Feeling ... Perception ... Volitional constructions ... Consciousness is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. One who places faith in these teachings and resolves on them thus is called a faith-follower, one who has entered the fixed course of rightness, [228] entered the plane of superior persons, transcended the plane of the worldlings. He is incapable of doing any deed by reason of which he might be reborn in hell, in the animal realm, or in the sphere of ghosts: he is incapable of passing away without having realized the fruit of stream-entry.

‘One for whom these teachings are accepted thus after being pondered to a sufficient degree with wisdom is called a Dhamma-follower, one who has entered the fixed course of rightness, entered the plane of superior persons, transcended the plane of the worldlings. He is incapable of doing any deed by reason of which he might be reborn in hell, in the animal realm, or in the sphere of ghosts: he is incapable of passing away without having realized the fruit of stream-entry.

²⁷¹ *Viññāna-dhātu* is missing in Ee, but found in Be and Ce.

‘One who knows and sees these teachings thus is called a stream-enterer, no longer bound to the nether world, fixed in destiny, with enlightenment as his destination.’

Book V
Chapter 26
Connected Discourses on Arising
(Uppāda-samyutta)

1 The Eye

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, the arising, continuation, production, and manifestation of the eye is the arising of suffering, the continuation of disease, the manifestation of aging-and-death.²⁷² The arising, continuation, production, and manifestation of the ear ... of the nose ... of the tongue ... of the body ... of the mind [229] is the arising of suffering, the continuation of disease, the manifestation of aging-and-death.

‘The cessation, subsiding, and passing away of the eye ... the mind is the cessation of suffering, the subsiding of disease, the passing away of aging-and-death.’

2 Forms

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, the arising, continuation, production, and manifestation of forms ... of sounds ... of odours ... of tastes ... of tactile objects ... of mental phenomena is the arising of suffering, the continuation of disease, the manifestation of aging-and-death.

‘The cessation, subsiding, and passing away of forms ... of mental phenomena is the cessation of suffering, the subsiding of disease, the passing away of aging-and-death.’

3 Eye-consciousness

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, the arising, continuation, production, and manifestation of eye-consciousness ... of mind-consciousness is the arising of suffering, the continuation of disease, the manifestation of aging-and-death.

‘The cessation, subsiding, and passing away of eye-consciousness ... of mind-consciousness is the cessation of suffering, the subsiding of disease, the passing away of aging-and-death.’ [230]

4 Contact

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, the arising, continuation, production, and manifestation of eye-contact ... of mind-contact is the arising of suffering, the continuation of disease, the manifestation of aging-and-death.

‘The cessation, subsiding, and passing away of eye-contact ... of mind-contact is the cessation of suffering, the subsiding of disease, the passing away of aging-and-death.’

5 Feeling

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, the arising, continuation, production, and manifestation of feeling born of eye-contact ... of feeling born of mind-contact is the arising of suffering, the continuation of disease, the manifestation of aging-and-death.

‘The cessation, subsiding, and passing away of feeling born of eye-contact ... of feeling born of mind-contact is the cessation of suffering, the subsiding of disease, the passing away of aging-and-death.’

6 Perception

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, the arising, continuation, production, and manifestation of perception of forms ... of perception of mental phenomena is the arising of suffering, the continuation of disease, the manifestation of aging-and-death.

‘The cessation, subsiding, and passing away of perception of forms ... of perception of mental phenomena is the cessation of suffering, the subsiding of disease, the passing away of aging-and-death.’

7 Volition

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, the arising, continuation, production, and manifestation of volition regarding forms ... of volition regarding mental phenomena is the arising of suffering, the continuation of disease, the manifestation of aging-and-death.

‘The cessation, subsiding, and passing away of volition regarding forms ... of volition regarding mental phenomena is the cessation of suffering, the subsiding of disease, the passing away of aging-and-death.’

²⁷² This is a template, to be filled in with the same content as in the preceding chapter.

8 Craving

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, the arising, continuation, production, and manifestation of craving for forms ... of craving for mental phenomena is the arising of suffering, the continuation of disease, the manifestation of aging-and-death. [231]

‘The cessation, subsiding, and passing away of craving for forms ... of craving for mental phenomena is the cessation of suffering, the subsiding of disease, the passing away of aging-and-death.’

9 Elements

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, the arising, continuation, production, and manifestation of the earth element ... of the water element ... of the heat element ... of the air element ... of the space element ... of the consciousness element is the arising of suffering, the continuation of disease, the manifestation of aging-and-death.

‘The cessation, subsiding, and passing away of the earth element ... of the consciousness element is the cessation of suffering, the subsiding of disease, the passing away of aging-and-death.’

10 Aggregates

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, the arising, continuation, production, and manifestation of form ... of feeling ... of perception ... of volitional constructions ... of consciousness is the arising of suffering, the continuation of disease, the manifestation of aging-and-death.

‘The cessation, subsiding, and passing away of form ... of consciousness is the cessation of suffering, the subsiding of disease, the passing away of aging-and-death.’

Book VI
Chapter 27
Connected Discourses on Defilements
(Kilesa-saṃyutta)

1 The Eye

[232] Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, desire and lust for the eye is a defilement of the mind.²⁷³ Desire and lust for the ear ... for the nose ... for the tongue ... for the body ... for the mind is a defilement of the mind. When a bhikkhu has abandoned the mental defilement in these six cases, his mind inclines to renunciation. A mind fortified by renunciation becomes wieldy in regard to those things that are to be realized by direct knowledge.’²⁷⁴

2 Forms

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, desire and lust for forms is a defilement of the mind. Desire and lust for sounds ... for odours ... for tastes ... for tactile objects ... for mental phenomena is a defilement of the mind. When a bhikkhu has abandoned the mental defilement in these six cases, his mind inclines to renunciation. A mind fortified by renunciation becomes wieldy in regard to those things that are to be realized by direct knowledge.’

3 Consciousness

‘Bhikkhus, desire and lust for eye-consciousness ... for mind-consciousness is a defilement of the mind. When a bhikkhu has abandoned the mental defilement in these six cases ... [233] ... in regard to those things that are to be realized by direct knowledge.’

4 Contact

‘Bhikkhus, desire and lust for eye-contact ... for mind-contact is a defilement of the mind. When a bhikkhu has abandoned the mental defilement in these six cases ... in regard to those things that are to be realized by direct knowledge.’

5 Feeling

‘Bhikkhus, desire and lust for feeling born of eye-contact ... for feeling born of mind-contact is a defilement of the mind. When a bhikkhu has abandoned the mental defilement in these six cases ... in regard to those things that are to be realized by direct knowledge.’

6 Perception

‘Bhikkhus, desire and lust for perception of forms ... for perception of mental phenomena is a defilement of the mind. When a bhikkhu has abandoned the mental defilement in these six cases ... in regard to those things that are to be realized by direct knowledge.’

7 Volition

‘Bhikkhus, desire and lust for volition regarding forms ... [234] ... for volition regarding mental phenomena is a defilement of the mind. When a bhikkhu has abandoned the mental defilement in these six cases ... in regard to those things that are to be realized by direct knowledge.’

8 Craving

‘Bhikkhus, desire and lust for craving for forms ... for craving for mental phenomena is a defilement of the mind. When a bhikkhu has abandoned the mental defilement in these six cases ... in regard to those things that are to be realized by direct knowledge.’

²⁷³ *Cittass’eso upakkilesa*. SA: A defilement of what mind? The mind of the four planes. Admittedly, it is so for the mind of the three (mundane) planes, but how is it a defilement of the supramundane mind? By obstructing its arising. For it is a defilement because it does not allow that mind to arise.

²⁷⁴ SA: *His mind inclines to renunciation (nekkhammaninnaṃ c’assa cittaṃ hoti)*: The mind of serenity and insight inclines to the nine supramundane states. *Those things to be realized by direct knowledge (abhiññā sacchikaraṇīyesu dhammesu)*: the things pertaining to the six direct knowledges. SA does not gloss the verb *khāyati*, lit. ‘appears.’

9 Elements

‘Bhikkhus, desire and lust for the earth element for the water element ... for the heat element ... for the air element ... for the space element ... for the consciousness element is a defilement of the mind. When a bhikkhu has abandoned the mental defilement in these six cases ... in regard to those things that are to be realized by direct knowledge.’

10 Aggregates

‘Bhikkhus, desire and lust for form ... for feeling ... for perception ... for volitional constructions ... for consciousness is a defilement of the mind. When a bhikkhu has abandoned the mental defilement in these five cases, his mind inclines to renunciation. A mind fortified by renunciation becomes wieldy in regard to those things that are to be realized by direct knowledge.’

Book VII

Chapter 28

Connected Discourses with Sāriputta (Sāriputta-samyutta)

1 Born of Seclusion

[235] On one occasion the Venerable Sāriputta was dwelling at Sāvattthī in Jeta's Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika's Park. Then, in the morning, the Venerable Sāriputta dressed and, taking bowl and robe, entered Sāvattthī for alms. Then, when he had walked for alms in Sāvattthī and had returned from the alms round, after his meal he went to the Blind Men's Grove for the day's abiding. Having plunged into the Blind Men's Grove, he sat down at the foot of a tree for the day's abiding.

Then, in the evening, the Venerable Sāriputta emerged from seclusion and went to Jeta's Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika's Park. The Venerable Ānanda saw the Venerable Sāriputta coming in the distance and said to him: 'Friend Sāriputta, your faculties are serene, your facial complexion is pure and bright. In what dwelling has the Venerable Sāriputta spent the day?'²⁷⁵

'Here, friend, secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, I entered and dwelt in the first jhāna, which is accompanied by thought and examination, with rapture and happiness born of seclusion. Yet, friend, it did not occur to me, "I am attaining the first jhāna," or "I have attained the first jhāna," or "I have emerged from the first jhāna."' [236]

'It must be because I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit have been thoroughly uprooted in the Venerable Sāriputta for a long time that such thoughts did not occur to him.'²⁷⁶

2 Without Thought

Setting at Sāvattthī... (*as above*) ... The Venerable Ānanda saw the Venerable Sāriputta coming in the distance and said to him: 'Friend Sāriputta, your faculties are serene, your complexion is pure and bright. In what dwelling has the Venerable Sāriputta spent the day?'

'Here, friend, with the subsiding of thought and examination, I entered and dwelt in the second jhāna, which has internal confidence and unification of mind, is without thought and examination, and has rapture and happiness born of concentration. Yet, friend, it did not occur to me, "I am attaining the second jhāna," or "I have attained the second jhāna," or "I have emerged from the second jhāna."'

'It must be because I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit have been thoroughly uprooted in the Venerable Sāriputta for a long time that such thoughts did not occur to him.'

3 Rapture

Setting at Sāvattthī... The Venerable Ānanda saw the Venerable Sāriputta coming in the distance....

'Here, friend, with the fading away as well of rapture, I dwelt equanimous and, mindful and clearly comprehending, I experienced happiness with the body: I entered and dwelt in the third jhāna of which the noble ones declare: "He is equanimous, mindful, one who dwells happily." [237] Yet, friend, it did not occur to me....' (*Complete as in preceding sutta.*)

4 Equanimity

Setting at Sāvattthī... The Venerable Ānanda saw the Venerable Sāriputta coming in the distance....

'Here, friend, with the abandoning of pleasure and pain, and with the previous passing away of joy and displeasure, I entered and dwelt in the fourth jhāna, which is neither painful nor pleasant and includes the purification of mindfulness by equanimity. Yet, friend, it did not occur to me....'

5 The Base of the Infinity of Space

Setting at Sāvattthī... The Venerable Ānanda saw the Venerable Sāriputta coming in the distance....

'Here, friend, with the complete transcendence of perceptions of forms, with the passing away of perceptions of sensory impingement, with non-attention to perceptions of diversity, aware that "space is infinite," I entered and dwelt in the base of the infinity of space.' ...

²⁷⁵ As at 21:3. See I,n.18.

²⁷⁶ See II,n.334.

6 The Base of the Infinity of Consciousness

Setting at Sāvathī.... The Venerable Ānanda saw the Venerable Sāriputta coming in the distance....

‘Here, friend, by completely transcending the base of the infinity of space, aware that “consciousness is infinite,” I entered and dwelt in the base of the infinity of consciousness.’...

7 The Base of Nothingness

Setting at Sāvathī.... The Venerable Ānanda saw the Venerable Sāriputta coming in the distance....

‘Here, friend, by completely transcending the base of the infinity of consciousness, aware that “there is nothing,” I entered and dwelt in the base of nothingness.’... [238]

8 The Base of Neither-perception-nor-non-perception

Setting at Sāvathī.... The Venerable Ānanda saw the Venerable Sāriputta coming in the distance....

‘Here, friend, by completely transcending the base of nothingness, I entered and dwelt in the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception.’...

9 The Attainment of Cessation

Setting at Sāvathī.... The Venerable Ānanda saw the Venerable Sāriputta coming in the distance....

‘Here, friend, by completely transcending the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, I entered and dwelt in the cessation of perception and feeling. Yet, friend, it did not occur to me, “I am attaining the cessation of perception and feeling,” or “I have attained the cessation of perception and feeling,” or “I have emerged from the cessation of perception and feeling.”’

‘It must be because I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit have been thoroughly uprooted in the Venerable Sāriputta for a long time that such thoughts did not occur to him.’

10 Sucimukhī

On one occasion the Venerable Sāriputta was dwelling at Rājagaha in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrel Sanctuary. Then, in the morning, the Venerable Sāriputta dressed and, taking bowl and robe, entered Rājagaha for alms. Then, when he had walked for alms on continuous alms round in Rājagaha,²⁷⁷ he ate that almsfood leaning against a certain wall.

Then the female wanderer Sucimukhī approached the Venerable Sāriputta and said to him: ‘Recluse, do you eat facing downwards?’²⁷⁸

‘I don’t eat facing downwards, sister.’

‘Then, recluse, do you eat facing upwards?’

‘I don’t eat facing upwards, sister.’ [239]

‘Then, recluse, do you eat facing the (four) quarters?’²⁷⁹

‘I don’t eat facing the (four) quarters, sister.’

‘Then, recluse, do you eat facing the intermediate directions?’

‘I don’t eat facing the intermediate directions, sister.’

‘When you are asked, “Recluse, do you eat facing downwards?”... “Do you eat facing the intermediate directions?” you reply, “I don’t eat thus, sister.” How then do you eat, recluse?’

‘Sister, those recluses and brahmins who earn their living by the debased art of geomancy²⁸⁰—a wrong means of livelihood—these are called recluses and brahmins who eat facing downwards. Those recluses and brahmins who earn their living by the debased art of astrology²⁸¹—a wrong means of livelihood—these are called recluses and brahmins who eat facing upwards. Those recluses and brahmins who earn their living by undertaking to go on errands and run messages²⁸²—a wrong means of livelihood—these are called recluses and brahmins who eat facing

²⁷⁷ See I,n.377.

²⁷⁸ Her name means ‘Pure Face.’ SA explains that she approached the elder intending to mock him with her questions and to instigate a debate. Each question and reply has an implicit meaning which is elicited just below.

²⁷⁹ *Disāmukha*. SA: *Catasso disā olokeno ti attho*.

²⁸⁰ *Vatthuvijjā*, the science of sites, included among the types of wrong livelihood for ascetics at DN I 9,7. SA explains it as the means of determining whether a site will be suitable for agricultural cultivation, but DA I 93,27 as the science of determining the virtues and faults of sites selected for homes and monasteries, etc., including the protective charms to be recited over them.

²⁸¹ *Nakkhattavijjā*. See DN I 10,10–31 for more detailed treatment.

²⁸² *Dūteyya-pahiṇagamanānuyoga*. See DN I 8,20–25.

the (four) quarters. Those recluses and brahmins who earn their living by the debased art of palmistry²⁸³—a wrong means of livelihood—these are called recluses and brahmins who eat facing the intermediate directions.

‘Sister, I do not earn my living by such wrong means of livelihood as the debased art of geomancy, or the debased art of astrology, or by undertaking to go on errands and run messages, or by the debased art of palmistry. I seek almsfood righteously and, having sought it, I eat my almsfood righteously.’ [240]

Then the female wanderer Sucimukhī went from street to street and from square to square in Rājagaha announcing: ‘The recluses who are followers of the Sakyan scion eat righteous food : they eat blameless food . Give almsfood to the recluses who are followers of the Sakyan scion.’

²⁸³ *Āṅgavijjā*, mentioned also at DN I 9,7. SA explains as the science of determining a person’s future from his or her bodily features. ‘Palmistry’ is certainly too narrow, but we don’t have another simple English word that captures the sense.

Book VIII
Chapter 29
Connected Discourses on Nāgas
(Nāga-saṃyutta)

1 Simple Version

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these four modes of generation of nāgas.²⁸⁴ What four? Nāgas born from eggs, nāgas born from the womb, nāgas born from moisture, nāgas of spontaneous birth. These are the four modes of generation of nāgas.’

2 Superior

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these four modes of generation of nāgas.... [241]

‘Therein, bhikkhus, nāgas born from the womb, from moisture, and born spontaneously are superior to nāgas born from eggs. Nāgas born from moisture and born spontaneously are superior to nāgas born from eggs and from the womb. Nāgas born spontaneously are superior to nāgas born from eggs, from the womb, and from moisture.

‘These, bhikkhus, are the four modes of generation of nāgas.’

3 The Uposatha (1)

Setting at Sāvattthī. Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him: ‘Venerable sir, what is the cause and reason why some egg-born nāgas here observe the Uposatha and relinquish (concern for) their bodies?’²⁸⁵

‘Here, bhikkhus, some egg-born nāgas think thus: “In the past we acted ambivalently with the body, ambivalently with speech, ambivalently with the mind.²⁸⁶ Having done so, with the breakup of the body, after death, we were reborn in the company of egg-born nāgas. If today we practise good conduct with the body, good conduct with speech, and good conduct with the mind, then with the breakup of the body, after death, we shall be reborn in a happy destination, in a heavenly world. Come now, let us practise good conduct with the body, speech, and mind.”

‘This, bhikkhu, is the cause and reason why some egg-born nāgas here observe the Uposatha and relinquish their bodies.’ [242]

4–6 The Uposatha (2–4)

(The same is repeated for the other three types of nāgas.) [243]

7 He Has Heard (1)

Setting at Sāvattthī.... Sitting to one side, that bhikkhu said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, what is the cause and reason why someone here, with the breakup of the body, after death, is reborn in the company of egg-born nāgas?’

‘Here, bhikkhu, someone acts ambivalently with the body, ambivalently with speech, ambivalently with the mind. He has heard: “Egg-born nāgas are long-lived, beautiful, and abound in happiness.” He thinks: “Oh, with the breakup of the body, after death, may I be reborn in the company of egg-born nāgas!” Then, with the breakup of the body, after death, he is reborn in the company of egg-born nāgas.

‘This, bhikkhus, is the cause and reason why someone here, with the breakup of the body, after death, is reborn in the company of egg-born nāgas.’

²⁸⁴ On the nāgas and the supernatural beings featured in the next three chapters, see Introduction, pp.???. The four modes of generation (*yoni*) are intended to comprise all sentient beings; see MN I 73,3–15. According to SA, the Buddha spoke this sutta in order to rescue these bhikkhus from the nāga modes of generation (*nāgayonīhi uddharanattam*; or Ce: *ukkaṇṭhanattam*, to make them fed up with the nāga modes of generation).

²⁸⁵ *Uposatham upavasanti vossatṭhakāyā ca bhavanti*. According to Buddhist folklore, the nāgas can undertake the precepts of virtue on the Uposatha days (see **I,n.513**), and may even resolve to keep the precepts at the cost of their lives. The classic illustration of this is the Campeyya Jātaka (No. 506), in which the Bodhisatta, reborn as a nāga-king, adheres to the Uposatha precepts even when cruelly tormented by a snake-charmer. SṬ: ‘Relinquish their bodies’: as they are determined to maintain the precepts, they have given up their bodies with a mind of unconcern, thinking, ‘Let those who have need of my skin, blood, or bones take it all.’

²⁸⁶ SA glosses *dvayakārino* with *duvidhakārino*, and explains that they do both wholesome and unwholesome deeds.

8–10 He Has Heard (2–4)

(These three suttas repeat the same for the other three types of nāgas.) [244]

11–20 With the Support of Giving (1)

Sitting to one side, that bhikkhu said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, what is the cause and reason why [245] someone here, with the breakup of the body, after death, is reborn in the company of egg-born nāgas?’

‘Here, bhikkhu, someone acts ambivalently with the body, ambivalently with speech, ambivalently with the mind. He has heard: “Egg-born nāgas are long-lived, beautiful, and abound in happiness.” He thinks: “Oh, with the breakup of the body, after death, may I be reborn in the company of egg-born nāgas!” He gives food.... He gives drink.... He gives clothing.... He gives a vehicle.... He gives a garland.... He gives a fragrance.... He gives an unguent.... He gives a bed.... He gives a dwelling.... He gives a lamp.²⁸⁷ Then, with the breakup of the body, after death, he is reborn in the company of egg-born nāgas.

‘This, bhikkhus, is the cause and reason why someone here, with the breakup of the body, after death, is reborn in the company of egg-born nāgas.’

21–50 With the Support of Giving (2–4)

(These three decads each repeat the preceding decad for the other three types of nāgas.) [246]

²⁸⁷ Each gift item is the subject of a separate sutta.

Book IX
Chapter 30
Connected Discourses on Supaṇṇas
(Supaṇṇa-samyutta)

1 Simple Version

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these four modes of generation of supaṇṇas. What four? Supaṇṇas born from eggs, supaṇṇas born from the womb, supaṇṇas born from moisture, supaṇṇas of spontaneous birth. These are the four modes of generation of supaṇṇas.’ [247]

2 They Carry Off

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these four modes of generation of supaṇṇas....

‘Therein, bhikkhus, egg-born supaṇṇas carry off only nāgas that are egg-born, not the womb-born, or the moisture-born, or the spontaneously born.²⁸⁸ Womb-born supaṇṇas carry off nāgas that are egg-born and womb-born, but not the moisture-born or the spontaneously born. Moisture-born supaṇṇas carry off nāgas that are egg-born, womb-born, and moisture-born, but not the spontaneously born. Spontaneously born supaṇṇas carry off nāgas that are egg-born, womb-born, moisture-born, and spontaneously born.

‘These, bhikkhus, are the four modes of generation of supaṇṇas.’

3 Ambivalent (1)

Setting at Sāvattthī.... Sitting to one side, that bhikkhu said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, what is the cause and reason why someone here, with the breakup of the body, after death, is reborn in the company of egg-born supaṇṇas?’

‘Here, bhikkhu, someone acts ambivalently with the body, ambivalently with speech, ambivalently with the mind. He has heard: “Egg-born supaṇṇas are long-lived, beautiful, and abound in happiness.” He thinks: “Oh, with the breakup of the body, after death, may I be reborn in the company of egg-born supaṇṇas!” Then, with the breakup of the body, after death, he is reborn in the company of egg-born supaṇṇas.

‘This, bhikkhus, is the cause and reason why someone here, with the breakup of the body, after death, is reborn in the company of egg-born supaṇṇas.’

4–6 Ambivalent (2–4)

(The same is repeated for the other three types of supaṇṇas.) [248]

7–16 With the Support of Giving (1)

Sitting to one side, that bhikkhu said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, what is the cause and reason why someone here, with the breakup of the body, after death, is reborn in the company of egg-born supaṇṇas?’

‘Here, bhikkhu, someone acts ambivalently with the body, ambivalently with speech, ambivalently with the mind. He has heard: “Egg-born supaṇṇas are long-lived, beautiful, and abound in happiness.” He thinks: “Oh, with the breakup of the body, after death, may I be reborn in the company of egg-born supaṇṇas!” He gives food.... He gives drink.... He gives clothing.... He gives a vehicle.... He gives a garland.... He gives a fragrance.... He gives an unguent.... He gives a bed.... He gives a dwelling.... He gives a lamp. Then, with the breakup of the body, after death, he is reborn in the company of egg-born supaṇṇas.

‘This, bhikkhus, is the cause and reason why someone here, with the breakup of the body, after death, is reborn in the company of egg-born supaṇṇas.’

17–46 With the Support of Giving (2–4)

(These three decads each repeat the preceding decad for the other three types of supaṇṇas.) [249]

²⁸⁸ Supaṇṇas of a given class are able to carry off only nāgas that are of an inferior or equal class but not their superiors.

Book X
Chapter 31
Connected Discourses on Gandhabbas
(Gandhabba-samyutta)

1 Simple Version

Setting at Sāvattḥī. [250] ‘Bhikkhus, I will teach you about the devas of the gandhabba order. Listen to that....

‘And what, bhikkhus, are the devas of the gandhabba order? There are, bhikkhus, devas dwelling in fragrant roots:²⁸⁹ there are devas dwelling in fragrant heartwood: there are devas dwelling in fragrant softwood: there are devas dwelling in fragrant bark: there are devas dwelling in fragrant shoots: there are devas dwelling in fragrant leaves: there are devas dwelling in fragrant flowers: there are devas dwelling in fragrant fruits: there are devas dwelling in fragrant sap: there are devas dwelling in fragrant scents.

‘These, bhikkhus, are called the devas of the gandhabba order.’

2 Good Conduct

Setting at Sāvattḥī.... Sitting to one side, that bhikkhu said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, what is the cause and reason why someone here, with the breakup of the body, after death, is reborn in the company of the devas of the gandhabba order?’

‘Here, bhikkhu, someone practises good conduct with the body, good conduct with speech, good conduct with the mind.²⁹⁰ He has heard: “The devas of the gandhabba order are long-lived, beautiful, and abound in happiness.” He thinks: “Oh, with the breakup of the body, after death, may I be reborn in the company of the devas of the gandhabba order!” Then, with the breakup of the body, after death, he is reborn in the company of the devas of the gandhabba order.

‘This, bhikkhus, is the cause and reason why someone here, with the breakup of the body, after death, is reborn in the company of the devas of the gandhabba order.’

3 Giver (1)

Setting at Sāvattḥī.... Sitting to one side, that bhikkhu [251] said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, what is the cause and reason why someone here, with the breakup of the body, after death, is reborn in the company of the devas who dwell in fragrant roots?’

‘Here, bhikkhu, someone practises good conduct with the body, good conduct with speech, good conduct with the mind. He has heard: “The devas who dwell in fragrant roots are long-lived, beautiful, and abound in happiness.” He thinks: “Oh, with the breakup of the body, after death, may I be reborn in the company of the devas who dwell in fragrant roots!” He becomes a giver of fragrant roots. Then, with the breakup of the body, after death, he is reborn in the company of the devas who dwell in fragrant roots.

‘This, bhikkhus, is the cause and reason why someone here, with the breakup of the body, after death, is reborn in the company of the devas who dwell in fragrant roots.’

4–12 Giver (2–10)

(The same paradigm is repeated for each of the other groups of gandhabbas—those who dwell in fragrant heartwood, etc.—as enumerated in §1, each the giver of the corresponding type of gift.) [252]

13–22 With the Support of Giving (1)

(Repeat §3 down to the aspiration:)

‘He thinks: “Oh, with the breakup of the body, after death, may I be reborn in the company of the devas who dwell in fragrant roots!” He gives food ... He gives drink.... He gives clothing.... He gives a vehicle.... He gives a garland.... He gives a fragrance.... He gives an unguent.... He gives a bed.... He gives a dwelling.... He gives a lamp. Then, with the breakup of the body, after death, he is reborn in the company of the devas who dwell in fragrant roots.

²⁸⁹ The gandhabbas are associated with fragrant substances, no doubt because the word is based on the stem *gandha*, meaning scent. SA: Those dwelling in fragrant roots are born with the support of a tree whose roots are fragrant, but the entire tree is available to them as a dwelling place. The same for the other types.

On the Vedic origins of the Buddhist conception of the gandhabbas, see Wijesekera, ‘Vedic Gandharva and Pāli Gandhabba,’ in *Buddhist and Vedic Studies*, esp. pp.191–93.

²⁹⁰ Rebirth as a gandhabba is considered favourable and is thus the direct result of good conduct, unlike rebirth as a nāga or supanna, which is of mixed status and thus the result of ambivalent kamma.

‘This, bhikkhus, is the cause and reason why someone here, with the breakup of the body, after death, is reborn in the company of the devas who dwell in fragrant roots.’ [253]

23–112 With the Support of Giving (2)

(Repeat the paradigm of §§13–22 for each of the other types of gandhabbas, those who dwell in fragrant heartwood, etc.)

Book XI
Chapter 32
Connected Discourses on Cloud Devas
(Valāhaka-samyutta)

1 Simple Version

[254] Setting at Sāvattihī. ‘Bhikkhus, I will teach you about the devas of the cloud-dwelling order. Listen to that....’

‘And what, bhikkhus, are the devas of the cloud-dwelling order?’²⁹¹ There are, bhikkhus, cool-cloud devas: there are warm-cloud devas: there are storm-cloud devas: there are wind-cloud devas: there are rain-cloud devas. ‘These, bhikkhus, are called the devas of the cloud-dwelling order.’

2 Good Conduct

(Identical with 31:2, except that it concerns rebirth in the company of the devas of the cloud-dwelling order.)

3–12 With the Support of Giving (1)

*(These suttas are modelled on 31:13–22, but in regard to rebirth in the company of the cool-cloud devas.)*²⁹²[255]

13–52 With the Support of Giving (2)

(These suttas repeat the paradigm in regard to rebirth among the other types of cloud-dwelling devas.) [256]

53 Cool-cloud Devas

Setting at Sāvattihī.... Sitting to one side, that bhikkhu said to the Blessed One: ‘Venerable sir, what is the cause and reason why it sometimes becomes cool?’

‘There are, bhikkhu, (beings) called cool-cloud devas. When it occurs to them, “Let us revel in our own kind of delight,”²⁹³ then, in accordance with their wish, it becomes cool. This, bhikkhu, is the cause and reason why it sometimes becomes cool.’

54 Warm-cloud Devas

... ‘Venerable sir, what is the cause and reason why it sometimes becomes warm?’

‘There are, bhikkhu, (beings) called warm-cloud devas. When it occurs to them, “Let us revel in our own kind of delight,” then, in accordance with their wish, it becomes warm. This, bhikkhu, is the cause and reason why it sometimes becomes warm.’

55 Storm-cloud Devas

... ‘Venerable sir, what is the cause and reason why it sometimes becomes stormy?’

‘There are, bhikkhu, (beings) called storm-cloud devas. When it occurs to them, “Let us revel in our own kind of delight,” then, in accordance with their wish, it becomes stormy. This, bhikkhu, is the cause and reason why it sometimes becomes stormy.’

56 Wind-cloud Devas

... ‘Venerable sir, what is the cause and reason why it sometimes becomes windy?’

‘There are, bhikkhu, (beings) called wind-cloud devas. [257] When it occurs to them, “Let us revel in our own kind of delight,” then, in accordance with their wish, it becomes windy. This, bhikkhu, is the cause and reason why it sometimes becomes windy.’

²⁹¹ SA: These are devas living in space who have arisen in the company of the devas called the cloud dwellers.

²⁹² The numbering of suttas in Ee has gone awry here, both in text and translation.

²⁹³ I follow Ce and Ee: *Yaṃ nūna mayaṃ sakāya ratiyā rameyyāma*. Be reads the verb as *vaseyyāma*. SA explains that cool weather during the rainy season or winter is a natural coolness caused by the change of seasons, but when it becomes extremely cold during the cool season, or cold during the summer, that is caused by the power of these devas. Similar explanations are given for the other cases.

56 Rain-cloud Devas

... ‘Venerable sir, what is the cause and reason why it sometimes rains?’

‘There are, bhikkhu, (beings) called rain-cloud devas. When it occurs to them, “Let us revel in our own kind of delight,” then, in accordance with their wish, it rains. This, bhikkhu, is the cause and reason why it sometimes rains.’

Book XII

Chapter 33

Connected Discourses with Vacchagotta

(*Vacchagotta-samyutta*)

1 Because of Not Knowing (1)

Setting at Sāvattthī. Then the wanderer Vacchagotta approached the Blessed One and exchanged greetings with him.²⁹⁴ When they had concluded their greetings and cordial talk, he sat down to one side and said to him: [258]

‘Master Gotama, what is the cause and reason why these various speculative views arise in the world: “The world is eternal” or “The world is not eternal”: or “The world is finite” or “The world is infinite”: or “The soul and the body are the same” or “The soul is one thing, the body is another”: or “The Tathāgata exists after death,” or “The Tathāgata does not exist after death,” or “The Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death,” or “The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death”?’

‘It is, Vaccha, because of not knowing form, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation that those various speculative views arise in the world: “The world is eternal” ... or “The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death.” This, Vaccha, is the cause and reason why those various speculative views arise in the world.’²⁹⁵

2 Because of Not Knowing (2)

Setting at Sāvattthī....

‘It is, Vaccha, because of not knowing feeling, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation that those various speculative views arise in the world: “The world is eternal” ... or “The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death.” This, Vaccha, is the cause and reason why those various speculative views arise in the world.’

3 Because of Not Knowing (3)

[259] ... ‘It is, Vaccha, because of not knowing perception, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation that those various speculative views arise in the world....’

4 Because of Not Knowing (4)

... ‘It is, Vaccha, because of not knowing volitional constructions, their origin, their cessation, and the way leading to their cessation that those various speculative views arise in the world....’

5 Because of Not Knowing (5)

[260] ... ‘It is, Vaccha, because of not knowing consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation that those various speculative views arise in the world....’

6–10 Because of Not Seeing

... ‘It is, Vaccha, because of not seeing form ... not seeing feeling ... not seeing perception ... not seeing volitional constructions ... not seeing consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation that those various speculative views arise in the world....’²⁹⁶

11–15 Because of Not Breaking Through

... ‘It is, Vaccha, because of not breaking through form ... not breaking through feeling ... not breaking through perception ... not breaking through volitional constructions ... not breaking through consciousness, its

²⁹⁴ Vacchagotta appears as the inquirer in three suttas in MN, Nos. 71, 72, and 73. In the third he becomes a monk and attains arahantship. In SN he reappears in 44:7–11, again with questions about the undeclared points.

²⁹⁵ This sutta, and those to follow, apply the framework of the four noble truths to each of the five aggregates. Since non-knowledge of the four truths (*dukkhe aññānaṃ*, etc.) is ignorance (*avijjā*; see 12:2; II 4, 11–14), these suttas collectively establish that ignorance (i.e., non-knowledge) is the underlying cause of the ten speculative views. SA says that in this *samyutta* there are eleven suttas with a total of fifty-five explanations, but I have followed the printed editions, which count each explanation as a separate sutta.

²⁹⁶ SA explains each of the causes as a synonym of not knowing. The Pāli ablatives are: *adassanā*, *anabhisamayā*, *ananubodhā*, *appaṭivedhā*, *asallakkhaṇā*, *anupalakkhaṇā*, *apaccupalakkhaṇā*, *asamapekkhaṇā*, *appaccupekkhaṇā*, *apaccakkhakammā*.

origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation that those various speculative views arise in the world....' [261]

16–20 Because of Not Comprehending

(The same, but read 'not comprehending form,' etc.)

21–25 Because of Not Penetrating

26–30 Because of Not Discerning

31–35 Because of Not Discriminating

36–40 Because of Not Differentiating

41–45 Because of Not Scrutinizing

[262]

46–50 Because of Not Closely Examining

51–55 Because of Not Directly Cognizing

... 'It is, Vaccha, because of not directly cognizing form ... feeling ... perception ... volitional constructions ... consciousness, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation that those various speculative views arise in the world: [263] "The world is eternal" ... or "The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death." This, Vaccha, is the cause and reason why those various speculative views arise in the world: "The world is eternal" or "The world is not eternal": or "The world is finite" or "The world is infinite": or "The soul and the body are the same" or "The soul is one thing, the body is another": or "The Tathāgata exists after death," or "The Tathāgata does not exist after death," or "The Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death," or "The Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death."

Book XIII
Chapter 34
Connected Discourses on Meditation
*(Jhāna-saṃyutta)*²⁹⁷

1 Attainment Rooted in Concentration

Setting at Sāvattḥī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of meditators. What four? [264]

‘Here, bhikkhus, a meditator is skilled in concentration in regard to concentration but is not skilled in attainment in regard to concentration.’²⁹⁸

‘Here a meditator is skilled in attainment in regard to concentration but is not skilled in concentration in regard to concentration.

‘Here a meditator is skilled neither in concentration in regard to concentration nor in attainment in regard to concentration.

‘Here a meditator is skilled both in concentration in regard to concentration and in attainment in regard to concentration.

‘Therein, bhikkhus, the meditator who is skilled both in concentration in regard to concentration and in attainment in regard to concentration is the chief, the best, the foremost, the highest, the most excellent of these four kinds of meditators.

‘Just as, bhikkhus, from a cow comes milk, from milk comes cream, from cream comes butter, from butter comes ghee, and from ghee comes cream-of-ghee,²⁹⁹ which is reckoned the best of all these, so too, the meditator who is skilled both in concentration in regard to concentration and in attainment in regard to concentration is the chief, the best, the foremost, the highest, the most excellent of these four kinds of meditators.’

2 Maintenance Rooted in Concentration

Setting at Sāvattḥī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of meditators. What four?’

‘Here, bhikkhus, a meditator is skilled in concentration in regard to concentration but is not skilled in maintenance in regard to concentration.’³⁰⁰

‘Here a meditator is skilled in maintenance in regard to concentration but is not skilled in concentration in regard to concentration.

‘Here a meditator is skilled neither in concentration in regard to concentration nor in maintenance in regard to concentration.

‘Here a meditator is skilled both in concentration in regard to concentration and in maintenance in regard to concentration.

‘Therein, bhikkhus, the meditator who is skilled both in concentration in regard to concentration and in maintenance in regard to concentration [265] is the chief, the best, the foremost, the supreme, the most excellent of these four kinds of meditators.

‘Just as, bhikkhus, from a cow comes milk ... and from ghee comes cream of ghee, which is reckoned the best of all these, so too, the meditator who is skilled both in concentration and in maintenance ... is the most excellent of these four kinds of meditators.’

²⁹⁷ Jhāna-saṃyutta is also the title of SN 53, which concerns the four jhānas as meditative attainments. Since the present saṃyutta focuses on *the process* of meditation rather than on the results, I have translated the title accordingly. SA states that this entire Jhāna-saṃyutta is discussed by way of mundane jhāna.

²⁹⁸ SA: *Skilled in concentration (samādhikusala)*: skilled in determining the factors thus, ‘The first jhāna has five factors, the second three factors,’ etc. *But not skilled in attainment in concentration (na samādhismim samāpattikusala)*: though he makes the mind pliant by gladdening it [ST: by removing the opposed states and collecting the cooperative causes], he is unable to attain the jhāna.

I doubt that this explanation captures the intended meaning and think it more likely that lack of skill in attainment is synonymous with lack of the ‘mastery in attainment’ (*samāpattivāsī*) described at Paṭi I 100 thus: ‘He attains the first jhāna (etc.) where, when, and for as long as he wishes; he has no difficulty in attaining.’

²⁹⁹ *Sappimaṇḍa*. See II,n.64.

³⁰⁰ *Na samādhismim ṭhītikusalo*. SA: Not skilled in steadying the jhāna, unable to steady the jhāna for a mere seven or eight fingersnaps.

This skill may correspond to the ‘mastery in determination’ (*adhiṭṭhānavasī*) described at Paṭi I 100: ‘He determines (the duration of) the first jhāna (etc.) where, when, and for as long as he wishes; he has no difficulty in determining (the duration).’

3 Emergence Rooted in Concentration

(The same, but for ‘skilled in maintenance’ read ‘skilled in emergence.’)³⁰¹

4 Pliancy Rooted in Concentration

(The same, but read ‘skilled in pliancy.’)³⁰² [266]

5 The Object Rooted in Concentration

(The same, but read ‘skilled in the object.’)³⁰³

6 The Range Rooted in Concentration

(The same, but read ‘skilled in the range.’)³⁰⁴ [267]

7 Resolution Rooted in Concentration

(The same, but read ‘skilled in resolution.’)³⁰⁵

8 Thoroughness Rooted in Concentration

(The same, but read ‘a thorough worker in regard to concentration.’)³⁰⁶ [268]

9 Persistence Rooted in Concentration

(The same, but read ‘a persistent worker in regard to concentration.’)³⁰⁷

10 Suitability Rooted in Concentration

(The same, but read ‘one who does what is suitable in regard to concentration.’)³⁰⁸ [269]

11 Continuance Rooted in Attainment

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of meditators. What four?’

‘Here, bhikkhus, a meditator is skilled in attainment in regard to concentration but is not skilled in maintenance in regard to concentration.’

‘Here a meditator is skilled in maintenance in regard to concentration but is not skilled in attainment in regard to concentration.’

‘Here a meditator is skilled neither in attainment in regard to concentration nor in maintenance in regard to concentration.’

‘Here a meditator is skilled both in attainment in regard to concentration and in maintenance in regard to concentration.’

‘Therein, bhikkhus, the meditator who is skilled both in attainment in regard to concentration and in maintenance in regard to concentration is the chief, the best, the foremost, the highest, the most excellent of these four kinds of meditators.’

‘Just as, bhikkhus, from a cow comes milk ... and from ghee comes cream-of-ghee, which is reckoned the best of all these, so too, the meditator who is skilled both in attainment and maintenance ... is the most excellent of these four kinds of meditators.’

³⁰¹ *Na vuṭṭhānakusalo*. SA: Unable to emerge from the jhāna at the predetermined time. See the definition of ‘mastery in emergence’ (*vuṭṭhānavasī*) at Paṭis I 100, parallel to the definitions of the previous two masteries.

³⁰² *Na kallitakusalo*. SA: Unskilled in making the mind pliant by gladdening it.

³⁰³ *Na ārammaṇakusalo*. SA: Unskilled in the *kaṣiṇa* object.

³⁰⁴ *Na gocarakusalo*. SA: Unskilled in the range of the meditation subject [ST: in the range of the concentration to be produced, in the place of its occurrence known as the meditation subject], and unskilled in the range of the alms round [ST: owing to lack of mindfulness and clear comprehension].

³⁰⁵ *Na abhinīhāraṅkusalo*. ST: Unskilled in resolving to elevate the meditation subject so that it partakes of distinction (*kammaṭṭhānaṃ viśesabhāgiyatāya abhinīharitum akusalo*). This means being unable to raise it from the first jhāna to the second, from the second to the third, etc.

³⁰⁶ *Na sakkaccakārī*.

³⁰⁷ *Na sātaccakārī*.

³⁰⁸ *Na sappāyakārī*. SA: He is unable to fulfil the qualities that are helpful, suitable, for concentration.

12 Emergence Rooted in Attainment

(*The same, but for 'skilled in maintenance in regard to concentration' read 'skilled in emergence in regard to concentration.'*) [270]

13 Pliancy Rooted in Attainment

(*The same, but read 'skilled in pliancy.'*)

14 The Object Rooted in Attainment

(*The same, but read 'skilled in the object.'*)

15 The Objective Range Rooted in Attainment

(*The same, but read 'skilled in the range.'*) [271]

16 Resolution Rooted in Attainment

(*The same, but read 'skilled in resolution.'*)

17 Thoroughness Rooted in Attainment

(*The same, but read 'a thorough worker in regard to concentration.'*)

18 Persistence Rooted in Attainment

(*The same, but read 'a persistent worker in regard to concentration.'*)

19 Suitability Rooted in Attainment

(*The same, but read 'one who does what is suitable in regard to concentration.'*) [272]

20 Emergence Rooted in Continuance

Setting at Sāvattthī. 'Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of meditators. What four?

'Here, bhikkhus, a meditator is skilled in maintenance in regard to concentration but is not skilled in emergence in regard to concentration.

'Here a meditator is skilled in emergence in regard to concentration but is not skilled in maintenance in regard to concentration.

'Here a meditator is skilled neither in maintenance in regard to concentration nor in emergence in regard to concentration.

'Here a meditator is skilled both in maintenance in regard to concentration and in emergence in regard to concentration.

'Therein, bhikkhus, the meditator who is skilled both in maintenance in regard to concentration and in emergence in regard to concentration is the chief ... the most excellent of these four kinds of meditators.' [273]

21–27 Pliancy Rooted In Continuance, Etc.

(*These seven suttas are modelled on the preceding one, but 'emergence' is replaced by the seven terms from 'pliancy' through 'one who does what is suitable,' as in §§13–19.*)

28 Pliancy Rooted in Emergence

Setting at Sāvattthī. 'Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of meditators. What four?

'Here, bhikkhus, a meditator is skilled in emergence in regard to concentration but is not skilled in pliancy ... [274] ... skilled in pliancy in regard to concentration but is not skilled in emergence ... skilled neither in emergence in regard to concentration nor in pliancy ... skilled both in emergence in regard to concentration and in pliancy in regard to concentration.

'Therein, bhikkhus, the meditator who is skilled both in emergence in regard to concentration and in pliancy in regard to concentration is the chief ... the most excellent of these four kinds of meditators.'

29–34 The Object Rooted in Emergence, Etc.

(*These six suttas are modelled on the preceding one, but 'pliancy' is replaced by the six terms from 'the object' through 'one who does what is suitable.'*) [275]

35 The Object Rooted in Pliancy

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of meditators. What four?’

‘Here, bhikkhus, a meditator is skilled in pliancy in regard to concentration but is not skilled in the object ... skilled in the object in regard to concentration but is not skilled in pliancy ... skilled neither in pliancy in regard to concentration nor in the object ... skilled both in pliancy in regard to concentration and in the object in regard to concentration.

‘Therein, bhikkhus, the meditator who is skilled both in pliancy in regard to concentration and in the object in regard to concentration is the chief ... the most excellent of these four kinds of meditators.’

36–40 The Objective Range Rooted in Pliancy, Etc.

(These five suttas are modelled on the preceding one, but ‘the object’ is replaced by the five terms from ‘the range’ through ‘one who does what is suitable.’)

41 The Objective Range Rooted in the Object

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of meditators. What four?’

‘Here, bhikkhus, a meditator is skilled in the object in regard to concentration but is not skilled in the range ... skilled in the range in regard to concentration but is not skilled in the object ... skilled neither in the object in regard to concentration nor in the range ... skilled both in the object in regard to concentration and in the range in regard to concentration.

‘Therein, bhikkhus, the meditator who is skilled both in the object in regard to concentration and in the range in regard to concentration is the chief ... the most excellent of these four kinds of meditators.’ [276]

42–45 Resolution Rooted in the Object, Etc.

(These four suttas are modelled on the preceding one, but ‘the range’ is replaced by the four terms from ‘resolution’ through ‘one who does what is suitable.’)

46 Resolution Rooted in the Objective Range

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of meditators. What four?’

‘Here, bhikkhus, a meditator is skilled in the range in regard to concentration but is not skilled in resolution ... skilled in resolution in regard to concentration but is not skilled in the range ... skilled neither in the range in regard to concentration nor in resolution ... skilled both in the range in regard to concentration and in resolution in regard to concentration.

‘Therein, bhikkhus, the meditator who is skilled both in the range in regard to concentration and in resolution in regard to concentration is the chief ... the most excellent of these four kinds of meditators.’

47–49 Thoroughness Rooted in the Objective Range, Etc.

(These three suttas are modelled on the preceding one, but ‘resolution’ is replaced by the three terms: ‘a thorough worker in regard to concentration,’ ‘a persistent worker in regard to concentration,’ and ‘one who does what is suitable in regard to concentration.’)

50 Thoroughness Rooted in Resolution

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of meditators. What four?’

‘Here, bhikkhus, a meditator is skilled in resolution in regard to concentration [277] but is not a thorough worker ... a thorough worker in regard to concentration but is not skilled in resolution ... neither skilled in resolution in regard to concentration nor a thorough worker ... both skilled in resolution in regard to concentration and a thorough worker in regard to concentration.

‘Therein, bhikkhus, the meditator who is both skilled in resolution in regard to concentration and a thorough worker in regard to concentration is the chief ... the most excellent of these four kinds of meditators.’

51–52 Thoroughness Rooted in the Objective Range, Etc.

(These two suttas are modelled on the preceding one, but ‘a thorough worker in regard to concentration’ is replaced by the two terms: ‘a persistent worker in regard to concentration’ and ‘one who does what is suitable in regard to concentration.’)

53 Persistence Rooted in Thoroughness

Setting at Sāvathī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of meditators. What four?’

‘Here, bhikkhus, a meditator is a thorough worker in regard to concentration but not a persistent worker ... a persistent worker in regard to concentration but not a thorough worker ... neither a thorough worker in regard to concentration nor a persistent worker ... both a thorough worker in regard to concentration and a persistent worker in regard to concentration.

‘Therein, bhikkhus, the meditator who is both a thorough worker in regard to concentration and a persistent worker in regard to concentration is the chief ... the most excellent of these four kinds of meditators.’

54 Suitability Rooted in Thoroughness

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of meditators. What four?’

‘Here, bhikkhus, a meditator is a thorough worker in regard to concentration but not one who does what is suitable....’

55 Suitability Rooted in Persistence

Setting at Sāvattthī. ‘Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of meditators. What four?’

‘Here, bhikkhus, a meditator is a persistent worker in regard to concentration but not one who does what is suitable ... one who does what is suitable in regard to concentration but not a persistent worker ... neither a persistent worker in regard to concentration nor one who does what is suitable ... [278] both a persistent worker in regard to concentration and one who does what is suitable in regard to concentration.

‘Therein, bhikkhus, the meditator who is both a persistent worker in regard to concentration and one who does what is suitable in regard to concentration is the chief, the best, the foremost, the highest, the most excellent of these four kinds of meditators.

‘Just as, bhikkhus, from a cow comes milk, from milk comes cream, from cream butter, from butter ghee, and from ghee comes cream-of-ghee, which is reckoned the best of all these, so too, the meditator who is both a persistent worker in regard to concentration and one who does what is suitable in regard to concentration is the chief, the best, the foremost, the highest, the most excellent of these four kinds of meditators.’